Will the new route or the new (single) CEO last longer?

I still can't believe the stubborn naiveness of this airline (which had the advantage to clean up its stable after their 2002 bankruptcy) to have this unsurmountable desire to repeat the same errors all other airlines (including its own) have already made...

I had posted about this before: but starting a new I/C flight (with a new premium C product) on a route with 3 (struggling) competitors on it, in order to capture low yield African transfer traffic ex JFK is a mix for disaster at a moment where so many other airlines can't run fast enough to axe those foreseeably loss-making routes.

It was pathetic to see on Belgian TV, how inaugural (experienced) flight attendants [who's hairdo and make-up look as if they already had worked the inaugural flight of Sabena to JFK -- back in the days] where so "enthusiastic" to be on this flight and were only regretting that their ex-Sabena colleagues didn't have the opportunity to be with them on board. They didn't seem enthusiastic to "serve their clients" or anything like that. As usual on Belgian state TV, after the trade union representatives, the CEO was allowed to impart his recently acquired strategic insight on airline management: after we failed to get our Brussels non-stop routes to Europe and Africa profitable on their own, it's very clear: we are now embarking on building a "hub" to connect the US to Africa and Europe.

I'm intrigued: should the report examining the reasons of Sabena's demise not have been the #1 compulsory literature for a to-be-CEO, who joins an airline as a consultant without prior sector experience? Here are the links:

http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/50/1514/50K1514003.pdf

and in more digestable form:

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...366278,00.html


It's not too late for Lufthansa to stop the amateurism!