Originally Posted by
TSORon
SG, I don’t know what to say. I posted some of the specifics on the device, and you completely failed to understand. Here, I’ll try again.
“The "Mark II" "microbombs" had Casio digital watches as the timers, stabilizers that looked like cotton wool balls, and an undetectable nitroglycerin as the explosive. Other ingredients included glycerin, nitrate, sulfuric acid, and minute concentrations of nitrobenzene, silver azide (silver trinitride), and liquid acetone.”
Not a solid dude, but liquid. Putting a liquid into cotton balls does not make that liquid a solid.
To me, that says that the explosive may have been a liquid at one point, but it really wasn't a liquid at the point the solid stabilizers were used. Let me use an example of my argument. Say you have a cup of alcohol. If you fill it with cotton balls and the cotton balls absorb all the alcohol, do you say you have a liquid or a solid at that point? I'd say a saturated solid, but not a liquid.
Now, we know that liquid nitroglycerin is unstable and never would have made it to the airport, let alone probably out of the apartment parking lot, if it hand't been stabilized. That at least tells me that that it would have had to have had enough stabilizer to absorb the liquid nitroglycerin to get it to the point of stability. Seems to me like a saturated solid, not a liquid.
Not quite SG. Close, but no cigar. TSA’s policy in place requires testing for any medically necessary liquid in a container greater than 3.4 ounces in size.
Depending on how consistently inconsistent TSA is being that day. I've experienced larger medicine bottles being swabbed and ignored.
Actually, there are several things that could have detected it. Technology is always advancing.
So why are we still using 1970s X-rays then?
The point was that there is always a “first”. The reason they call it “first” is because there is usually a “second” and a “third”, and so on.
Do you have any evidence that there was a second attempt, or a third? Do you have any evidence that subsequent attempts were successful?
As for the cargo aspect, the bomb on PanAm 103 was not cargo but checked luggage. A Samsonite suitcase to be specific.
Ok, you're right about that. Upon looking into it, you still see the same vulnerabilities that allowed that bag to get thru to happen on the cargo side. Namely no screening and talk of an extensive security system that Pan Am really didn't implement very well, if at all. They did talk up the enhanced security pretty well though. Look at how well it served them.
Both were lessons learned. After PanAm 103 it was made more difficult to ship luggage without being a passenger.
Not really a lesson learned if I can go up to any trusted shipper and get something on a plane shortly thereafter. And if you have someone willing to die for a cause, not going with the bag is irrelevant.
Reid caused shoes to be removed. 9/11 caused (in part) locked doors and no sharp objects of any kind. Lessons learned. Its how we humans learn, by experience. As long as someone pays attention to these lessons action is taken and the human condition is improved. Not something that happens here at FT/TSS very often to be sure, but then again there are always these little backwashes in reality in just about even human endeavor.
Only in the US. Are you saying the rest of the world that doesn't practice the shoe carnival is stupid or just lucky? If just lucky, is that what we were prior to 2006 when the mandatory shoe carnival was instated? Or did it take TSA nearly 5 years to come up with a plan? Or does the rest of the world accept the fact that the risk of a shoe bomb is a miniscule risk and diverts limited resources to more effective methods of security?
As Kippie stated, TSA security is really geared toward getting the stupid terrorist. No doubt Reid was stupid. Had he gone to the bathroom and then lit his shoes, we wouldn't be having this discussion. Problem is, a lot of TSA's mentality is on the same level as Reid. It reacts, but really doesn't study the threat or the likelihood of attack and success.
TSA has had lessons taught to it repeated times that a lot of its measures are successful. If you're going to bang on the lessons learned drum, why does TSA ignore those lessons?