Old Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
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Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html

Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
READ BEFORE POSTING

Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.

Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...

As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.

The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.

Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Originally Posted by WineCountryUA
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).

However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.

The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.

Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.

The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).

Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.

WineCountryUA
UA coModerator



United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.

How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:

View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.

The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.

For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.

All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.




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B737MAX Recertification - Archive

Old Mar 30, 2019, 7:50 pm
  #901  
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Originally Posted by AlreadyThere
Just to throw my unnecessary two cents in... Here's what I don't understand, and it reflects poorly on Boeing's response to the first incident, and would seem to indicate that a simple software fix might not cut it.

I thought I understood the Lion Air crash: minimally-retrained NG pilots had not been really informed about MCAS; the cockpit didn't know what was going on; and Boeing said the pilots should have realized what was happening and disabled MCAS. I figured that at that point, every MAX pilot would now be laser-focused on the possibility of a runaway MCAS and what to do about it. Then ET, with a very experienced captain, seems to have suffered the same fate, with everyone in the cockpit having full knowledge of what had reportedly happened to Lion Air, yet unable to do anything about it. I find that far scarier than the first incident.
Agreed, a simple software fix isn't going fix third world airlines training; they're going to keep crashing 737/A320, as they have repeatedly over the last decade. At least it should let the US carriers get flying again.
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Old Mar 30, 2019, 10:19 pm
  #902  
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Originally Posted by username
I have a stupid question - why is it so hard to determine from the FDR data if the MCAS did anything? Shouldn't it be logging to it?
Not sure if this is what you mean, but it is very clear from the FDR data I have seen when the aircraft was trimming itself nose down due to MCAS, and conversely when the pilots were trying to re-trim it nose up.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 7:51 am
  #903  
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Originally Posted by Bear96
Not sure if this is what you mean, but it is very clear from the FDR data I have seen when the aircraft was trimming itself nose down due to MCAS, and conversely when the pilots were trying to re-trim it nose up.
And yet if the pilots flipped some switches and flown it by hand they could have regained control of the aircraft.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 8:09 am
  #904  
 
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Originally Posted by mduell
Agreed, a simple software fix isn't going fix third world airlines training ...
{P}ilot training in a certain area of the world was not the only problem here. At least not more than Boeing’s arrogance.

Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 31, 2019 at 10:59 am Reason: Discuss the issues, not the poster(s)
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 8:33 am
  #905  
 
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Originally Posted by worldclubber
{P}ilot training in a certain area of the world was not the only problem here. At least not more than Boeing’s arrogance.
That is certainly the leading hypothesis but it's far from proven. It appears MCAS was active on ET during a condition that it shouldn't have. I have yet to see information showing WHY it was active (FCS or pilot error?) during that critical period, specifically how it interacted with pilot control, why the pilots didn't check it or ensure it was off so soon after Lion Air .... I agree that the information released to the public to date makes it look very bad for Boeing, just disagree with the common assertion on this thread that Boeing's error or culpability has been proven.

Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 31, 2019 at 10:59 am Reason: Quote updated to reflect Moderator edit
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 8:36 am
  #906  
 
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Originally Posted by worldclubber
{P}ilot training in a certain area of the world was not the only problem here. At least not more than Boeing’s arrogance.
I don't know if it is arrogance or a blindness because there is always too much focus on the short term for far too many businesses. The current CEOs will be long gone when the long term impacts begin to surface.

Ever since US Air 427 fell out of the sky in September 1994, I have always had some doubts about the 737. I think the NTSB concluded that there were rudder problems similar to the 737 1991 crash of United 585, and the 1996 Eastwinds 517 incident.

If you are superstitioius about 13, 427 adds up to 13, 517 adds up to 13, and the fist two and last two numbers of 585 add up to 13.

..

Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 31, 2019 at 11:00 am Reason: Quote updated to reflect Moderator edit
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 8:39 am
  #907  
 
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Originally Posted by ExplorerWannabe
That is certainly the leading hypothesis but it's far from proven. It appears MCAS was active on ET during a condition that it shouldn't have. I have yet to see information showing WHY it was active (FCS or pilot error?) during that critical period, specifically how it interacted with pilot control, why the pilots didn't check it or ensure it was off so soon after Lion Air .... I agree that the information released to the public to date makes it look very bad for Boeing, just disagree with the common assertion on this thread that Boeing's error or culpability has been proven.
I never said that. But I take issue with suggest{ions} that everything is just a result of bad "third-world" pilot training. Boeing definitely contributed its share to some of the holes in the swiss cheese, which then lined up and caused the crash.

Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 31, 2019 at 11:02 am Reason: Discuss the issues, not the poster(s)
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 9:32 am
  #908  
 
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Originally Posted by worldclubber
But I take issue with suggest{ions} that everything is just a result of bad "third-world" pilot training.
I know nothing of the training these crews have received so can't comment on it.

My main interest is in finding out why three crews (one needed help from the jumpseater) were unable to accomplish the runaway stab procedure. A runaway stab is something that can happen in any airliner--not just the MAX. It shouldn't be particularly challenging. Was there something else going on that prevented properly trained crews from getting that done in time? So far, we don't have that answer.

Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 31, 2019 at 11:03 am Reason: Quote updated to reflect Moderator edit
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 10:27 am
  #909  
 
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Originally Posted by LarryJ
My main interest is in finding out why three crews (one needed help from the jumpseater) were unable to accomplish the runaway stab procedure.
My guess is that they didn’t recognize it as runaway stab. Since MCAS kicks in intermittently (every 5 secs if I remember right), and only moves the stab a few degrees at a time, I believe the pilots didn’t realize it was happening and didn’t think to follow runaway stab procedure until it was too late. Combine that with low altitude and they just didn’t have time to react.

I’ve watched videos of takeoffs and it seems that the trim wheels are adjusting themselves rather frequently under typical operations so they probably thought it was normal and that the problem was with some other flight control. A runaway stab would have the wheels spinning like crazy and be obvious that the stab is out of control. That’s my guess anyway.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 10:36 am
  #910  
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Originally Posted by AlreadyThere
Just to throw my unnecessary two cents in... Here's what I don't understand, and it reflects poorly on Boeing's response to the first incident, and would seem to indicate that a simple software fix might not cut it.

I thought I understood the Lion Air crash: minimally-retrained NG pilots had not been really informed about MCAS; the cockpit didn't know what was going on; and Boeing said the pilots should have realized what was happening and disabled MCAS. I figured that at that point, every MAX pilot would now be laser-focused on the possibility of a runaway MCAS and what to do about it. Then ET, with a very experienced captain, seems to have suffered the same fate, with everyone in the cockpit having full knowledge of what had reportedly happened to Lion Air, yet unable to do anything about it. I find that far scarier than the first incident.
In the second crash, the copilot was extremely inexperienced. AFAIK the copilot could have been at the controls, doing the takeoff for practice. Even if the pilot was the primary person executing the takeoff, that pilot could have effectively been alone in the cockpit, without a second person who could be counted on to help immediately when the plane experienced difficulties. At that point, the problem needed to be recognized and (well known) things needed to be done quickly; I don't think the copilot could have been counted on to be much (if any) help.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 10:42 am
  #911  
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Originally Posted by Bear96
Not sure if this is what you mean, but it is very clear from the FDR data I have seen when the aircraft was trimming itself nose down due to MCAS, and conversely when the pilots were trying to re-trim it nose up.
What I don't understand is the "due to MCAS" part. If it was so obvious, how come this fact did not come out right away in either case? I mean, would MCAS write to the FDR "I did it because..." or we are really concluding based on the trimming data?
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 10:50 am
  #912  
 
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Originally Posted by mrswirl
I’ve watched videos of takeoffs and it seems that the trim wheels are adjusting themselves rather frequently under typical operations so they probably thought it was normal and that the problem was with some other flight control.
That's true, but you're trimming frequently while flying during a departure. As the configuration changes, the and the aircraft accelerates, the aircraft requires trimming., That is normal for any airplane.

From what we know of the Lion Air accident, the MCAS activation would have started trimming the nose down. As the pilot-flying feels the nose getting heavy he's instinctively adds nose-up trim to return to a neutral-trim condition. This happens all the time. The use of electric trim will stop the MCAS activation and the MCAS will pause for five seconds. The process would repeat. There's no reason, that we know of, that you couldn't continue to fly in this repeating cycle indefinitely. After three or four cycles, maybe a couple more with the distraction from the stick shaker and possible airspeed anomalies, you should realise that the trim keeps trimming down and accomplish the runaway stabilizer procedure. I'm still waiting for more information from the investigations to find out why they didn't.

A runaway stab would have the wheels spinning like crazy and be obvious that the stab is out of control.
That's one way that it might happen but there's nothing in training that would lead you to believe that it is the only way it could happen.

The story of the incident, and two accidents, is becoming fairly clear from a systems failure point of view. The human factors is still, mostly, a mystery.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 11:00 am
  #913  
 
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Originally Posted by LarryJ
My main interest is in finding out why three crews (one needed help from the jumpseater) were unable to accomplish the runaway stab procedure. A runaway stab is something that can happen in any airliner--not just the MAX. It shouldn't be particularly challenging. Was there something else going on that prevented properly trained crews from getting that done in time? So far, we don't have that answer.
They had a lot on their hands, they did not expect it and the manufacturer had not exactly highlighted that this could happen and should be addressed in training.

As usual, many factors contributed to these crashes and it is not all Boeing's fault, but it also isn't solely the result of inferior "third-world" training. All can learn from this and improve, hopefully. And all includes Boeing, particularly if they want to continue to sell extremely large numbers of these planes to the "third-world countries" repeatedly blamed in this thread and elsewhere. These countries are an important market now and will be even more so in the future, so manufacturers have to adapt to this new situation.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 11:08 am
  #914  
 
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Originally Posted by username
What I don't understand is the "due to MCAS" part. If it was so obvious, how come this fact did not come out right away in either case? I mean, would MCAS write to the FDR "I did it because..." or we are really concluding based on the trimming data?
I don't the details of what is recorded. I wouldn't be surprised if the MCAS activation is recorded explicitly. If not, it would be easy to deduce from the trimming data which I know is recorded due to the regular pattern of activation.
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Old Mar 31, 2019, 11:13 am
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Originally Posted by LarryJ
As the pilot-flying feels the nose getting heavy he's instinctively adds nose-up trim to return to a neutral-trim condition. This happens all the time. The use of electric trim will stop the MCAS activation and the MCAS will pause for five seconds. The process would repeat. There's no reason, that we know of, that you couldn't continue to fly in this repeating cycle indefinitely. After three or four cycles, maybe a couple more with the distraction from the stick shaker and possible airspeed anomalies, you should realise that the trim keeps trimming down and accomplish the runaway stabilizer procedure.
I agree that there is still a lot more to learn about what happened I saw the read outs from the Lion Air black box and you can see the pitch up/ pitch down cycle repeats more than 20 times as the pilot fought the controls all the way to the ground. Each time losing altitude. Why they didn’t think to hit the cutout switches is the big mystery as you say.

As for feeling the nose get heavy in the stick, is the stabilizer the primary control surface that would cause this or is it possible the pilot thought it was happening due to elevators or flaps or some other control? It should be instinctual as you say for pilots to work the trim but I’m just curious if the pitching could be confused with some other control that would cause them to look at other things first.

Last edited by mrswirl; Mar 31, 2019 at 11:46 am
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