Countering someone's
claim that the electronic strip-search machines cannot save images, I found a
2009 letter from John Verdi and Courtney Barclay of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to TSA's FOIA officer. In that letter, they wrote:
Rapiscan's Secure 1000 scanner is certified by DHS for homeland security. This technology allows operators to save images from the scanner on the system's hard disk or on an external disk `for training and legal documentation.' The stored images can be recalled and viewed on the system monitory or on any IBM compatible personal computer with color graphics.
The applicable footnote in their letter reads, "Backscatter, Rapiscan Secure 1000, FAQ, http://rapiscansystems.com/sec1000faqs.html#10". That
FAQ page still lists "Q: Can the Secure 1000 images be saved?", but later in the page, that question and its answer no longer exist. Fortunately, the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine has a
cache of it, which shows the answer to which
EPIC referred:
Q: Can the Secure 1000 images be saved?
A: Saving images can be disabled completely. If saving images is enabled then the images acquired with the system can be saved on the system's hard disk or transferred to floppy disk for training and legal documentation. The stored images can be recalled and viewed on the system monitor or on any IBM compatible personal computer with color graphics.
In a
February, 2010, letter from Gail D. Rossides, Acting Administrator of TSA, to Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Homeland Security, Ms. Rossides wrote:
Thank you for your letter of January 21, 2010, regarding the privacy concerns that the Committee on Homeland Security has raised about the capability of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) to store, print, record, and export images.
[...]
The procurement specifications mentioned in your letter support TSA's statements on AIT.
The specifications state:
- The "systems will prohibit the storage and exporting of passenger images during normal screening operations" (para. 3.1.1.1.2); and
- "During the screening mode, the WBI [whole body imager] shall be prohibited from exporting passenger image data, including via the Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) which is networking of technology. During the test mode, the WBI shall not be capable of conducting passenger screening. The WBI shall prohibit local storage of image data in all modes." (para. 3.1.1.1.2).
[...]
TSA requires AIT machines to have the capability to retain and export imagines only for testing, training. and evaluation purposes. Testing was done at the TSA Systems Integration Facility (TSIF) and the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL). Images used for operator training were also recorded and used at the Threat Mitigation Laboratory (TML), the facility where Transportation Security Officer (TSO) training is developed. All AIT machines are delivered to airports without the capability to store, print, or transmit images, and cannot be modified by the operators. TSOs operating in the airport environment have neither the technical capability nor the authority to change the AIT into test mode.
[...]
AIT has the ability to store' and transmit data; however, the only locations where the functionalities of storage and data transmission are enabled are at the testing and development sites: TSIF, TSL, and TML.
[...]
AITs used for screening operations at airports are not able to store, export, print, or transmit images. All images are deleted from the system after they are reviewed by the remotely-located operator. The image storage functions are disabled by the manufacturer before the devices are placed in an airport and do not have the capability to be activated by the operators.
In her
letter, Ms. Rossides did not describe how a machine is to determine whether it is in operation at one of the "testing locations" (in which case it should save images) or in operation at some other location (in which case it should not save images). Nor did she describe what, if anything, prevents TSA airport staff from gaining the technical capability to re-enable a machine's ability to save images.
In his November 22, 2010, L.A. Times article, "Maker defends airport full-body image scanners," Hugo Martín asks,
"What about the privacy rights concerns? How do we know that body images taken by the machine won't be copied, stored or sent out on the Internet?" then quotes Peter Kant, executive vice president of Rapiscan as responding, "The systems are designed without any capability of storing, saving or otherwise archiving any images or data that are taken from the checkpoint."
I e-mailed both John Verdi and Hugo Martín about this.