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Old Feb 17, 11, 8:47 pm
  #5  
Mimi111
 
Join Date: Jan 2011
Posts: 331
Originally Posted by idriveuride View Post
With the recent extremely sad events in Moscow we should pause and support security initiatives of our nation.

We forget that events such as these have happened MANY times throughout the world .. Rome, Vienna, Madrid, Glasgow immediately come to mind. Yet it remains shocking as it is "over there", not here.

We should be proactive (versus reactive) and develop a broader and stronger perimeter strategy to protect our airports and both domestic travelers and visitors to our nation.

Let the flaming begin; but, there needs to be a more focused approach to our security. Security must balance, not take a back seat, to convenience. Yes, travel is a business and the fiscal interest of air carriers, airports, vendors, passengers and business should be accountable; but, we need to learn from history. Incidents cost $$$$ millions and get on CNN, which is why there will always be incidents.

Recent events remind me how we were so "shocked" about 9/11 hijackings and flat out forgot that just 10-20 years earlier hijackings and bombings happened just about every week. Yet, security remains reactive.

I remember back in the mid-90's working front line at airports and refusing to transport the work materials of several construction company employees and tradesmith. Eventually it was brought to my attention that it was acceptable to transport accelerants, torches, bits and get this . . . box cutters as carry on.

I was simply amazed as just 10 years earlier, while a Flight Attendant at TWA, if we saw a loose screw in the lav during a pre-flight inspection, the entire plane was stripped apart. I was in ATH on the 747SP when our 727 From FCO enroute to ATH was bombed.

We get complacent and elements of society will continue to capitalize on this.

Immediate "simple" efforts that TSA should put in place:

1. Separating checkpoints to eliminate cross over over baggage and screening. Passengers should accompany their own luggage and be within a dedicated team of screener.

2. Install a wall at the checkpoints so that passengers in line cannot see the actual screening process (like FRA and parts of AMS), this reduces the ability to "scout", establish patterns and track/identify employees. This also increase the ability of screener to focus on the people in their zone.

3. Similar to #1, screening should be compartmentalized to teams. One line is walled/separated from the next and isolated so that the 3 (only 3) TSA personnel can focus on the passengers in their "zone". Any more that 3 agents only serves to distract the process. In addition, the person who is assigned to read the imaging technology should be better isolated to reduce distraction and eliminate identification.

4. Eliminate "socializing" on the clock. The chatter that goes on at the screening checkpoints would bot be tolerated in any workplace and distracts from the mission. I have been through dozens of checkpoints where it was more like hazing at a frat house that securing our airports and country.

5. Place "roaming" agents in the terminal building. Extend the security presence beyond the checkpoint where the exposure to challenge or breach could be as small as 30-60 seconds. Being that we currently had 20 agents running 2-3 checkpoints, these procedures could effectively be operated with existing resources.

Expanded presence tom the point a person enters the terminal, adoption of broader training and identification methods. This will not eliminate challenges; but, it would substantially reduce them. Randomly screen, help with directions, be proactive, positive and AWARE.

Likely the single strongest element to secure of airports will have the greatest resistence, limit carry on luggage. Mandating one carry-on would make the greatest single impact to security.

Further efforts should address the security of our terminals and discussion of bringing security to the door should begin in earnest. Sterile terminals should have been a project 2000, not a project 2020.

It is WAY too easy to breach our present system. Combine this with our mentality to eventually develop complacency and further erode efforts as they become inconvenient and you begin to see the nexus of a new 9/11.

Not being a killjoy . . . just reflecting on the pattern of history.

Most, if not everyone, reading this likely complains about shoes, laptops, sweaters, water bottles and all the procedures currently in place without taking pause that the clock is ticking toward the next "CNN" moment.
Until those doing the screening (and everyone in their management chain) are at all times:
- of the highest caliber,
- highly qualified and proof of said qualifications produced,
- trainable and properly trained on an ongoing basis,
- tested regularly and required to pass,
- held accountable for what they do and doing what they shouldn't,
- are trustworthy and can be trusted,
- are not criminals or those with criminal leanings,
- are not susceptible to bribe or threat,
- are required to be professionals who act in a professional manner at all times

And until:
- everyone entering the sterile area is ALWAYS screened in the same fashion as passengers
- there is a zero tolerance for any rule breaking, law breaking, etc,

what you suggest is not only not possible without abuse but it is also pointless. On second thought, they will probably try and it will be an even bigger fiasco than what is happening now.

Last edited by Mimi111; Feb 18, 11 at 12:04 pm
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