Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
#586
Join Date: Oct 2018
Location: Bay Area, CA
Posts: 223
The blame here seems to be solely on Boeing's shoulders. They originally submitted FAA cert docs that mentioned the MCAS system could only manipulate the tail by 0.6 degrees. They then realized that 0.6 was not sufficient and decided to reprogram it allow for a 2.5 degree manipulation without letting the FAA know (atleast that is what the article implies). So the FAA certified the plane on an assumption that MCAS would move the plane by +/- 0.6 degrees and in reality was doing +/- 2.5 degrees. That is half the total movement and in flight terms a lot! Yes the FAA didn't double check, but looks like Boeing manipulated - maybe just like VW did with the emissions scandals to fool the inspectors and the inspection.
Article Source - https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
Article Source - https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
#587
Join Date: May 2010
Location: AVP & PEK
Programs: UA 1K 1.8MM
Posts: 6,335
The blame here seems to be solely on Boeing's shoulders. They originally submitted FAA cert docs that mentioned the MCAS system could only manipulate the tail by 0.6 degrees. They then realized that 0.6 was not sufficient and decided to reprogram it allow for a 2.5 degree manipulation without letting the FAA know (atleast that is what the article implies).
The proposed software update was/is to only allow a one-time automatic manipulation.
This, coupled with only one sensor being used for the MCAS evaluation and not both, and also not checking for sensor comparison errors pre-departure (Lio nAir sensors were apparently off by 20 degrees prior to take-off), tells me that there was some serious logic failures at Boeing.
#589
Join Date: Feb 2008
Programs: 6 year GS, now 2MM Jeff-ugee, *wood LTPlt, SkyPeso PLT
Posts: 6,526
Not only that, but what about the 777X folding wingtips? Makes you wonder if the same (or any) care was taken to certify that. I don't believe United has any on order, but from my understanding, not all customers have been identified.
If it's a new Boeing, I'm not going.
If it's a new Boeing, I'm not going.
Boeing OTOH had to put new front landing gear, changed the tail, and moved the engines up and forward, all of which changes the aerodynamics and as such how the plane flies. The MCAS system was designed to mask these changes in how the plane flew. Airbus did not have to do something like this.
The blame here seems to be solely on Boeing's shoulders. They originally submitted FAA cert docs that mentioned the MCAS system could only manipulate the tail by 0.6 degrees. They then realized that 0.6 was not sufficient and decided to reprogram it allow for a 2.5 degree manipulation without letting the FAA know (atleast that is what the article implies). So the FAA certified the plane on an assumption that MCAS would move the plane by +/- 0.6 degrees and in reality was doing +/- 2.5 degrees. That is half the total movement and in flight terms a lot! Yes the FAA didn't double check, but looks like Boeing manipulated - maybe just like VW did with the emissions scandals to fool the inspectors and the inspection.
Article Source - https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
Article Source - https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
What I think that this shows is how much different that the MAX is from the NG. They needed a full 2.5 degrees.
#590
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
Programs: UA, AA, DL, Hertz, Avis, National, Hyatt, Hilton, SPG, Marriott
Posts: 9,443
If the article is correct, then it was much worse than what is mentioned above, as the system would reset itself each time there was a corrective pilot input, effectively allowing "endless" MCAS manipulation.
The proposed software update was/is to only allow a one-time automatic manipulation.
The proposed software update was/is to only allow a one-time automatic manipulation.
The former FAA safety engineer who worked on the MAX certification, and a former Boeing flight controls engineer who worked on the MAX as an authorized representative of the FAA, both said that such safety analyses are required to be updated to reflect the most accurate aircraft information following flight tests.
“The numbers should match whatever design was tested and fielded,” said the former FAA engineer.
But both said that sometimes agreements were made to update documents only at some later date.
“It’s possible the latest numbers wouldn’t be in there, as long as it was reviewed and they concluded the differences wouldn’t change the conclusions or the severity of the hazard assessment,” said the former Boeing flight controls engineer.
If the final safety analysis document was updated in parts, it certainly still contained the 0.6 limit in some places and the update was not widely communicated within the FAA technical evaluation team.
“The numbers should match whatever design was tested and fielded,” said the former FAA engineer.
But both said that sometimes agreements were made to update documents only at some later date.
“It’s possible the latest numbers wouldn’t be in there, as long as it was reviewed and they concluded the differences wouldn’t change the conclusions or the severity of the hazard assessment,” said the former Boeing flight controls engineer.
If the final safety analysis document was updated in parts, it certainly still contained the 0.6 limit in some places and the update was not widely communicated within the FAA technical evaluation team.
With that said, the article hits on the lack of redundancy we have been discussing for nearly a week:
Lemme said Boeing could have designed the system to compare the readings from the two vanes, which would have indicated if one of them was way off.
Alternatively, the system could have been designed to check that the angle-of-attack reading was accurate while the plane was taxiing on the ground before takeoff, when the angle of attack should read zero.
“They could have designed a two-channel system. Or they could have tested the value of angle of attack on the ground,” said Lemme. “I don’t know why they didn’t.”
Alternatively, the system could have been designed to check that the angle-of-attack reading was accurate while the plane was taxiing on the ground before takeoff, when the angle of attack should read zero.
“They could have designed a two-channel system. Or they could have tested the value of angle of attack on the ground,” said Lemme. “I don’t know why they didn’t.”
#591
Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: SEA/ORD/ADB
Programs: TK ELPL (*G), AS 100K (OWE), BA Gold (OWE), Hyatt Globalist, Hilton Diamond, Marriott Plat, IHG Plat
Posts: 7,763
Respectfully, skill and judgement of pilots is gained from experience. A 200 hour pilot can just as easily put an Airbus in the trees as a Boeing.
I started my career in a CRJ with around 700 flight hours. Looking back now, that was dangerous. 200 hours is unimaginable in a B737, you're just a warm body working the radios with that experience level.
I started my career in a CRJ with around 700 flight hours. Looking back now, that was dangerous. 200 hours is unimaginable in a B737, you're just a warm body working the radios with that experience level.
Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.
#592
Join Date: May 2010
Location: AVP & PEK
Programs: UA 1K 1.8MM
Posts: 6,335
I am surprised to hear that the software update will to allow only one-time activation. The change to two-channel fail-safe architecture and inhibition of the function with AOA or airspeed disagree is pretty elementary and should have been there from day 1. OTOH, if the MCAS function is limited to one cycle of nose-down trim input, it's much less useful as an active stall prevention feature and might be better served as an aural or tactile warning to pilots in the same vein as a horn or stick shaker.
#593
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Pacific Northwest
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In almost every other country in the world (including Europe), it is completely normal for FOs to start flying after 150 hours or so of flying time. This ET FO who had 350 hours of flying time was no doubt inexperienced, but it is the norm in most countries and OEMs need to design aircraft and training keeping this fact in mind.
Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.
Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.
#594
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: May 2012
Location: MCO
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Prior to the Colgan crash the FO could be a commercial pilot. Following the legislature that passed, FOs are now required to be ATP certified. This was a very poor, reactive, and short-sighted move.
#595
Original Poster
Join Date: Oct 2015
Location: SAN
Programs: 1K (since 2008), *G (since 1990), 1MM
Posts: 3,214
In almost every other country in the world (including Europe), it is completely normal for FOs to start flying after 150 hours or so of flying time. This ET FO who had 350 hours of flying time was no doubt inexperienced, but it is the norm in most countries and OEMs need to design aircraft and training keeping this fact in mind.
Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.
Most countries don't have general aviation like the US does, so pilot training is prohibitively expensive and difficult. Airlines usually pay for training for pilots with no experience (cadet system). It is not realistic to expect the airline to pay for 1000+ hours of flight training before getting their pilots on the line. The overall safety record of aviation worldwide seems to show that this system works reasonably well.
#596
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: 4éme
Posts: 12,024
And what about a situation where the FO needs to take command of the aircraft and perform to ATP standards?
#597
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: New York, NY
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Posts: 9,443
The rule is controversial, but as a general matter it is premised on the theory that more hours = more experience = better/safer pilot. Importantly, it's not to say that 1500 hours = safe pilot, or 1500 hours = well-trained pilot, but there is no doubt that an ATP must demonstrate a higher degree of proficiency to earn the ticket.
#598
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I don't understand then - how have two planes flown themselves into the ground ? Certainly the pilots are trying - in vain - to pull the nose up with all they've got ? I can only speak for myself, but I'm imagining fight-for-life scenario in the cockpit with the flying pilots desperately trying to fly a plane intent on flying itself into the Earth ?
#599
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#600
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: ATL
Programs: Delta PlM, 1M
Posts: 6,363
The worst was the decision to downplay the existence of the system. Had pilots been trained to recognize the failure they would not have spent precious minutes making useless trim adjustments that the MCAS would revers shortly afterwards. Cuting the electiic trim control completley and mechanically wheeling it in would presumably have worked in both cases.
So Boeing made a human decision to conceal that the MAX was more difficult to handle, and that decision cost lives.
The public can understand an issue like that a lot better than they can understand the concept of giving too much authority to the automated systems.
And at the end of the day, the public really does matter.