Jul 20, 2019, 7:49 pm
737-Max 8 safety concerns
Mar 20, 2019, 10:57 am
#121
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Mar 21, 2019, 6:27 am
#122
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Speaking of which: https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/asia/...ntl/index.html
Mar 21, 2019, 9:56 am
#123
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A lot of things went wrong to cause these accidents, which tends to be how it goes. I feel like if one or two things were different, at least one of the two accidents likely wouldn't have happened.
Mar 21, 2019, 1:22 pm
#124
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Think about this
1) Newest airplane so likely upgrades everywhere so takes many hours to become familiar
2) By design as we are now learning minimal new required training to enable fastest certification and also what many of the airlines wanted this to enable max flexibility around flight crews
3) Third world ( sorry just the expression ) likely minimal to no training on differences, less experience, less hours, etc. etc. and as we now learn planes with optional safety features NOT purchased
4) Takeoff always plane is heaviest, minimal altitude, near stall, not a long of time when things go crazy to diagnose, correctly assess and correct
5) At least with Lion Air we now know they failed to fix the mechanical issue that resulted in repeated issues and prior flight had additional independent help to rescue them. You'd argue if corrective PM was done the flight that crashed wouldn't have as the failure would have never happened. Could argue with more experienced crew they'd always detect and switch of and override the system. Who knows how many undocumented events like this have already happened and suppressed.
For Ethiopian Air the jury is still out but the air track data now is indeed worrisome and what finally drove grounding everywhere.
One could argue a well trained crew, experienced pilot in a moment of such an emergency if he does the "right" thing would have avoided a crash. But if BA says safety is job one then everything they could do they should incorporate into the system; confusing switches, lack of redundancy, NOT revealing software control explicitly, offering additional safety features for this but charging extra sounds disingenuous to the comment of Safety First. Seems to be "good enough safety" but schedule and $ and pleasing customers at equal priority, and it is indeed how it is in the business world.
1) Newest airplane so likely upgrades everywhere so takes many hours to become familiar
2) By design as we are now learning minimal new required training to enable fastest certification and also what many of the airlines wanted this to enable max flexibility around flight crews
3) Third world ( sorry just the expression ) likely minimal to no training on differences, less experience, less hours, etc. etc. and as we now learn planes with optional safety features NOT purchased
4) Takeoff always plane is heaviest, minimal altitude, near stall, not a long of time when things go crazy to diagnose, correctly assess and correct
5) At least with Lion Air we now know they failed to fix the mechanical issue that resulted in repeated issues and prior flight had additional independent help to rescue them. You'd argue if corrective PM was done the flight that crashed wouldn't have as the failure would have never happened. Could argue with more experienced crew they'd always detect and switch of and override the system. Who knows how many undocumented events like this have already happened and suppressed.
For Ethiopian Air the jury is still out but the air track data now is indeed worrisome and what finally drove grounding everywhere.
One could argue a well trained crew, experienced pilot in a moment of such an emergency if he does the "right" thing would have avoided a crash. But if BA says safety is job one then everything they could do they should incorporate into the system; confusing switches, lack of redundancy, NOT revealing software control explicitly, offering additional safety features for this but charging extra sounds disingenuous to the comment of Safety First. Seems to be "good enough safety" but schedule and $ and pleasing customers at equal priority, and it is indeed how it is in the business world.
Mar 21, 2019, 2:30 pm
#125
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In The New York Times:
Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras
AA MAX8 planes have both options. Southwest originally opted for the disagree alert indicator and later installed an angle of attack indicator in a display mounted above the pilots’ heads. United MAX9's have neither because "its pilots use other data to fly the plane."
Boeing’s optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.
Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. Boeing started moving on the software fix and the equipment change before the crash in the Ethiopia.
The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. Boeing started moving on the software fix and the equipment change before the crash in the Ethiopia.
The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
Mar 22, 2019, 3:18 am
#126
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And the order cancellations have begun:
Garuda Indonesia’s cancellation is believed to be the first scrapping of orders in reaction to the crashes.
Ikhsan Rosan, a spokesman for Garuda Indonesia, told The Washington Post the decision to cancel the orders was due to “consumers’ low confidence” in the airplanes following the crashes. The order was first announced in October 2014.
Ikhsan Rosan, a spokesman for Garuda Indonesia, told The Washington Post the decision to cancel the orders was due to “consumers’ low confidence” in the airplanes following the crashes. The order was first announced in October 2014.
Mar 22, 2019, 9:26 am
#127
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As an engineer it is clear the Max can fly safely in almost all conditions when things are reasonably okay given the number of planes and time it has already flown.
A terrible tragedy that at the corners of the envelope, call it a six sigma condition in combination with poorly trained crews and equipment failures and hidden software / automation intervention the crashes occured.
Flying has to be totally safe and understandable airlines will now noodle cancelling, its PR and business combined.
But look at the airlines, the short haul point to point business is exploding, the number of narrow body fuel efficient airplanes needed is crazy, just look at the backlog for the 320 NEO and 737-max are what > 3K and 5K respectively. Airlines that cancel will either stand back of the line at Airbus and likely pay more as Airbus knows what it's got, and wait even longer for deliver crimping the airlines revenue and growth and bottom line businesm
No in the end BA will have a huge egg on its face, get dragged thru the mud, stock will fall maybe even to the low 300s. The engineers there and software are working 7x24 and will produce a solution, the path is obvious
1) Triple redundance to the inputs to the software
2) Realtime indicators to the pilot
3) Sensible over-rides, maybe even more software to automatically suspend the software, LOL
4) Training and more training
I highly doubt any 737-max pilot doesn't now know what is happening when his plane climbs un-intentionally nor what to do, sadly how it became required knowledge is tragic and BA PR problem
BA will be on the hook for years and billions of in liability and class action, will have to compensate billions for the grounded airlines lost revenue, and by next year everything will be in the rear view mirror and hopefully a deep lesson for the AI/software engineers working on driverless cars!
A terrible tragedy that at the corners of the envelope, call it a six sigma condition in combination with poorly trained crews and equipment failures and hidden software / automation intervention the crashes occured.
Flying has to be totally safe and understandable airlines will now noodle cancelling, its PR and business combined.
But look at the airlines, the short haul point to point business is exploding, the number of narrow body fuel efficient airplanes needed is crazy, just look at the backlog for the 320 NEO and 737-max are what > 3K and 5K respectively. Airlines that cancel will either stand back of the line at Airbus and likely pay more as Airbus knows what it's got, and wait even longer for deliver crimping the airlines revenue and growth and bottom line businesm
No in the end BA will have a huge egg on its face, get dragged thru the mud, stock will fall maybe even to the low 300s. The engineers there and software are working 7x24 and will produce a solution, the path is obvious
1) Triple redundance to the inputs to the software
2) Realtime indicators to the pilot
3) Sensible over-rides, maybe even more software to automatically suspend the software, LOL
4) Training and more training
I highly doubt any 737-max pilot doesn't now know what is happening when his plane climbs un-intentionally nor what to do, sadly how it became required knowledge is tragic and BA PR problem
BA will be on the hook for years and billions of in liability and class action, will have to compensate billions for the grounded airlines lost revenue, and by next year everything will be in the rear view mirror and hopefully a deep lesson for the AI/software engineers working on driverless cars!
Mar 22, 2019, 9:30 am
#128
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Probable more alternate planes will be bought
Sukhoi Superjet 100, Airbus A2xx, Embraer, COMAC..
Boeing lost a lot of Trust when they were seen as trustworthy by many (which they could price into their aircrafts)
Sukhoi Superjet 100, Airbus A2xx, Embraer, COMAC..
Boeing lost a lot of Trust when they were seen as trustworthy by many (which they could price into their aircrafts)
Mar 22, 2019, 10:35 am
#129
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Boeing's determination to NOT tell the pilots was a sales decision, not a safety one.
The fact that Boeing didn't widely publish the necessary information after the Lion Air crash is, IMO, more unconscionable than their initial decision to sell the 737-Max. I suspect Boeing's engineers were spending those weeks/months looking for a way to patch the software yet again to avoid being honest.
Well, it's too late now.
Boeing will very likely pay a higher price than if they'd just admitted it up front - much like VW and their dirty diesel.
Mar 22, 2019, 11:31 am
#130
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That's the key issue.
Boeing's determination to NOT tell the pilots was a sales decision, not a safety one.
The fact that Boeing didn't widely publish the necessary information after the Lion Air crash is, IMO, more unconscionable than their initial decision to sell the 737-Max. I suspect Boeing's engineers were spending those weeks/months looking for a way to patch the software yet again to avoid being honest.
Well, it's too late now.
Boeing will very likely pay a higher price than if they'd just admitted it up front - much like VW and their dirty diesel.
Boeing's determination to NOT tell the pilots was a sales decision, not a safety one.
The fact that Boeing didn't widely publish the necessary information after the Lion Air crash is, IMO, more unconscionable than their initial decision to sell the 737-Max. I suspect Boeing's engineers were spending those weeks/months looking for a way to patch the software yet again to avoid being honest.
Well, it's too late now.
Boeing will very likely pay a higher price than if they'd just admitted it up front - much like VW and their dirty diesel.
Look into past issues of this and always in the end come clean and admit your sins always HAS to happen , and the sooner the better. The charade playing simply doesn't work in this modern twitter / internet age
Mar 25, 2019, 2:22 am
#131
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As an engineer it is clear the Max can fly safely in almost all conditions when things are reasonably okay given the number of planes and time it has already flown.
A terrible tragedy that at the corners of the envelope, call it a six sigma condition in combination with poorly trained crews and equipment failures and hidden software / automation intervention the crashes occured.!
A terrible tragedy that at the corners of the envelope, call it a six sigma condition in combination with poorly trained crews and equipment failures and hidden software / automation intervention the crashes occured.!
We all know the answer already. Boeing made correct training a hidden sales opportunity and carried on a charade that all the pilots certified for an airplane with different characteristics were correctly trained, making it seem "cheaper" for airlines to purchase this aircraftt.
So why do you choose to smear the dead? Not cool.
Mar 25, 2019, 8:40 am
#132
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I beg to differ.
Please allow me to quote one of our resident MAX pilots, @LarryJ, from another thread:
A properly trained pilot would have followed the runaway stabilizer procedure. The deadheading pilot on the Lion Air plane the day before it crashed knew what to do, he was properly trained.
Please allow me to quote one of our resident MAX pilots, @LarryJ, from another thread:
The procedure is not the "MCAS deactivation procedure". It is the "runaway stabilizer" procedure. A variety of systems, and failures, can result in a runaway stabilizer; MCAS is only one of them. Because an unchecked runaway stabilizer can quickly lead to a loss of control, you don't waste time trying to diagnose the reason for the runaway. If you have a runaway, you disable the electric stab trim which stops it. Let the mechanics figure out the cause of the runaway after you land. The runaway stabilizer procedure is the correct actions regardless of the underlying cause of the runaway. Since the autopilot also operates the trim (when it is on), the procedure has you disconnect the autopilot as part of the procedure because a failure in the autopilot could potentially cause a runaway. We're talking here specifically about a runaway caused by MCAS so, in that case, the autopilot must already be off by definition
Last edited by TWA884; Mar 25, 2019 at 9:20 am Reason: Append
Mar 25, 2019, 1:32 pm
#133
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I haven't seen enough details to know whether it's related to the MAX problems, but China just placed a huge order with Airbus. Despite this Boeing stock prices are up today on a day when major USA indices are down slightly.
Mar 25, 2019, 6:41 pm
#134
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The investigation into the Lion Air crash does illustrate how an experience pilot can indeed save the aircraft from MCAS software misbehaving.
Nevertheless, it's unfair to the pilots that they have to deal with a software system they didn't know existed. Boeing should have been required to disclose the software, provide training materials to airlines, and make the safety feature of AOA-disagree part of the standard package for the 737-Max.
That's why I'd personally place the majority of the responsibility for the deaths on Boeing rather than the pilots. I'm sure we'll find that there were things the pilots could have done to avert disaster.
But it's not fair that they were put into that position by a badly designed aircraft.
Nevertheless, it's unfair to the pilots that they have to deal with a software system they didn't know existed. Boeing should have been required to disclose the software, provide training materials to airlines, and make the safety feature of AOA-disagree part of the standard package for the 737-Max.
That's why I'd personally place the majority of the responsibility for the deaths on Boeing rather than the pilots. I'm sure we'll find that there were things the pilots could have done to avert disaster.
But it's not fair that they were put into that position by a badly designed aircraft.
Mar 25, 2019, 7:59 pm
#135
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An unscheduled MCAS activation presents as a runaway stabilizer. MCAS is one of several systems that can control the stabilizer trim which means that they have the potential to cause a runaway stabilizer. Regardless of the cause of a runaway stabilizer, there is a single procedure used to stop it--the runaway stabilizer procedure.
There is no time to stop and think about the possible causes of the runaway and, if you somehow figured it out, it wouldn't help you.
The other systems which also control stabilizer trim, and have the potential to cause a runaway, are the electric trim system, autopilots (there are two), and the speed trim system. All of those have been part of the 737 since it first flew more than 50 years ago.