Last edit by: WineCountryUA
This is an archive thread, the archive thread is https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/1960195-b737max-cleared-faa-resume-passenger-flights-when-will-ua-max-flights-resume.html
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
Thread Topic
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
READ BEFORE POSTING
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
Once again many posters in this thread have forgotten the FT rules and resorted to "Personal attacks, insults, baiting and flaming " and other non-collegial, non-civil discourse. This is not allowed.
Posters appear to be talking at others, talking about others, not discussing the core issues. Repeating the same statements, saying the same thing LOUDER is not civil discourse. These problems are not with one poster, they are not just one point of view, ...
As useful as some discussion here has been, continuing rules violations will lead to suspensions and thread closure. Please think about that before posting.
The purpose of FT is to be an informative forum that, in this case, enables the UA flyer to enhance their travel experience. There are other forums for different types of discussions. This thread was had wide latitude but that latitude is being abused.
Bottom line, if you can not stay within the FT rules and the forum's topic areas, please do not post.
And before posting, ask if you are bringing new contributing information to the discussion -- not just repeating previous points, then please do not post.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
This thread has engendered some strongly felt opinions and a great tendency to wander into many peripherally related topics. By all normal FT moderation standards, this thread would have been permanently closed long ago ( and numerous members receiving disciplinary actions).
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
However, given the importance of the subject, the UA Moderators have tried to host this discussion but odd here as UA is not the top 1 or 2 or 3 for MAX among North America carriers. However, some have allowed their passion and non-UA related opinions to repeatedly disrupt this discussion.
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
Discussion of Boeing's culture or the impact on Boeing's future is not in scope. Nor is comments on restructuring the regulatory process. Neither is the impacts on COVID on the general air industry -- those are not UA specific and are better discussed elsewhere. And for discussion of UA's future, there is a separate thread.
Additionally repeated postings of essentially the same content should not happen nor unnecessarily inflammatory posts. And of course, the rest of FT posting rules apply including discuss the issue and not the posters.
The Moderator team feels there is a reason / need for this thread but it has been exhausting to have to repeated re-focus the discussion -- don't be the reason this thread is permanently closed ( and get yourself in disciplinary problems).
Stick to the relevant topic which is (repeating myself)
The reason for continuing this thread is to inform the UA traveler on the status of the MAX recertification and if / when UA might deploy the MAX aircraft. And UA flyer's thoughts about UA deploying the MAX if that was to happen.
WineCountryUA
UA coModerator
United does not fly the 737 MAX 8 that has been involved in two recent crashes, but it does operate the 737 MAX 9.
How to tell if your flight is scheduled to be operated by the MAX 9:
View your reservation or flight status page, either on the web or on the app. United lists the entire aircraft type. Every flight that is scheduled to be on the 737 MAX will say "Boeing 737 MAX 9." If you see anything else -- for example, "Boeing 737-900," it is not scheduled to be a MAX at this time.
The same is true in search results and anywhere else on the United site.
For advanced users: UA uses the three letter IATA identifier 7M9 for the 737 MAX 9.
All 737 MAX aircraft worldwide (MAX 8, MAX 9, and MAX 10) are currently grounded.
B737MAX Recertification - Archive
#436
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Meanwhile the 767 cargo plane that crashed in Houston has long been forgotten.
#437
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Since the MCAS issue was already known to everyone, and a software fix was still pending, what is beyond me is why the system was allowed to be left active at all - there should have been an order to either disable the system, or voluntarily ground MAX aircraft if the operator did not want to do that.
Last edited by WineCountryUA; Mar 16, 2019 at 12:57 am Reason: OT content removed
#438
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Since the MCAS issue was already known to everyone, and a software fix was still pending, what is beyond me is why the system was allowed to be left active at all - there should have been an order to either disable the system, or voluntarily ground MAX aircraft if the operator did not want to do that.
#439
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UA missed a great PR opportunity to get in front of the US field and ground their MAX aircraft voluntarily. It was obvious that soon after the Ethiopian Airlines crash that there would be a world wide grounding of the max ... very poor foresight from the UA leadership...
#440
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A 773ER was subbed for today’s 739max 11:29am SFO-OGG. The return flight is delayed 16 hours until tomorrow 11am for crew to overnight (obviously no 773 pilot base on Maui). Answers my question about return pilots in earlier post.
#441
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So, can the 739Max pilots just slide into non-Max 738/9s in the interim?
#442
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Yes. I'm not an expert on the details of the certification process, but one of the things that's been mentioned on this thread is that Boeing convinced the FAA that the 737 MAX was a modified 737, meaning that a pilot who is rated for the 737 MAX will also be rated for other 737 models and can move between them.
#443
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Yes. I'm not an expert on the details of the certification process, but one of the things that's been mentioned on this thread is that Boeing convinced the FAA that the 737 MAX was a modified 737, meaning that a pilot who is rated for the 737 MAX will also be rated for other 737 models and can move between them.
#444
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Since the MCAS issue was already known to everyone, and a software fix was still pending, what is beyond me is why the system was allowed to be left active at all - there should have been an order to either disable the system, or voluntarily ground MAX aircraft if the operator did not want to do that.
#446
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Of course, we're never sure if this is more political than anything else. But safety is something that we should never take for granted. Slacking and cost-cutting in safety is a continuous risk, and although we like to think the opposite, US aviation is not immune from that.
#447
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I believe this must be approached on a case by case basis. No two accidents are exactly the same, just as no two aircraft, no two fleets, no two airlines are exactly the same. In this instance, it makes sense to ground the fleet of aircraft. In a different instance it may not. Take for example the earlier 737 rudder flaws back in the 90s. While those accidents were the result of the same design flaw, they occurred years apart and at the time thousands of 737s were flying. Even after the second accident the FAA did not ground the 737 fleet. There was very nearly a third of the same crash due to rudder hardover, however fortunately in that case the crew were able to bring the aircraft under control and land it safely.
It would be great to be able to apply blanket rules to every accident scenario, however that isn't realistic because by nature, there are so many factors affecting a decision like this.
It would be great to be able to apply blanket rules to every accident scenario, however that isn't realistic because by nature, there are so many factors affecting a decision like this.
As you note, the commercial interests won the day in the 90s, and the 737 was not grounded. You'll also recall that Boeing went to great lengths to characterize the incident as an improper response to wake turbulence.
All this is exactly why I'm not in favor of letting social pressure and political influence dictate safety decisions made by the FAA and other regulators. Would it have been more appropriate not to ground the MAX if this series of accidents took place five years from now, with upwards of a thousand in service?
Since the MCAS issue was already known to everyone, and a software fix was still pending, what is beyond me is why the system was allowed to be left active at all - there should have been an order to either disable the system, or voluntarily ground MAX aircraft if the operator did not want to do that.
What's most baffling to me is why this kind of fail-safe logic wasn't a part of the system in the first place... it seems pretty intuitive and is consistent with redundancy of other automated flight control augmentation systems, like yaw damper. Instead, the MCAS went into production models with a single-channel input for AOA data, which came from only one AOA sensor, creating a single point of failure. This starts the cascade of failures and worst-case-scenarios (there were several) that most likely led to the Lion Air crash and is now implicated in the ET302 disaster.
Last edited by EWR764; Mar 14, 2019 at 8:46 am
#448
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....Because, absent an instrumentation failure (faulty AOA sensor), the MCAS actually protects against a stall when flying under certain conditions. That's why the Boeing fix won't disable, inactivate or substantially modify the system; instead, it will probably include functions to automatically inhibit it and alert pilots when there is evidence of an instrument malfunction, like an AOA disagree. The simplest fix appears to be a software update to the MCAS logic to accept two AOA input channels, allowing a comparison of data to signal some sort of instrumentation failure.
What's most baffling to me is why this kind of fail-safe logic wasn't a part of the system in the first place... it seems pretty intuitive and is consistent with redundancy of other automated flight control augmentation systems, like yaw damper. Instead, the MCAS went into production models with a single-channel input for AOA data, which came from only one AOA sensor, creating a single point of failure. This starts the cascade of failures and worst-case-scenarios (there were several) that most likely led to the Lion Air crash and is now implicated in the ET302 disaster.
What's most baffling to me is why this kind of fail-safe logic wasn't a part of the system in the first place... it seems pretty intuitive and is consistent with redundancy of other automated flight control augmentation systems, like yaw damper. Instead, the MCAS went into production models with a single-channel input for AOA data, which came from only one AOA sensor, creating a single point of failure. This starts the cascade of failures and worst-case-scenarios (there were several) that most likely led to the Lion Air crash and is now implicated in the ET302 disaster.
I've been flying airplanes for a very long time, and maybe I'm too much of an old-timer because I don't fly airplanes full of computers except the single one in my head, but since the advent of computerized flight control and management systems, I am not sure the statistics lead to a long term conclusion of improved flight safety when compared to the era of aircraft with fewer computerized systems, and many flight and aeronautical science professionals feel a similar way about this issue.
#449
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What's most baffling to me is why this kind of fail-safe logic wasn't a part of the system in the first place... it seems pretty intuitive and is consistent with redundancy of other automated flight control augmentation systems, like yaw damper. Instead, the MCAS went into production models with a single-channel input for AOA data, which came from only one AOA sensor, creating a single point of failure.
I maintain all of these "techie" aircraft gizmos designed to enhance flying safety put too much decision making control in the hands of computers, or at the very least, may deny the pilot access to accurate information about the aircraft's current condition due to misinterpretations or faulty data collection.
As you'll probably agree, the ensuing discussion will not be about the amount of automatization on the flight deck. No big aircraft producer has indicated a desire or need to reduce that amount, even while they've been hearing the calls from pilot unions about the decrease of hand-flying skills for years. Boeing has indicated that - because of a lack of engineering background - it struggles to convey necessary technical information to flight crews in a way that they can comprehend. The discussion will probably shift more towards how we should define the role of the pilot and the computer on a flight deck that is expected to be increasingly more complex and safe in the years forward, and as you may guess, it may not bode too well for the pilots.
#450
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I know what the MCAS does and it's purpose - I maintain all of these "techie" aircraft gizmos designed to enhance flying safety put too much decision making control in the hands of computers, or at the very least, may deny the pilot access to accurate information about the aircraft's current condition due to misinterpretations or faulty data collection. When I am flying under instruments I always know my life depends on trusting my instruments, but if there is a computer system standing between the mechanical collection of flight conditions and my instruments, now I need to think about whether my instruments are accurate, and is the computer accurate. Honestly, that makes me feel uneasy.
I've been flying airplanes for a very long time, and maybe I'm too much of an old-timer because I don't fly airplanes full of computers except the single one in my head, but since the advent of computerized flight control and management systems, I am not sure the statistics lead to a long term conclusion of improved flight safety when compared to the era of aircraft with fewer computerized systems, and many flight and aeronautical science professionals feel a similar way about this issue.
I've been flying airplanes for a very long time, and maybe I'm too much of an old-timer because I don't fly airplanes full of computers except the single one in my head, but since the advent of computerized flight control and management systems, I am not sure the statistics lead to a long term conclusion of improved flight safety when compared to the era of aircraft with fewer computerized systems, and many flight and aeronautical science professionals feel a similar way about this issue.
As far as the last point about whether higher levels of automation have led to improved flight safety as compared to the era of less automation, the statistics are pretty clear that they absolutely do. Automation dependency is an issue of unintended consequences stemming from increased automation, and over the last twenty years we've seen professional pilot training begin to re-emphasize manual flying skills. But are you really suggesting that flying is demonstrably less safe in the current era than it was 20, 30, 40 years ago, and that there are credible professionals who actually believe it?
I could be wrong, but everything I've read indicates that it was. I'm not sure this particular failure mode (faulty AOA input, improper MCAS activation, failure of crew to react appropriately to stab runaway, loss of pitch control) was found to be a reasonable possibility... but those kinds of engineering errors are not unheard of.