QF32 - how bad was it? (Full damage report)
#46
Join Date: Nov 2006
Programs: AAdvantage EXP
Posts: 1,482
Wouldnt one factor not be the max length of a runway at one airport but the minimum length? You can not guarantee which runway you can use - so they may be able to fly off one, prep the aircraft for that and actually be flying off another which they can not fly from.
#47
Join Date: Aug 2001
Programs: AA Plat & LTG; QF LTG
Posts: 9,837
But in the case of trans-Pacific ops, I think would find that even with 14,000 feet of runway available at each end, the payload restriction would still make the operation non-viable with the thrust restrictions imposed.
#48
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Additionally, the ability to move/pump fuel is part and parcel of jettisoning it.
Lastly, even once the leaking tank is dry, you still need to manage the fuel you have left.
#49
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Both wings are full of fuel at takeoff, with a leak eventually one will be empty -- and the plane will be in a spin sometime before that.
#50
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Not at all. The ATSB will, at some point, declare that they are finished with the aircraft, and repairs will start. That will be in a much shorter time frame, and could even have happened already.
#51
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
What was not understood was the contribution made by reverse to blasting water off a wet runway, and so giving the brakes some level of grip. Airbus haven't learnt this lesson yet, as shown by their reluctance to fit reverse to the 380, until forced to do so by the FAA.
The problem in BKK though was that the #4 thrust lever wasn't quite closed. That inhibited reverse thrust on all engines, and because the aircraft had flicked back to air mode, it also stopped the spoilers from rising. If anything the spoilers had a far bigger effect on the outcome than anything else.
#52
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
From the comments, it seems that the issue with LAX relates to the length of the runways.
LAX
6L/24R 8,925
6R/24L 10,285
7L/25R 12,091
7R/25L 11,096
SYD
07/25 8,301
16L/34R 7,999
16R/34L 12,999
MEL
09/27 7,500
16/34 11,998
LHR
09L/27R 12,799
09R/27L 12,008
SIN
02L/20R 13,123
02C/20C 13,123
I'm not sure I'm seeing the problem here... 7L/25R at LAX is longer then MEL's longest (16/34).
LAX
6L/24R 8,925
6R/24L 10,285
7L/25R 12,091
7R/25L 11,096
SYD
07/25 8,301
16L/34R 7,999
16R/34L 12,999
MEL
09/27 7,500
16/34 11,998
LHR
09L/27R 12,799
09R/27L 12,008
SIN
02L/20R 13,123
02C/20C 13,123
I'm not sure I'm seeing the problem here... 7L/25R at LAX is longer then MEL's longest (16/34).
Secondly, 07L/25R at LA is not available for A380 ops, as it is too close to the parallel taxiway.
#53
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
The QF engines were originally ordered to deliver 72,000lb thrust. But take-off thrust (or any operational thrust for that matter) is not defined by the pilots in pounds or thrust. Different engines use different method to set the engine power - RR RB211 and P&W use Engine Pressure Ration (EPR) while GE and some other RR models use the rotation speed of the low pressure shaft, known as N1. N2 is also reported which is the rotation speed of the HP compressor shaft. This is generally used for dual-shaft engine types.
I understand the RB211 and subsequent Trent variants use the concept of an "integrated EPR" as the primary thrust reference, which is a combination of the ratio between pressure in front and behind the main fan blades (fan EPR) and the pressure ratio between the low pressure turbine and the blade input (core EPR). So this could be considered to be the ratio between the pressure entering the engine (in front of the big fan) and the total pressure coming out (from core and low pressure compressor).
Again the relationship between EPR and engine thrust is not totally linear, though it is certainly more linear than the relationship between N1 and thrust on engines using that mechanism as the primary thrust reference.
I understand the RB211 and subsequent Trent variants use the concept of an "integrated EPR" as the primary thrust reference, which is a combination of the ratio between pressure in front and behind the main fan blades (fan EPR) and the pressure ratio between the low pressure turbine and the blade input (core EPR). So this could be considered to be the ratio between the pressure entering the engine (in front of the big fan) and the total pressure coming out (from core and low pressure compressor).
Again the relationship between EPR and engine thrust is not totally linear, though it is certainly more linear than the relationship between N1 and thrust on engines using that mechanism as the primary thrust reference.
#54
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Yes, it is quite possible that in some weather conditions, you will not be able to take off, perhaps more to the point, won't be able to take off with a viable load. That applies to all aircraft. That's often seen in Oz, when the crosswinds at Sydney preclude the use of 16/34 and aircraft on long ops fly up to Brisbane to refuel, or perhaps drop in at Darwin, Perth or Melbourne.
#55
Original Member
Original Poster
Join Date: May 1998
Location: Portland OR Double Emerald (QF and AA), DL PM/MM, Starwood Plat
Posts: 19,589
CofG has quite a wide range of acceptable positions.... Firstly the wings are made up of multiple tanks. Secondly the leaking tank(s) were close to the centreline, and thirdly there is a tank much further out, which contained appreciable fuel. In any event, the aircraft won't spin from an empty tank on one side. It would certainly be one wing heavy, but complete loss of the contents is well within the control capabilities, although it would affect approach speeds, and helps explain why pilots do controlability checks.
Like all good stories, not quite true. ...The problem in BKK though was that the #4 thrust lever wasn't quite closed. That inhibited reverse thrust on all engines, and because the aircraft had flicked back to air mode, it also stopped the spoilers from rising. If anything the spoilers had a far bigger effect on the outcome than anything else.
The one aspect of QF32 that has not gotten a lot of public recognition is the great skill of the pilots in handling the failure, including dealing with multiple unexpected failures that I suspect were "not in the book" and not the way the simulator did them!!!! They deserve a lot of praise for being so competent and having an understanding of the way the airplane works and of the situation when deluged with system failures and unhelpful software.
#56
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Not really. All depends on the weather. Off a 4000 m runway (nil wind, 36°, max weight), you can go at FLEX 40 with flaps at 1+F and air conditioning off, or at Flex 37 with Config 2 and air on. But, at 37° Flex 37 actually equals TOGA, so I guess this is going to be very limiting through summer.
Last edited by jb747; Dec 15, 2010 at 9:53 pm
#57
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
Except that the A380 switched to alternate law (for reasons that are still not understood, at least per my sources) -- which means most of the flight laws that prevent this (complete loss of control) were inoperative. It was up to the skill of the pilots to keep the plane flying (the software basically said "too hard, give up").
They tried to pump fuel from the outboard wing tank to the center tank, but part of the engine shrapnel damage cut the wiring needed for that process (primary and not-so-redundant backup). Actually this is one of the most severe outcomes of the uncontained engine failure, that so much damage to so many crucial systems could occur ... far more than the design called for. A tribute to both the aircraft engineering and to the crew that they landed safely.
The one aspect of QF32 that has not gotten a lot of public recognition is the great skill of the pilots in handling the failure, including dealing with multiple unexpected failures that I suspect were "not in the book" and not the way the simulator did them!!!! They deserve a lot of praise for being so competent and having an understanding of the way the airplane works and of the situation when deluged with system failures and unhelpful software.
#58
Original Member
Original Poster
Join Date: May 1998
Location: Portland OR Double Emerald (QF and AA), DL PM/MM, Starwood Plat
Posts: 19,589
You'd better get your sources back to their books. The reversion to alternate law I was an easy to predict consequence. I've flown an A380 in alternate law (though I was in alt II). The aircraft is no worse mannered than a 747 (which, let's face it, spends its entire life in direct law). The software didn't 'give up', but it reverted to alternate law as the mode best suited to the aerodynamic configuration.....
One curious facet of the QF32 was the repeated autopilot disconnect during landing; is that also normal or predictable? The PIC tried to reengage it several times per ATSB report before giving up and landing manually (in what I call a very difficult landing that was perfectly executed).
#60
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Melbourne, Australia
Posts: 99
One curious facet of the QF32 was the repeated autopilot disconnect during landing; is that also normal or predictable? The PIC tried to reengage it several times per ATSB report before giving up and landing manually (in what I call a very difficult landing that was perfectly executed).