Originally Posted by
JDiver
How do an AS MD-83 improperly lubricated / maintained jackscrew and associated acme nut assembly relate to AA pilot-determined fuel loads? In both AA fuel incidents, the PIC determined landing to take on fuel would mitigate risk and took appropriate action.
It's pretty obivous: The relationship is we can't just on total faith assume airlines won't cut in areas that impact safety or push employees to make unsafe decisions. In specific relation to AA, the ORD D10 crash was a result of a maintenance procedure in regards to wing engine mounts. The procedure AA was using was to same time/money. Obviously AA management didn't think they were rolling the dice, but in the end, that is in fact what happened.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/0..._n_117872.html
"Labor unions at two major airlines _ American Airlines and US Airways _ have filed complaints with FAA, saying the airlines are pressuring members not to request spare fuel for flights.
American notified dispatchers on July 7 that their records on fuel approved for flights would be monitored, and dispatchers not abiding by company guidelines could ultimately be fired.
American said its fuel costs this year were expected to increase to $10 billion, a 52 percent over 2007. "The additional cost of carrying unnecessary fuel adversely affects American's financial success," the airline told dispatchers in a letter."