Jan 4, 2021, 1:37 am
Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
Mar 19, 2019, 3:19 pm
#601
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Houston
Programs: UA Plat, Marriott Gold
Posts: 12,692
The worst was the decision to downplay the existence of the system. Had pilots been trained to recognize the failure they would not have spent precious minutes making useless trim adjustments that the MCAS would revers shortly afterwards. Cuting the electiic trim control completley and mechanically wheeling it in would presumably have worked in both cases.
So Boeing made a human decision to conceal that the MAX was more difficult to handle, and that decision cost lives.
So Boeing made a human decision to conceal that the MAX was more difficult to handle, and that decision cost lives.
We don't know what cost lives yet, since the accident reports aren't out yet.
Mar 19, 2019, 3:21 pm
#602
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
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Posts: 9,450
Disagree with you here. The engineering mistakes and decisions will look bad, but are not the worst.
The worst was the decision to downplay the existence of the system. Had pilots been trained to recognize the failure they would not have spent precious minutes making useless trim adjustments that the MCAS would revers shortly afterwards. Cuting the electiic trim control completley and mechanically wheeling it in would presumably have worked in both cases.
The worst was the decision to downplay the existence of the system. Had pilots been trained to recognize the failure they would not have spent precious minutes making useless trim adjustments that the MCAS would revers shortly afterwards. Cuting the electiic trim control completley and mechanically wheeling it in would presumably have worked in both cases.
In other words, I'm arguing that the failure should have been recognized, both by the Lion Air (like the crew that brought the ill-fated jet into CGK the night before) or Ethiopian crew (which received training on the post-Lion Air MCAS faults). Human factors and altitude-critical phase of flight likely precluded the timely recognition of the issue and application of corrective measures in both instances.
What should not be happening is one single failure very rapidly setting in motion a chain of events leading to the necessity of a 'do-or-die' intervention by the crew. Simply put, that introduces far too many variables (pilot workload, experience, quality of training, CRM, mental recall, fatigue etc.) to ensure a reasonably acceptable expectation of success when/if said failure happens. If that's ultimately what brought down the ET302 flight, then I think Boeing's biggest problem is right there.
The alleged "concealment" is a bit of sensationalism, IMO.
Mar 19, 2019, 4:20 pm
#603
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: ATL
Programs: Delta PlM, 1M
Posts: 6,363
Which the runaway pitch trim procedure addresses, MCAS or not. As the actual pilots upthread said, they're more informed about MCAS now, but it's irrelevant to their reaction, they're still going to do the runway pitch trim procedure.
We don't know what cost lives yet, since the accident reports aren't out yet.
We don't know what cost lives yet, since the accident reports aren't out yet.
I am not a pilot, so read through several hundred posts by such on another thread. Looked to me like the majority had a valid point that the initial MCAS trim actions would not have looked abnormal. Only a modest adjustment by the system. Not like a runaway stab trim where it just goes straight to the limit. Some said it should be obvious because the trim moved for 10 seconds vs a few seconds, but really? Are the pilots supposed to know to note that (especially the Lion Air pilots who did not even know the concept existed).
We will see how it plays out, agreed.
Mar 19, 2019, 4:52 pm
#604
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
Programs: UA, AA, DL, Hertz, Avis, National, Hyatt, Hilton, SPG, Marriott
Posts: 9,450
The recovery is the same, but recognizing the issue is not.
I am not a pilot, so read through several hundred posts by such on another thread. Looked to me like the majority had a valid point that the initial MCAS trim actions would not have looked abnormal. Only a modest adjustment by the system. Not like a runaway stab trim where it just goes straight to the limit. Some said it should be obvious because the trim moved for 10 seconds vs a few seconds, but really? Are the pilots supposed to know to note that (especially the Lion Air pilots who did not even know the concept existed).
I am not a pilot, so read through several hundred posts by such on another thread. Looked to me like the majority had a valid point that the initial MCAS trim actions would not have looked abnormal. Only a modest adjustment by the system. Not like a runaway stab trim where it just goes straight to the limit. Some said it should be obvious because the trim moved for 10 seconds vs a few seconds, but really? Are the pilots supposed to know to note that (especially the Lion Air pilots who did not even know the concept existed).
Objectively, it's hard to argue with the logic that continuing to fight with the airplane through 25+ cycles of uncommanded nose down trim inputs (with the trim wheel spinning as trim is automatically added) was an inappropriate course of action, under the circumstances. Unfortunately, what appears to have happened is the JT crew fought with the airplane, instead of executing a procedure to correct a potential, and arguably obvious, cause of the improper input. There were likely a number of cues to suggest it was a stab trim issue.
The Lion Air pilots knew the concept existed - they were trained on it - and the crew that brought the accident airplane in the night before responded to the malfunction correctly.
Runaway stabilizer doesn't have to look or feel like AS261.
Mar 19, 2019, 5:40 pm
#605
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Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Denver, CO, USA
Programs: Sometimes known as [ARG:6 UNDEFINED]
Posts: 26,689
Boeing is unique in that their brand new planes have killed 300+ people in the last five months. Just sayin'.
Mar 19, 2019, 6:00 pm
#606
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2000
Location: TPA for now. Hopefully LIS for retirement
Posts: 13,691
A thread was just started this morning on the Air Canada forum about AC cancelling all MAX flights through at least July 1.
Is AC being too conservative? Or is Boeing releasing bad news to the airlines (including UA) behind the scenes that warranted this move by AC, and UA will shortly be doing announcing similar?
In any case, it is not surprising to me that this will take at *least* several months to resolve.
Is AC being too conservative? Or is Boeing releasing bad news to the airlines (including UA) behind the scenes that warranted this move by AC, and UA will shortly be doing announcing similar?
In any case, it is not surprising to me that this will take at *least* several months to resolve.
Mar 19, 2019, 7:07 pm
#607
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Join Date: Jul 2008
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Saw a link to this elsewhere online today. Click to view it in full resolution. 6 of UA's MAX planes just hanging out grounded at Hobby Airport in Houston. I like how you can see the Southwest liveries in the background, and that gigantic plume of smoke is a raging industrial fire. Oh Houston...
Mar 19, 2019, 7:30 pm
#608
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: BNA
Programs: HH Gold. (Former) UA PP, DL PM, PC Plat
Posts: 8,184
The rule is controversial, but as a general matter it is premised on the theory that more hours = more experience = better/safer pilot. Importantly, it's not to say that 1500 hours = safe pilot, or 1500 hours = well-trained pilot, but there is no doubt that an ATP must demonstrate a higher degree of proficiency to earn the ticket.
There is a whole list of different kinds of flights and experience as well as an additional knowledge test and required instruction. You can't spend 1,500 hours flying around your local airport then suddenly qualify for an ATP.
If anyone wants to read the requirements, they are in 14 CFR 61 Subpart G.
Mar 19, 2019, 11:07 pm
#609
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Join Date: May 2001
Posts: 10,965
To me, as bad as it is, design flaws and programming/manufacturing defects happen. The worst parts are definitely the decisions to conceal the system and not immediately coming clean on the issue right after the 1st and even 2nd crash. That is unethical, immoral and criminal!
If they can essentially add a software layer for the MAX to emulate the NG and call it NG for training and certification purposes, what's next?
Imagine if you were the engineers in these design meetings....there is got to be some other reasons for them to design it like this (increased correction and the number of times), right? Then only using 1 AOA sensor input....why?
If they can essentially add a software layer for the MAX to emulate the NG and call it NG for training and certification purposes, what's next?
Imagine if you were the engineers in these design meetings....there is got to be some other reasons for them to design it like this (increased correction and the number of times), right? Then only using 1 AOA sensor input....why?
Mar 20, 2019, 12:53 am
#610
Join Date: Dec 2004
Posts: 2,866
737 FREAK
To me, as bad as it is, design flaws and programming/manufacturing defects happen. The worst parts are definitely the decisions to conceal the system and not immediately coming clean on the issue right after the 1st and even 2nd crash. That is unethical, immoral and criminal!
If they can essentially add a software layer for the MAX to emulate the NG and call it NG for training and certification purposes, what's next?
Imagine if you were the engineers in these design meetings....there is got to be some other reasons for them to design it like this (increased correction and the number of times), right? Then only using 1 AOA sensor input....why?
If they can essentially add a software layer for the MAX to emulate the NG and call it NG for training and certification purposes, what's next?
Imagine if you were the engineers in these design meetings....there is got to be some other reasons for them to design it like this (increased correction and the number of times), right? Then only using 1 AOA sensor input....why?
Maybe instead of it being called the 737 MAX, it should be called 737 FREAK.
Mar 20, 2019, 9:13 am
#611
Join Date: Jun 2014
Programs: UA MM
Posts: 4,122
I have to respectfully disagree with you here. The initial trim actions may not have looked abnormal, but after a few cycles, with nose down trim rolling in despite repeated trim inputs to nose up, it most certainly would not have appeared normal. This realization should have been well before the point at which full back pressure on the yoke still resulted in a nose-down pitch attitude.
Objectively, it's hard to argue with the logic that continuing to fight with the airplane through 25+ cycles of uncommanded nose down trim inputs (with the trim wheel spinning as trim is automatically added) was an inappropriate course of action, under the circumstances. Unfortunately, what appears to have happened is the JT crew fought with the airplane, instead of executing a procedure to correct a potential, and arguably obvious, cause of the improper input. There were likely a number of cues to suggest it was a stab trim issue.
The Lion Air pilots knew the concept existed - they were trained on it - and the crew that brought the accident airplane in the night before responded to the malfunction correctly.
Runaway stabilizer doesn't have to look or feel like AS261.
Objectively, it's hard to argue with the logic that continuing to fight with the airplane through 25+ cycles of uncommanded nose down trim inputs (with the trim wheel spinning as trim is automatically added) was an inappropriate course of action, under the circumstances. Unfortunately, what appears to have happened is the JT crew fought with the airplane, instead of executing a procedure to correct a potential, and arguably obvious, cause of the improper input. There were likely a number of cues to suggest it was a stab trim issue.
The Lion Air pilots knew the concept existed - they were trained on it - and the crew that brought the accident airplane in the night before responded to the malfunction correctly.
Runaway stabilizer doesn't have to look or feel like AS261.
Mar 20, 2019, 9:39 am
#612
Join Date: Jan 2005
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Those are all good points. What would have been "new" to the Lion Air crew was the reason for the repeated aircraft overrides. When you don't know a system exists, you really don't know to even look for the correct reason the aircraft is behaving wrongly. Without that knowledge, how do you know what to do to really fly the plane safely from that point? The UA pilot I know quite well told me they were not trained on how to deactivate the MAX MCAS in this situation until after the Lion Air crash (and wouldn't be a problem for them now). Who knows why the ET crew didn't apparently know what to do as well.
There was a notable revelation yesterday that the Lion Air crew which flew the airplane to CGK the night before (and experienced the same unwanted MCAS activation) had to be reminded of the stab trim cutout by a jumpseating pilot. Once automatic trim was shut off, controlled flight was reestablished.
I'm not going to repeat my thesis as to the system design, we know that's a major problem for Boeing. But I maintain that every type-rated 737 pilot even before JT610 was trained in a procedure which corrects auto stabilizer trim problems, which would include unwanted MCAS inputs. There are problems with execution, too.
Mar 20, 2019, 9:52 am
#613
Join Date: Jun 2014
Programs: UA MM
Posts: 4,122
The point is, there was no "MCAS deactivation procedure" and there still isn't. If an unscheduled stabilizer trim input is experienced, pilots are taught, as a memory item, to cut off electric stab trim. An improper MCAS activation would present to the pilot in this manner (as uncommanded nose down trim), and the pilot would be expected to respond appropriately. This was the case before and after Lion Air. It's way too early to comment on Ethiopian causes, but it must be understood that the ET302 crew received the post-Lion Air MCAS "training", which was mostly a reminder about electric trim cut out procedures and background information on the purpose and function of MCAS.
There was a notable revelation yesterday that the Lion Air crew which flew the airplane to CGK the night before (and experienced the same unwanted MCAS activation) had to be reminded of the stab trim cutout by a jumpseating pilot. Once automatic trim was shut off, controlled flight was reestablished.
I'm not going to repeat my thesis as to the system design, we know that's a major problem for Boeing. But I maintain that every type-rated 737 pilot even before JT610 was trained in a procedure which corrects auto stabilizer trim problems, which would include unwanted MCAS inputs. There are problems with execution, too.
There was a notable revelation yesterday that the Lion Air crew which flew the airplane to CGK the night before (and experienced the same unwanted MCAS activation) had to be reminded of the stab trim cutout by a jumpseating pilot. Once automatic trim was shut off, controlled flight was reestablished.
I'm not going to repeat my thesis as to the system design, we know that's a major problem for Boeing. But I maintain that every type-rated 737 pilot even before JT610 was trained in a procedure which corrects auto stabilizer trim problems, which would include unwanted MCAS inputs. There are problems with execution, too.
Mar 20, 2019, 10:13 am
#614
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Join Date: Oct 1999
Posts: 11,468
What has be the fall-out of those 14 planes for UAs schedule?
Which routes are seeing cut-backs?
Which routes are seeing cut-backs?
Mar 20, 2019, 10:27 am
#615
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Tx
Programs: AA, UA, WN
Posts: 812
What was the preponderance of runaway trim on the ng without mcas vs the max? I just want to know if mcas is causing more runaway trim scenarios than what is statistically expected. If so this is a problem about CRM especially at critical phases of flight such as low altitude scenarios.
Would the crew even suspect runaway trim before other issues based on failure rates?...could that be a cause for slow or non responsive actions by the crew? Does runaway trim need to move up further up the most likely failure list?
MTBF should decrease with legacy systems.. if this has caused more runaway trim scenarios then boeing will have to show the fix puts this failure back in line with the ng rates.
on another note how is the 73X affected by mcas? Could the 10 be delayed even if then 8 and 9 are fixed. The flight profile of the 10 is even more dependent on a system like mcas due to aircraft length to "feel" like the ng. Then add in the failure rates of telescoping gear.
Lastly the announcement by AC and UA a few days ago about summer impacts is just bad timing...no need to even mention revenue projections with a prolonged grounding...do people even think how that may be viewed less than week since the grounding... furthers the perception of $ over safety
Been enjoying the candid discussion
Would the crew even suspect runaway trim before other issues based on failure rates?...could that be a cause for slow or non responsive actions by the crew? Does runaway trim need to move up further up the most likely failure list?
MTBF should decrease with legacy systems.. if this has caused more runaway trim scenarios then boeing will have to show the fix puts this failure back in line with the ng rates.
on another note how is the 73X affected by mcas? Could the 10 be delayed even if then 8 and 9 are fixed. The flight profile of the 10 is even more dependent on a system like mcas due to aircraft length to "feel" like the ng. Then add in the failure rates of telescoping gear.
Lastly the announcement by AC and UA a few days ago about summer impacts is just bad timing...no need to even mention revenue projections with a prolonged grounding...do people even think how that may be viewed less than week since the grounding... furthers the perception of $ over safety
Been enjoying the candid discussion
Last edited by Halo117; Mar 20, 2019 at 10:34 am