moondog

I don't know how successful HKG-SGN was, but it made the most sense to me of all the fifth freedom flights UA tried ex-HK. Sure, 787s could handle SFO-SGN with ease, but that's a really thin route. I suppose MNL could be another fifth freedom contender, but HKG constitutes backtracking in this case (compared to TYO and ICN).

WineCountryUA

Exhibit #1 why there will be no fifth freedom flights,

lsquare

What's the definition of a long thin route?

HkCaGu

Pre COVID, any US-VN route was thin because TW/HK carriers took all the diaspora traffic.

moondog

Both terms are somewhat arbitrary, but figure long is >~5500 miles in the case of US Asia. As for thin, one of the two endpoints might not be a super strong/big market. SFO-BKK is a good example. SFO-SiN sort of qualifies as well, but O&D demand is pretty robust; plus, it affords good connections to markets in Australia that couldn't sustain dedicated service from the US.

An example going the reverse direction is Hainan Airlines BjS/SHA-BOS. I can't imagine any of the US3 would touch that one because BOS alone isn't big enough to fill planes. It works for HU because they can get passengers from other places in China to Beijing and Shanghai.
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lsquare

Why? Would love jsloan's take as well.

moondog

Historically, Hong Kong and Singapore were the two major business/finance hubs for Asia non-Japan. United deemed Singapore important enough to fly there from both Hong Kong and Tokyo using its fifth freedom rights. I flew the HKG-SIN legs about a dozen times in isolation because the fares were cheaper than CX and SQ, and I had UA status. Those flights seemed reasonably full to me. This was before the a350 and 787 entered the scene.

emcampbe

Reasonably full does not equal reasonably profitable. In fact, knowing you flew HKG-SIN on its own because the fares were cheaper than other carriers probably is decent evidence that they were not necessarily....at least compared to CX/SQ, which obviously also has advantages being local carriers from one end. My understanding, though I have no specific data, is that the HKG fifth freedom flights were not necessarily profitable, but were more about not having aircraft RON in HKG, which by comparison, was expensive (IIRC, most, if not all UAs HKG flights arrived in the evening, and didn't leave until the next morning or early afternoon (in case of SFO)). Maybe a carrier has to pay $10K in fees to overnight in HKG, but lose on average 'only' $5K on the HKG-SIN-HKG roundtrip - note these numbers are completely made up by me, but something close to how it could have worked.

UA_Flyer

I would like to suggest changing the title of the thread to:

”What is the future of Hong Kong in the United’s Asia Route Network?” or something similar. HKG was never a hub.

I think the term “Hub” is misused and it leads to posters providing negative responses that “it won’t be a hub again”.

Personally I don’t like to see the word “dead” to describe a location. It is quite insensitive when people’s job and welfare are on the line.

I used to know a country manager (PMUA) in Asia. He did reference the high cost of overnight aircrafts in NRT and later HKG became the most expensive airport to overnight the aircraft (by aircraft capacity). This was when 747s were the backbone of UA Asia route network. It does not make sense to park 747s in HKG, and there were passenger and cargo demands to SIN and demand to keep and expand Asia presence.

Unfortunately for UA, HKG has been a highly competitive market within Asia. All the regional national (and others) have multiple flights to/from HKG…similar to LAX. It was hard to break even. Overtime with the higher cost of fuel and inflation and also HKG made an adjustment on overnight fees, it became more economical to overnight the aircrafts in HKG. With the introduction of 787, UA also don’t need to overnight any aircrafts in SIN.

For those who are familiar with flying UA to Asia, UA typically do not keep aircrafts overnight (including PMUA era). There are exceptions due to scheduling and airport restrictions and slot controls.

TPE, HKG (before suspension of flights), PEK (SFO flight) and PVG (1 of the 2 flights before Covid) were the exceptions. UA tried to move the PEK-SFO flight to late afternoon, so the inbound SFO-PEK plane did not have to overnight, but there were fewer connections out of SFO in the evenings and passengers demand decreased, so UA moves the SFO flight to earlier in the day and kept one aircraft at PEK overnight.

SPN Lifer

GUM is overdue for a nonstop flight from the U.S. mainland, perhaps SFO or IAH.

That would make all the difference in Guam's viability as a hub. As for O/D traffic and comparisons with OGG, how many military bases are there on Maui? After a decade of delays and postponement, the long anticipated military build-up on Guam is getting closer, including movement of USMC units from Okinawa.

With the current geopolitical situation and Chinese expansionism, the strategic military importance of Guam can only increase. The very factors that are causing Hong Kong's decline are moving toward greater demand for nonstop service to GUM from the U.S. mainland by U.S. military and government personnel.

When that demand reaches a certain level, it may very well be in UA's financial interest to meet it.

lsquare

I thought that was already well underway? Without going way too OT, Guam is essential for the US to project military power in Asia. China knows it, which is why it is assumed they'll not only strike US bases in Japan but Guam will be struck as well in any Sino-US conflict.

moondog

1. Maui will never be a hub, but it is an established destination
2. I predict China will start to mellow out big time after mid October

angetenar

What does Maui have to do with anything

SPN Lifer

See Post # 112.

moondog

See post 130.