The problem isn't merely MCAS software. I agree that can be patched.

The problem was the MAX is inherently unsafe because the next gen engine is too big for the 737 airframe. And that can't be fixed except by complete decertification of the MAX forcing Boeing to start over either with a new airframe or a smaller engine.

And the political issue is the public has no interest in flying on this plane again. They want it permanently taken out if service. The question is whether Boeing can use its combination of power and spin, which are considerable, to override public opinion.

Southwest is a very special situation (and indeed, one could argue that they bear some derivative responsibility for this because of their strange commitment to the 737 branding as they expand to markets that really require larger planes).

This hyperbole again?

The MAX 10 is certifiable without MCAS. Engine fits just fine on the airframe and wing.

So here is a summary of where we are:

1. greedy, cheap aircraft manufacturer who refused to spend the needed money to get the design done correctly (ie new airframe and/or landing gear) to raise the engines up higher
2. a design which is known to be inherently unstable, meaning the actual performance of the airframe is dynamically unstable
3. a design flaw (2) which is mitigated by complex software on onboard systems
4. mitigation systems (3) which are inherently flawed due to the lack of redundancy
5. inadequate training for crews which left them at a disadvantage when dealing with a critical emergency (MCAS engaging at low altitude, or outright malfunctioning due to the lack of redundancy) which the greedy, cheap aircraft manufacturer knew was a severe and dangerous risk
6. a greedy, cheap aircraft manufacturer who refused to accept the emergence of this critical flaw, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people, all while pushing government regulators to ignore the situation and look the other way
7. the only mitigation for this DOA, flawed aircraft design is a retooling of the software

Bottom line - this is such an incredibly grievous situation, there is no other option but for the certification of the MAX to be pulled, permanently, until Boeing submits a new airframe/wing design which is not inherently unstable or relying on software tricks to avoid disaster, and a buy-back of every MAX that was delivered, along with appropriate compensation for every airline purchaser and the families who lost loved-ones in these crashes. Every executive and board member who knowingly participated in this program should be held personally, financially liable for a portion of the loss.

If this results in the bankruptcy of Boeing, then so be it. Break up the company into commercial aircraft, military aircraft and other systems divisions and then sell it off.

It isn't flying right now. Time will tell if it is certifiable, or safe.

There's no hyperbole- if Boeing had said "passenger safety is more important than the 737 branding", they would have attached this engine to a new airframe design that was higher off the ground. This is a design defect, not a software issue.

No, there is not a design defect. The airplane flies fine without MCAS. Like a car with automatic steering, artificial force needs to be applied in some situations to give a consistent feel to the pilot/driver. This has been explained many, many times in the thread. At the same time, it is also possible to admit Boeing and the regulators made mistakes that must never reoccur.

If you are a manufacturer, you make products your customers want to buy. No airline wanted to buy a new airframe. If you want to argue that Boeing should have ignored the market and pursued a product development strategy for the good of humanity, rather than in response to its stakeholders... well, that’s OMNI territory.

So your position is that the fact that the engine was placed on a 737 airframe, for branding reasons, had no causal relationship whatsoever here? That you put the same engine on a different airframe and the plane still crashes?

Because that is not true. Which makes it a design defect.

And no, you don't make unsafe planes just because they are easier to market. People are dead because of Boeing's marketing decisions.

First, engines need to be placed on an airframe for physics reasons: without them, airplanes don’t fly. Second, branding was irrelevant: Boeing could have called the airplane the 808 Deathstar and Southwest would have bought it if it’s pilots could interchange with the 737NG.

I recognize there’s an agenda, but it’s worth stating facts one more time. The planes didn’t crash because of where the engines were.

actually it did not fit. But the expedient of just moving the engine forward and therefore further from the ground was not enough, since the plane would have a major tail strike problem given that this is a 6x stretch of the original air frame. [the -100 was 94' long; the -200 / -500 / -600 was 100' long (single stretch), the -300 / -700 was 110' long (double stretch); the -400 was 120' (triple stretch), the -800 was 130' long (quadruple stretch), and the -900 is 138' long (5x stretch), and the -10 is 144' long (6x stretch].

So Boeing added telescoping landing gear. Hopefully it will work....

This year Boeing is -93 net sales of the MAX; so far Airbus is +674 sales on the neo this year....

I bet the Airbus x-mas party was better this year....

Methinks execs at Bombardier would agree ..... their very advanced Canadair (now) A220 did not create sales that a plane with so much going for it would expect @:-)

Can't argue with that :cool:

False. https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/0...ta-boeing-nma/

In fact, the reality is that only one airline really did want the old airframe and that was AA (because it did not want to invest in properly training its flight crews).

Other airlines bought the plane because the only other option isn't all that much better and would take too long to acquire.

One option you are ignoring is Boeing could have not produced a plane at all.

Seriously, their first ethical obligation was not to kill anyone. If that means they can't produce a new plane that sells, well, too bad.

And as I said, Southwest's insistence on back-compatibility with the 737 is a contributing cause here too. Lives are more important than saving money on flight training.

Ahh, yes, I should have noted Southwest and AA in my previous post. I always forget Southwest is a thing.

Well, say Boeing decided to produce a new airframe. First of all, there's no rule that says that they can't make the controls very similar to the old 737, similar enough that minimal training is required. Although they probably wouldn't, because with modern technology, they could do things so much better. Which brings us to the second option: say Boeing made a new airframe that DOESN'T have controls similar to those of the old 737. What are WN and AA to do? If they stick with Boeing, they'd have to retrain their pilots. But if they switch to Airbus, they'd have to...wait for it...retrain their pilots. So, I fail to see how this would be a competitive disadvantage. WN and AA would have no choice unless they want to fly planes with relatively worse fuel efficiency, and then we'd get to see if fuel costs or pilot training costs are more important to them. I think I know what they'd choose, given that one of those is an ongoing expense and the other one is a one time expense.

This issue has invoked strong feelings / reactions, but once again must remind all posters of the ground rules, including
Also, inferring other posters do not care about these terrible events of is inappropriate. As said earlier
So, let's watch what you might be inferring about other posters and if you have already stated a concern multiple times, there is no reason to continue making the same assertions / statements over and over. There is no value to the community repeating the same statements over and over.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator