Originally Posted by
jkhuggins
Because my bag was already checked at the TSA checkpoint and deemed "safe" for transport.
Either TSA didn't do a proper job of checking the bag at the checkpoint (fail), or someone trusted to enter the sterile area without screening transferred an "unsafe" item into my bag inside the sterile area (fail). Gate screenings, as I understand them, are attempts to counteract either (or both) of those failures, and possibly others.
Or am I missing something?
Originally Posted by
TSORon
How do we know that some co-conspirator did not hand off something to you that was not properly screened?
Which points exactly back to the second failure I highlighted above. The only way that I could have obtained an improperly screened item from a co-conspirator is if that person somehow got that item into the sterile area. Hence, a security failure.
Originally Posted by
TSORon
Screening is not perfect. Nothing can make it perfect, no matter if it TSA doing it or some civilian agency. Even the military cannot make screening perfect. No one and nothing can make it perfect. Period. Eliminating screening is an even worse proposition. Suggesting that doing so is irresponsible, and ignorant (not that I am saying that this is what you are suggesting).
Fine. Passenger screening is imperfect, and always will be. The question then becomes: how best do we deploy finite resources in screening?
The teams that screen passengers at the gate are, simply on a statistical basis, going to be spending the vast majority of their time screening passengers and their possession which have already been screened ... in the hope that they might find something that was either missed the first time, or was improperly handed off by someone who didn't have to go through a physical screening. Thus, the opportunity to "find" something that shouldn't be there is going to be quite small. Sure, they'll find stuff that shouldn't be there, and security will be enhanced as a result.
An alternative proposal would be to take those same teams, and deploy them at the checkpoint. This could allow for enhanced security in a number of ways: allowing all screeners to look more carefully for prohibited items, performing physical screening of personnel who are currently not required to undergo such screening, and so on. This, too, will enhance security by finding stuff that isn't currently being found.
So, here are two alternative uses for TSA screening personnel: roving gate inspection teams, or enhanced checkpoint screening teams. Which use of resources is better? And how would we know which is better? I don't have the background to answer the question. But no-one with the background will give me a straight answer to the question. Would you answer it for me, please?