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Old Apr 17, 2010 | 3:01 pm
  #14  
studentff
20 Years on Site
 
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: BOS and vicinity
Programs: Former UA 1P
Posts: 3,730
Originally Posted by Ari
Is it possible they know this loophole and they ignore the SecureFlight data for now and make anyone with a positive name match check in with an agent so that the DOB and gender on the ID can be verified irrespective of whether the DOB/gender provided is a positive hit or not? In other words, is the TSA waiting until DOB and gender show up on boarding passes before they actually use SecureFlight for its intended purpose? Otherwise, there is no one to make sure that the DOB/gender provided for SecureFlight matches the DOB/gender on the ID. This would explain why SecureFlight hasn't helped anyone check in online even though the data they provide isn't a match; I haven't seen a single report that it has worked for anyone yet.

If the DOB/gender were on the boarding pass, the TSA TDC could verify that it matches the ID before someone enters the security checkpoint, but we aren't there yet. What do you guys think?
IMO there are two equally likely scenarios:

1)
DHS/TSA is too stupid to know about that loophole. Their general incompetence with regard to databases, the blacklists, the fake BP loophole, etc., supports this scenario.

2)
DHS/TSA has no intention of ever "clearing" a random unknown person with a near-match name but a clear DOB (even after TDC can scan a BP to match DOB). Instead, DHS/TSA is still harassing all near-near match names and is also harassing people with not-as-near-match names who have exact or near match DOBs (e.g., the STL-ORD flight that got called back to STL due to a near match DOB). This move actually increases the number of delays/harassments.

But, to "benefit" the passenger, DHS/TSA either plans to, or is already, keeping dossiers on near-match passengers with their name, DOB, and redress number. These positively identified cleared passengers might eventually be spared delay/harassment. Under this scenario, the combination of DOB and redress number becomes a sort of passkey for these passengers, and DHS/TSA is betting that the bad guy won't be able to get a hold of that info and use the passkey himself. (They might also wait for TDCs to be able to verify DOB previously suggested.)
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