Originally Posted by
travisc
Hybrid cards are no less secure than magstrip cards.
Nonsense. The hybrid cards
inherit all the same vulnerabilities,
plus they bring new vulnerabilities. The sum of two sets of vulnerabilities is obviously greater than each of the parts.
Originally Posted by
travisc
In countries that mandate chip support (EU/UK), they provide greater security as the chip aspect significantly decreases the chance the transaction was conducted using the actual card (not a clone).
Nonsense. The hybrid cards still have a magstripe, and they are still skimmed (even in chip-only terminals!). In fact, skimming still happens
in europe because there are still terminals that mechanically slide the whole card just to get the chip to the reader (which means the magstripe can still move over a maliciously installed magnetic read head).
From there, the illicitly obtained data can be used anywhere in the world, not just Europe. I know a European who was recently questioned at a police station because her chip and pin card was "used in Nigeria". Despite Nigeria being a typical hot spot for fraud, she was forced to prove that she did not make the transaction (because like you, many erroneously believe the addition of a chip makes the card infallible). She actually had to supply proof of where she was at the time to get off the hook.
Originally Posted by
travisc
Once all cards are hybrids, and all terminals accept EMV/Chips, we can remove magstrips and everything becomes a lot more secure. No more cloning cards. This is a very long process, but it will pay off in the end.
Sure, but now you're talking a different card. After 20 years of EMV chips, Europeans are
still today using hybrid cards. Europeans still want to be able to travel the third worlds and remote tropical islands without cash, so the magstripe still has utility for world travelers.
You're not only more vulnerable technologically with a hybrid card, you're also less safe legally (because you give up the otherwise legal advantage of the banks difficulty in proving that a fraudulent sig matches the card holders in cases of PIN forgery).