As a 1K for 10 consecutive years who has weathered the ups and downs of the program, its a shame to see some of the recent program changes over the past 12 months. In the case of two significant changes in particular, management appeared to be somewhat out of touch with the priorities of some of the very most frequent customers -- and in each case had to backpedal a bit in the face of a very adverse reaction from such passengers:

1) After announcing the replacement of 500 mile upgrades with UDU about this time last year, CR1's were originally to be eliminated. In addition, the PS transcontinental flights were excluded from the UDU system upon its implementation. Only after an extremely adverse reaction from some of UA's most frequent customers -- particularly those who frequently use the PS service for which CR1's became the only way to upgrade (without using miles) -- management decided to restore the CR1 program. Management appeared to have badly miscalculated the value of the CR1 instruments to many of its best customers.

2) In its latest attempt to either eliminate or severely dilute (by a ratio of 7.5 to 1) the CR1 program, management again apparently miscalculated the reaction of its frequent customers by not even giving them a full year's notice of the proposed dilution. After an outpouring of complaints, management quickly decided to extend the existing CR1 earning framework for one additional year. This temporary "fix" -- while the right thing to do -- is really only a band aid as the same issues will arise next year when 1K passengers are again facing the same dramatic dilution of their ability to earn CR1's.

Both episodes are troubling in that management seems to be out of touch with what is important and most valuable to the airline's most frequent and valuable customers. Management should have a much better sense of what keeps this passenger group loyal to UA. The two best means to achieve such understanding is through (i) contact with and substantive feedback from the passengers themselves and (ii) input from the front line emplyees -- both in 1K reservations, the 1K mileage plus service center and at the airports. These employees -- particularly at the supervisor and service director levels have the best understanding of what is most important to the most loyal passengers. They live with and experience the frustrations of these passengers on a daily basis, yet appear not to be regularly consulted by senior management. Management could learn a lot from these valuable front line employees.

Finally, with some of the most recent modifications to the program, management is actually working against its own economic interest in certain respects. For example, the conversion to UDU (from the old 500 mile upgrade system) actually deprives the airline of additional revenue on some routes in particular. For customers like myself who live on one of the coasts and often travel on transcontinentals, we were happy to pay for upgrades (beyond the ones we earned under the old system) for longer flights. By switching to the UDU system, management excluded certain flights like the PS transcontinentals -- most likely because they did not want to give away the enhanced business class seats for free. PS business class is a quality product and I don't blame management for this decision. Rather, I blame them for how it was applied: They easily could have included the PS flights in the current upgrade system but charged a fee (roughly equivalent to the prior cost of upgrading with 500 mile upgrades), prioritized by status just as the UDU system is prioritized. This would have served the dual purposes of (i) allowing passengers who value the PS business class product to upgrade on PS flights without having to use miles (or CR1's which management seems to be focused on eliminating) and (ii) bringing in material additional revenue to the airline from the passengers who value such upgrades and are willing to pay $250 to $300 each way for the ability to travel in comfort on these flights on a space available basis. Management's apparent inability to understand the priorities of the high frequency customer have resulted in passengers' frustration with the difficulty of upgrading the PS flights and the loss of significant revenue by the airline on these routes.

As the United/Continental merger evolves, its time for management to reach out to front line employees and very frequent customers for their input -- before the airline makes any further embarrasing and frustrating mistakes. There is still time to take these perspectives into account in trying to merge the programs without alienating some of the combined airline's most valuable customer base.