Can't you just keep it in the pouch?
That assumes (a) you haven't lost the pouch, (b) you're actually using the pouch correctly, and (c) the pouch actually suppresses the signals. The odds of all three happening together ... well, again, that depends on your level of paranoia.
And even if all of those things work ... at some point, you do have to pull the passport out of the pouch to use it. At that point, there's a window of opportunity for the signal to be read by third parties. It's a brief window, to be sure ... again, whether this is an issue depends on your level of paranoia.
Originally Posted by
Janus
The RFID value that is returned does not equal any value on the front/back of the card. It is basically a random number that is matched using a database when one approaches a US border. So the likelihood that this value would be tied to anything important is highly unlikely (as at a border crossing, the card would still be inspected and the photo in the database could be retrieved). Also, I think this value changes every time a new card is issued, again lessening its use.
Except that, since deterministic computing devices aren't involved, the numbers being transmitted aren't actually "random"; they're "pseudo-random". Which means, given enough time and computing power, one could associate a particular sequence of transmitted numbers with a particular identity. I will agree that this is highly unlikely, but not impossible. (If the value of the target is high enough, it might be seen as worth it.)
Originally Posted by
Janus
That all being said, I do see one other problem with the PP card. Tracking. Namely, since the RFID chip always returns the same value, a "bad person" (or the government) could install RFID readers throughout a building, city, state, etc and track the movements of that person. Combining that with video footage, credit card transactions, TDCs, etc and that RFID number could then be matched back to a person.
Well said.