Originally Posted by
Superguy
And again, West, this is TSA Kool Aid.
TSA admitted in the LA Times as late as 2006 that there hadn't even been a single attempt at a shoe bomb since Reid. And that's before TSA instituted the mandatory shoe carnival. All we have now was Kippie saying shoe bombs were a continued threat because he said they were. No evidence to point that there actually WAS/IS a continued threat.
What was it about the institution of the water carnival that suddenly raised shoes to a threat that there had to be a mandatory shoe carnival? Prior to that, I could take a secondary, have my shoes swabbed and been on my way.
You can argue that a shoe bomb can be made quickly, or that any loonie can make them. However, as stated earlier, look at the rest of the world. If shoe bombs are such a threat to aviation, why aren't there planes falling out of the sky in nations that don't have the shoe carnival? Clearly, either the rest of the world is just lucky, or shoe bombs AREN'T the threat that TSA makes them out to be.
And I'll ask you the same question I've asked Ron. I've asked TSA many times and no one has ever answered this. Pan Am 103 was a successful terror attack using a bomb placed in the cargo hold. Why does TSA continue to ignore and delay screening of cargo when there's been a successful terror attack and killed people, and could easily still succeed in the future while it spends all this time and money on shoe bombs that one nutjob tried once and failed, and hasn't even been attempted ever since in the rest of the world where shoes AREN'T examined?
I think the answer is clear: TSA focuses on what the public can see, despite the fact that the most danger lies in areas where the public CAN'T. If the public CAN'T see it, then clearly, TSA really isn't all that interested. That's apparent from the lack of security measures on the employee/underbelly side because it's "too hard" or "costs too much." Of course, TSA doesn't seem to care about the expense or resources on the showroom visible side.
I stopped drinking Koolaid when they took my MountainBerry Punch away. The consistent screening of footwear makes it infinitely more difficult to use it as a transport method for boom on US based (or incoming) flights. That is just a basic fact. Is it perfect? Nope. Can it fail? Of course, there are humans operating the xray and someone may miss something. The main point is, it is exceedingly difficult to use shoes as a transport device on flights to and from the US. To say that it hasn't happened does not mean that it isn't a simple and cost effective way to make an attack. You can continue to put up the same statement that nothing has happened, and it will not mean anything, there is an easy viable method of attack that the agency is screening for now. As to why they didn't do it before, I have no idea, I do not make policy. It could be that with the increased awareness of the type of attack they thought that with the relatively simple act of requiring all shoes to be screened, it could put a huge dent in the ability of the method to be used. I understand the problems it generates where people have a medical reason for not removing their shoes, and there are alternate clearing procedures for those people. Comparing other nations to the US is a non starter, most other nations have a different awareness of terrorism than we do. Most other countries (maybe with the exception of Great Britain, they are pretty hated worldwide too) are not even in the same boat as the US when it comes to opinions. A great deal of the world hates us for whatever reason (some call us barbarians, some say we are an evil nation bent on world domination, some say we are too decadent for the rest of the world, some say our acceptance of other ways of life are just completely out of touch with their theological stance, and any other number of reasons - good or bad). We are the number one target in the world right now, and for that reason we need to be more focused, and more adaptable in the security sector. There is a great deal of room for improvement (securing the borders more effectively and intelligently, using more HUMINT sources world wide, using ELINT mroe efficiently, communicating between intelligence sources more openly, being proactive as opposed to reactive, and on and on). We should be more focused on cargo, but according to HQ, we are on track to be 100% by the mandate. I agree we should have more interpersonal skills classes to teach TSOs how to talk to passengers. I agree that we should move the better tech to the forefront of our R&D so we can get better stuff to the floor and use it. I actually don't mind screening upon entry to the checkpoint or baggage, it doesn't phase me one way or the other (but then again I am honest and won't place myself in a situation where the agency would have to worry about it). I wouldn't mind having to screen every single person that enters the sterile area with no exceptions (but I think at this point, due to budgetary constraints that is something that would be miserable to implement and the people working there have had a clearance, and in todays government structure clearances are a way of life and an accepted method of clearance - not arguing right or wrong, just information purposes). I want better communication between HQ and the TSO at the end of that chain. I want a single POC for all information that a passenger needs in order to fly. All these things I want, may or may not come true or be placed into effect. As with all things, I do not know all, I am merely giving my opinion. Take it for what it is worth.
