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<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: As far as I am concerned, the probability of the passengers not stopping another hijacking is extremely low. So low that I am willing to drop these ascinine (stupid) random harassments at both the gate and at the checkpoints. </font> ------------------ ~ Glen ~ Calling all United 1K Members - please join .. www.1Kflyers.com |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: ...I think that just believing everything the TSA says is even stupider than relying on the passengers to prevent another hijacking...As far as I am concerned, the probability of the passengers not stopping another hijacking is extremely low.</font> Characterizing as extremely low the possibility that passengers would NOT be able to stop the hijackers is wishful thinking. The possibility is indeed present, unfortunately. |
And in your scenario, random gate/checkpoint harassment would help... how?
Moreover, as it has been shown, these passengers will fight for their lives as they now know that hijackers no longer have demands and that cooperation is pointless. 30 pax vs. 5 Bruce Lees will still result in victory for the pax, even if not all the pax are in the prime of their lives. Also, the pilots will land the plane immediately and one pilot will use the crash-axe to defend the cockpit. I'm sorry, but I still think it's extremely improbable that your scenario could happen to the extent that we need to devote huge resources that could better be spent elsewhere (like catching the 5 terrorists at the ticket counter). <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by anonplz: I recently took a flight in which the plane was half empty. As I recall, the other 25-30 passengers ran the gamut of typical passengers: black, white, latino, old, young, strong, weak. The FA's were two older females and one older man. The plane was half-full. Assuming that a team of hijackers of 5 (or even more) people board, armed with nail clippers or even simply their own brawn, trained in martial arts, it is not far-fetched to envision them taking out every single passenger resisting, then breaking down the cockpit door and taking over the plane. Characterizing as extremely low the possibility that passengers would NOT be able to stop the hijackers is wishful thinking. The possibility is indeed present, unfortunately.</font> "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry [This message has been edited by Spiff (edited 09-22-2002).] |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: And in your scenario, random gate/checkpoint harassment would help... how?</font> However, let me ask you this: we've all seen the reports about how investigative journalists today have managed to sneak weapons, guns and knives onto planes past the TSA security personnel, with degrees of success varying from airport to airport. If we eliminate security checks altogether, how does that improve security at airports with low degrees of success at catching loaded guns/knives/weapons/contraband? |
The problem is that the checkpoints need to have their technology strengthened and need to stop wasting resources randomly harassing passengers and actually pay attention to the x-ray machine. If there's something amiss, ask to open the bag. However, too much time and resources are diverted checking passengers' bags without probable cause.
Also, most of the items that are getting by are no longer credible threats. I'm sorry, but no one is going to hijack a plane with a screwdriver or a pool cue. Every item that is on that list of banned items diverts resources from keeping out real threats: guns and bombs. <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by anonplz: However, let me ask you this: we've all seen the reports about how investigative journalists today have managed to sneak weapons, guns and knives onto planes past the TSA security personnel, with degrees of success varying from airport to airport. If we eliminate security checks altogether, how does that improve security at airports with low degrees of success at catching loaded guns/knives/weapons/contraband?</font> ------------------ "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by LarryJ: Are you really stupid enough to think that it's that simple?</font> In 1993 they increased the World Trade Center's defenses against car bombs and many figured that they wouldn't try attacking there again. Al Queda adjusted their tactics and attacked again. In order to give the passengers of a hijacked airplane the best chance possible it is important to limit the effectiveness of the weapons that can be brought onboard. There is another aspect that Spiff's one dimentional thinking is missing. Prior to 9/11, the primary goal of airport security was to protect the crew and passengers on the airplane. After 9/11 the protection of important targets on the ground has become the primary goal but the protection of the crew and passengers is still a very close second. [This message has been edited by LarryJ (edited 09-22-2002).] |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: The problem is that the checkpoints need to have their technology strengthened and need to stop wasting resources randomly harassing passengers and actually pay attention to the x-ray machine. If there's something amiss, ask to open the bag. However, too much time and resources are diverted checking passengers' bags without probable cause.</font> Let me ask you another question: as to security checks, you focus on "probable cause" and that it would be permissible to search if probable cause were shown. Give me an example of a typical case when you think there is probable cause, i.e., what are the questions which need to be answered affirmatively before the TSA can argue successfully that they have "probable cause" to search? |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: The stuff being found at the gate can no longer be used to hijack a plane, yet we persist in celebrating these nail file confiscations via random gate harassment. </font> |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In 1993 they increased the World Trade Center's defenses against car bombs and many figured that they wouldn't try attacking there again. Al Queda adjusted their tactics and attacked again.</font> Remember, you can be harmed anywhere (geographically speaking) a terrorist makes an attack. Do you think you are completely safe on an airplane? Once the notion that the airplane can be commandeered and projected as a weapon itself was dispelled by the ingrained psyche of a society of determined passengers crew, terrorists were forced to find another venue. In addition, please remember that violence on an airplane is always a possibility regardless of security screening. Weapons can be created and modified easily from so-called "acceptable" items permitted on an airplane as has been detailed thoroughly in other postings. The only weapons of any concern should be firearms and explosives. Pocketknives, tweezers, and the like are rudimentary and should be accurately viewed as ineffective in a terrorist attack. In the end, once pilots are armed and the cockpit door better fortified, a repeat of 9/11 will be virtually impossible much like it already is. |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by CountinPlaces: They had to approach their attack externally to find success.</font> <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Remember, you can be harmed anywhere (geographically speaking) a terrorist makes an attack.</font> The goal of airport security is to get them to move their attempts away from airlines to targets that are less leathal and where they have a greater chance of being caught. <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Pocketknives, tweezers, and the like are rudimentary and should be accurately viewed as ineffective in a terrorist attack.</font> <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">In the end, once pilots are armed and the cockpit door better fortified, a repeat of 9/11 will be virtually impossible much like it already is.</font> |
Well, now I can draw my own conclusions about your thinking patterns as well, LarryJ. You seem to think that we can afford to focus all our efforts trying to prevent the most improbable of situations and that if there's a microscopically-probable way for the terrorists to use pool cues to hijack airplanes and fly them into buildings, they by God they will do it. Sorry, I don't believe that for a second.
The terrorists exploited our willingness to cooperate with hijackers. That is the fundamental reason 11 Sept. happened. It did not happen because we did not have a ban on box cutters. Yet somehow you feel that by driving passengers away with these intrusive searches for "weapons" even McGuyver couldn't exploit that we will be so much safer while our airlines' economic health approaches flatline. A most illogical stance for someone whose livelihood is tied to the economic success of the airlines, I must say. <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by Spiff: Also, like I said... I question the TSA's credibility and common sense and I think that just believing everything the TSA says is even stupider than relying on the passengers to prevent another hijacking. Furthermore, I restate my other comment: it's stupid to think we have endless resources and can afford to keep trying to plug the smallest and most improbable of holes. As far as I am concerned, the probability of the passengers not stopping another hijacking is extremely low. So low that I am willing to drop these asinine (stupid) random harassments at both the gate and at the checkpoints.</font> In order to give the passengers of a hijacked airplane the best chance possible it is important to limit the effectiveness of the weapons that can be brought onboard. There is another aspect that Spiff's one dimentional thinking is missing. Prior to 9/11, the primary goal of airport security was to protect the crew and passengers on the airplane. After 9/11 the protection of important targets on the ground has become the primary goal but the protection of the crew and passengers is still a very close second." ------------------ "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry |
Yes, let's just plug every security hole in every facet of society, no matter how improbable it is that these security holes can be exploited. A security guard for every home! A policeman on every corner! Video cameras recording every facet of our lives so that no criminal deed goes unpunished and never mind that a geometric progression of watchers watching watchers watching the watched will ensue! Spend, spend, spend! Protect, protect, protect! After all, you can't put a price tag on safety, now can you?
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by LarryJ: If there are holes they will find them. I'm sure they won't limit themselves to surface to air missles just to maintain the parallel with the WTV attacks. If we assume that they can't adapt and succeed again then we will be leaving holes that they can exploit as they have done in the past.</font> "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry |
How many guns were found by random security checks vs. the x-ray and the magnetometer?
Knives are largely irrelevant as they can no longer effectively be used to hijack an airplane. <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by cordelli: Originally posted by Spiff: The stuff being found at the gate can no longer be used to hijack a plane, yet we persist in celebrating these nail file confiscations via random gate harassment. </font> ------------------ "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry |
Something on the x-ray is either unclear or resembles a weapon: ask permission to search the bag.
Someone beeps when they walk through the magnetometer. Ask the person to be wanded. The wand indicates a metal object in a place where metal is not usually found. Ask the person for permission to pat them down. <font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by anonplz: Give me an example of a typical case when you think there is probable cause, i.e., what are the questions which need to be answered affirmatively before the TSA can argue successfully that they have "probable cause" to search?</font> ------------------ "Give me Liberty or give me Death." - Patrick Henry |
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="2">Originally posted by LarryJ: If only it were that simple. </font> I'm just thinking that everyone here is speculating about what they or others WOULD do "next time," (God forbid), but that's so easy to do. What did people do when they were REALLY in that situation? That would give us some credible insight into the actual process and how to address the threat and risk, and how concerned flyers can prepare for any situation. I even know people who have taken flight training, "just in case." |
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