jsloan

Sorry, what? I don't expect an "old" airframe to crash any more than a "new" airframe. That's the entire point of the regular maintenance checks.

Airlines sell older aircraft because they lack amenities, are fuel inefficient, or because they require too much upkeep, not because they become less safe with age.

worldclubber

This expectation is probably only partly true. Fatigue is definitely and issue and it becomes more and more difficult to maintain them.

Additionally, these old frames were/are often flown in very different environments. Just look at the crashes of the 727: early on, most crashes were by American airlines (mostly teething issues); this later shifted to older frames in developing territories.

cmd320

Yes, every couple of years. That's three accidents over a six year period which averages out to be one every two years. And it's noteworthy that those three crashes occurred in a shorter timespan than the aforementioned Ethiopian Airlines crashes.

The point is that the airline in this case is irrelevant. The aircraft itself was rushed into service because Boeing fell far behind its primary competitor, the aircraft is flawed and needs to be updated.

DenverBrian

It tells me that the design is inherently flawed. The root cause of all of this is the movement of the engine nacelles so far forward. In my mind, it's the same result as if they had shaved the wing length to save weight or something, and then added software in an attempt to compensate.

I want my passenger jets to fly like steady, drama-free boats in the sky. I don't want to think that my pilots have to compensate every two seconds to keep the damn thing in the air.

I might never set foot on a MAX again.

nnn

Has it actually been shown that the MAX is less "stable"? I don't believe so. I think all we have heard (in the flying public) is that in a near-stall condition (which is itself a condition that practically no airliner will ever get into), constant control pressure on the yoke would have resulted in increased pitch-up attitude. We want to avoid that, hence the need for MCAS, to avoid pitching up at constant control pressure. That says nothing to me about the plane's aerodynamic stability.

ajGoes

I'm thinking that when the MAX returns to the sky, I'll choose it over any other plane. Not only will it be the most carefully-scrutinized aircraft in years; nervous fellow flyers' looking elsewhere will make the MAX comfortably uncrowded. Of course, if that situation lasts more than a few months, airlines will have to quit operating them; if the nervousness abates and people quit avoiding them, they'll be just as full as any other jet. So the benefit won't last long either way.

MSPeconomist

ExplorerWannabe

No, that was 3 incidents over 11 years because my search went through the 1990s. Your statement made it sound like USAir was having 737 crashes every couple of years throughout the 1990s. And as I pointed out, 2 of the 3 were definitely attrbutable to human error -- NOT problems with the 737. I'm sure there are flaws in the MAX but some of the accusations about the 737 being inherently flawed (despite being one of the most flown airframes in aviation history) ignore the actual flight history and the overwhelming predominance of incidents occurring in Third World or cut-rate airlines. The pure statistics show the airline is NOT irrelevant. I didn't do a specific count but IIIRC, out of the small remainder occurring at US or European major airlines, a sizable portion were attributed to human error.

The FO had 350 flight hours. That may not have had anything to do with the crash but it wouldn't occur at a major US or European airline.

There's still a question about runaway stabilizer prcoedures as well as why MCAS was activated in a situation where it shouldn't have been. Experienced pilots seem to disagree about how overwhelmed the cabin crew were or should have been at the time. The fact a jumpseated pilot saved the very same plane just the day before by getting the flight crew to perform the proper procedure speaks volumes. If it was an issue for that crew to remember, why wasn't the next crew alerted to it? How big a variation in procedure is it from the decades-old procedures for runaway stabilizers? Again, the airline is NOT irrelevant because their standards for flight crew proficiency are relevant (until/unless we get information that shows the electronics overriding pilot inputs in a way that couldn't be negated by the 2 known cut-off switches).

LarryJ

The runaway stabilizer procedure to stop the trim runaway is not changed at all on the MAX.

The MAX checklist has added additional information to the end of runaway stabilizer procedure about MCAS in accordance with the airworthiness directive. This is something that you'd read while studying the emergency and non-normal procedures or AFTER you've disabled the electric trim system following a runaway. The procedure to stop the runaway has not changed.

ExplorerWannabe

Thanks @LarryJ. That's what I'd thought from your prior posts but wanted to ask that specific question explicitly since IANAP.

PVDtoDEL

(bolding mine)

This is patently untrue. Every major European airline has pilots flying with these levels of experience. The Germanwings FO who crashed his airplane back in 2015 had 630 hours, for example, and he had already flown almost 500 hours as an FO.

It is completely normal in Europe (and everywhere else in the world outside the US/Canada) for FOs start flying on the line at 150-200 hours of total experience. Of note, this experience is not really comparable to the Part 61 instruction that most US pilots get for their first hundreds of hours - foreign airlines put their pilot cadets through rigorous training programs including a lot of sim time designed to prepare the cadet for professional flying.

cmd320

What you decided to search isn't really relevant. The time period was 1989 to 1994 which is 5-6 years depending on how you want to look at it and in my original post I specifically said "the early 90s" not just the 1990s. I don't think anyone is ignoring the flight history of the aircraft as a whole, but if you're going to open this up to the complete history of the 737, you're going to find that there is not an overwhelming "third world" or "cut-rate" airlines (however both definitions are relatively impossible to define). And also, why would human error be irrelevant? Just below you yourself note:

I agree with you that it's unlikely that had anything to do with the crash, however your point is inaccurate. Only in the US after 2013 could an FO not have had 350 hours. Prior to that time, this was commonplace, and continues to be in Europe today which has no such restriction.

Why would the cabin crew have been overwhelmed at all at this point, and even so, what would that have to do with the accident at all? The Lion Air plane was saved the day before by a deadheading pilot, not the Ethiopian plane. And even if this situation was recoverable, it's clear that Boeing really rushed this thing into the air. The whole situation even being allowed to happen the way it did in today's aviation world brings to light a major failure in the system. These are the kinds of oversights and rush-jobs that used to happen decades ago. I would have hoped a major company with the market share of Boeing could have had better judgement than it seems they really did. Truly shameful.

BF263533

https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterco.../#360b931d40aa


I would feel more comfortable if the pilots got a lot of training on flying the 737 MAX without stability automation / augmentation so they got the actual feeling of flying a 737 with new larger engines moved forward.

dvs7310

Well in fairness it may not always be irrelevant, but frequently would be. Many human error crashes have absolutely nothing to do with the aircraft type, the 1991 USAir crash at LAX referenced earlier in the thread is a great example. That plane would have crashed and burned if it was an A320, MD80, 757, etc, it hit another plane on the runway that shouldn't have been there. Another perfect example is the SQ crash in 2000, the captain turned onto the wrong runway with construction equipment parked on it and attempted takeoff. It didn't matter that he was piloting a 747, the result would have been the same in a DC-10 or A340. There are loads of similar crashes that by and large shouldn't be included when debating if an aircraft type is safe or not.

DenverBrian

Apparently two new planes in five months had this "condition" or false "condition," and now 346 people are dead. @:-)

Not to mention, the day-before Lion Air recovery was only after some porpoising. I'm not interested in getting on a plane that has a history of needing to porpoise before it recovers - not my kind of "fun" experience.