While very true, there's a growing chorus of analysts who believe that part of AA's recent financial troubles (in addition to its higher labor costs) are due to its relatively smaller schedule to non-LHR European destinations, the absense of AA metal to several Asian destinations and perhaps its smaller size in NYC (compared to both UA and DL).

Someone above posted about the failure to buy NW; in 2000, prior to AA's announcement of the TWA asset purchase, Carty and NW talked about an AA acquisition but NW management wanted about double the then market value - and AA said "no thanks" (probably wisely).

USA-Japan is now open skies and it appears that the fifth freedoms enjoyed by UA and NW (now DL) are no longer exclusive to those two airlines - AA's ability to fly its own fifth freedom flights is limited only by slots at NRT. But as discussed ad nauseum, why must AA metal fly (and duplicate) JAL's existing network of intra-Asia flights? Delta has to keep its intra-Asia flights as it was unable to lure JAL away from Oneworld. UA, on the other hand, flies very few intra-Asia flights and now relies on its joint venture partner, NH, for much of its connectivity.

It's certainly true that AA and JAL combined carry less traffic to/from Tokyo than either UA or DL. I assume that AA intends to remedy some of that disparity once it acquires new widebodies (77Ws or 789s (more likely).