Jul 20, 2019, 7:49 pm
737-Max 8 safety concerns
Aug 2, 2019, 6:25 am
#526
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: Global
Posts: 5,995
Will things really change after the MAX accidents? Nope.
Gizmodo this week reporting on a software glitch in (some) older A350's:
"Airlines who haven’t performed a recent software update on certain models of the Airbus A350 are being told they must completely power cycle the aircraft every 149 hours or risk “...partial or total loss of some avionics systems or functions,” according to the EASA."
"This condition, if not corrected, could lead to partial or total loss of some avionics systems or functions, possibly resulting in an unsafe condition."
This was found in 2017!
So rather than saying to all airlines, hey fix this now, we are relying on airlines to cycle the power completely down. All it takes is one oops and we could have a tragedy. Why have they not done it? It requires the aircraft to be taken out of service. The regulating agencies - in this case, EASA - are too aligned with the manufacturers and airlines. This decision, like MAX decisions, came down to hurting Airbus/Airline profits.
So will anything really change after the MAX accidents/lack of oversight? I think no.
"Airlines who haven’t performed a recent software update on certain models of the Airbus A350 are being told they must completely power cycle the aircraft every 149 hours or risk “...partial or total loss of some avionics systems or functions,” according to the EASA."
"This condition, if not corrected, could lead to partial or total loss of some avionics systems or functions, possibly resulting in an unsafe condition."
This was found in 2017!
So rather than saying to all airlines, hey fix this now, we are relying on airlines to cycle the power completely down. All it takes is one oops and we could have a tragedy. Why have they not done it? It requires the aircraft to be taken out of service. The regulating agencies - in this case, EASA - are too aligned with the manufacturers and airlines. This decision, like MAX decisions, came down to hurting Airbus/Airline profits.
So will anything really change after the MAX accidents/lack of oversight? I think no.
Aug 2, 2019, 11:25 am
#527
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...except it's not
I suggest you open a fresh thread about safety concerns with the A350, where people can debate about the dangers of temporary loss of avionics if the plane isn't rebooted once a week.
About the relevance of your comparison to this discussion:
Was the fault a direct cause of pushing the plane to market in a haste?
Was it related to systems implemented to facilitate or bypass re-certification?
Was the fault in a piece of software/hardware whose existence was not communicated to clients and did not get mentioned in the aircraft's manual?
Was the solution communicated by Airbus completely inadequate and dangerous?
Did Airbus attempt to negate/minimize and shift blame on the cause of the issue?
Pretty thin my friend..... Can we get back on topic?
I suggest you open a fresh thread about safety concerns with the A350, where people can debate about the dangers of temporary loss of avionics if the plane isn't rebooted once a week.
About the relevance of your comparison to this discussion:
Was the fault a direct cause of pushing the plane to market in a haste?
Was it related to systems implemented to facilitate or bypass re-certification?
Was the fault in a piece of software/hardware whose existence was not communicated to clients and did not get mentioned in the aircraft's manual?
Was the solution communicated by Airbus completely inadequate and dangerous?
Did Airbus attempt to negate/minimize and shift blame on the cause of the issue?
Pretty thin my friend..... Can we get back on topic?
Aug 2, 2019, 1:36 pm
#528
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: Global
Posts: 5,995
...except it's not
I suggest you open a fresh thread about safety concerns with the A350, where people can debate about the dangers of temporary loss of avionics if the plane isn't rebooted once a week.
About the relevance of your comparison to this discussion:
Was the fault a direct cause of pushing the plane to market in a haste?
Was it related to systems implemented to facilitate or bypass re-certification?
Was the fault in a piece of software/hardware whose existence was not communicated to clients and did not get mentioned in the aircraft's manual?
Was the solution communicated by Airbus completely inadequate and dangerous?
Did Airbus attempt to negate/minimize and shift blame on the cause of the issue?
Pretty thin my friend..... Can we get back on topic?
I suggest you open a fresh thread about safety concerns with the A350, where people can debate about the dangers of temporary loss of avionics if the plane isn't rebooted once a week.
About the relevance of your comparison to this discussion:
Was the fault a direct cause of pushing the plane to market in a haste?
Was it related to systems implemented to facilitate or bypass re-certification?
Was the fault in a piece of software/hardware whose existence was not communicated to clients and did not get mentioned in the aircraft's manual?
Was the solution communicated by Airbus completely inadequate and dangerous?
Did Airbus attempt to negate/minimize and shift blame on the cause of the issue?
Pretty thin my friend..... Can we get back on topic?
To answer your questions -
Was the fault a direct cause of pushing the plane to market in a haste? - maybe. The comparisons would say YES.
A350 - Less than 2 years after release a software glitch was found
MAX - Less than 2 years after release a software glitch was found
Was it related to systems implemented to facilitate or bypass re-certification? - Don't think so.
Was the fault in a piece of software/hardware whose existence was not communicated to clients and did not get mentioned in the aircraft's manual? - 100% YES.
There was no mention anywhere to shut the plane down ever X hours.
Was the solution communicated by Airbus completely inadequate and dangerous? - Yes. The planes should have been grounded until the software fix was in place. We should not wait for an accident to force a grounding, especially when there is a known fix!
("This condition, if not corrected, could lead to partial or total loss of some avionics systems or functions, possibly resulting in an unsafe condition.")
Did Airbus attempt to negate/minimize and shift blame on the cause of the issue? - Don't think so, but that is an unfair question. No accidents have happened so there is nothing shift blame on.
The topic is MAX safety concerns and lack of oversight by regulating agencies. Boeing/FAA failed the flying public. I am one of the few here advocating for criminal prosecution if the BA/FAA accusations turn out to be true. You are focused on grammar and the history of colloquialism. (Talk about off-topic!) People are surprised that BA/FAA has such a close relationship, to the detriment of flying safety. There exists a similar cozy relationship between Airbus and EASA, to the detriment of flying safety.
So for you my friend, very thin indeed.
- Stop being an EASA apologist.
- Stop making up quotes.
- Stop arguing about colloquialisms.
Aug 3, 2019, 7:30 am
#531
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Of interest is the engine issue with the 777x while I flew I am not an aeronautical engineer however it seems this engine placement began with the 777 that was worked out, then comes the Max and now the 777x. making me wonder how far are we pushing the envelope on engine size and placement? There's a lot of software driving those designs and operation and yes there is redundancy however
This is all one mess that greed at the top of BA has caused, it has forever tarnished Boeing and to a minor extent our economy.
Ck six all
Aug 3, 2019, 12:30 pm
#532
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Not a good development but one I predicted earlier, the longer the Max sits the more visibility it gets and the more they will access more unlikely scenarios and require them fixed. Looks like now they are looking at reaction time, and who is to decide how much time is enough. In the end with this kind of thinking one could argue many airplanes in the sky even old ones like 757 and 767 or the Airbus fly by wire would not pass, but in the end only the Max get's punished, a mess BA may really never escape. They for certain didn't attack it the right way 6 months ago and the mess continues to deepen, the longer it is grounded the more fixes and more scruitiny each fix gets and the ever expanding investigation.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/737-max...ks-11564778841
"As part of the new focus, regulators also have shifted their attention to the speed at which pilots react to a range of extreme emergencies involving various flight-control features. A portion of the ongoing testing and analysis is delving into extremely remote but potentially catastrophic problems that have a probability of less than one in 100 million flights. For initial certification of safety-critical systems, regulators typically use a far tighter standard of roughly one in a billion."
"It took one of the pilots 16 seconds to identify and react to the malfunction, significantly longer than current FAA certification rules and safety guidelines permit, some of the agency officials said. The result, they added, was a determination that if an airline crew confronted such a problem—even though chances of it happening are extremely small—the consequences could be catastrophic."
https://www.wsj.com/articles/737-max...ks-11564778841
"As part of the new focus, regulators also have shifted their attention to the speed at which pilots react to a range of extreme emergencies involving various flight-control features. A portion of the ongoing testing and analysis is delving into extremely remote but potentially catastrophic problems that have a probability of less than one in 100 million flights. For initial certification of safety-critical systems, regulators typically use a far tighter standard of roughly one in a billion."
"It took one of the pilots 16 seconds to identify and react to the malfunction, significantly longer than current FAA certification rules and safety guidelines permit, some of the agency officials said. The result, they added, was a determination that if an airline crew confronted such a problem—even though chances of it happening are extremely small—the consequences could be catastrophic."
Aug 3, 2019, 2:23 pm
#533
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Thread closed pending Moderator Review
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