Completely true, but a point that seems to be completely lost on DHS/TSA and the aviation industry.

I'm all in favor of sensible cockpit security. The locked/hardened doors are the best (only?) real post-9/11 security enhancement IMO. I can even get on board with the little wire fences or carts blocking the aisle, particularly if the door is going to be opened for more than 10 seconds. But I'm sick and tired of the FAs manning those barriers staring down the entire front-cabin with a scowl that indicates they truly believe every flight contains a terrorist just waiting to storm the cockpit. Way too much of an "us vs. them" mentality for an employee of a company I am paying to transport me. And this mentality is what enables and encourages FA freakouts and needless harassment and arrest of passengers who happen to twitch while the barrier is out.

Sensible security means recognizing that brief random hiccups in the system don't measurably increase the chances of a bad guy getting through. It's the same as TSA's mentality of SSSSing everyone when the computers that generate boarding passes and verify the selectee list go down, causing giant lines at the impacted airports. Even if SSSS did enhance security, letting the system fail for a few hours isn't a threat because the bad guys can't predict and plan around that failure.

IMO TSA should be legislatively required by Congress to let one out of 10,000 passengers go through each checkpoint completely unscreened. It should be randomized in such a way to be totally unpredictable. This system would be an excellent teaching tool for TSOs to remind them that dumping the terminal because someone tripped over the WTMD power cord and SSSSing everyone because the airline computers are down are unnecessary and serve nobody.