Originally Posted by
RichardKenner
I'm not quite sure I'd put it that way. I do think that the risk of most cargo is overstated here. A very large amount of air cargo are shipments between known shippers. If a Boeing plant in Seattle orders a few crates of ball-bearings from a subcontractor in Buffalo, the chances that terrorists would be able to sneak a bomb into that shipment is quite low. Not zero, but low. Significantly lower than the chances of them being able to do so on the person of a passenger.
In my mind, the fundamental difference between cargo and passengers is that it's not considered acceptable (for a number of reasons) to divide passengers into categories based on risk. But it is for cargo (e.g., the example above). So a methodology that concentrates mostly on the higher-risk cargo seems appropriate to me: it doesn't bother me that much that we don't screen 100% of all cargo.
I understand what you're saying, but why the two sets of assumptions for cargo vs. people? With people, the TSA seems to be saying guilty until proven innocent. You have to show you're not a terrorist to get on a plane. But with cargo TSA is taking the opposite tack based on "trust."