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KATZ V. UNITED STATES, 389 U. S. 347 (1967)

For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
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KYLLO v. UNITED STATES 533 U.S. 27

Held: Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment "search," and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Pp. 31-41.

(a) The question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no in most instances, but the antecedent question whether a Fourth Amendment "search" has occurred is not so simple. This Court has approved warrantless visual surveillance of a home, see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213, ruling that visual observation is no "search" at all, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U. S. 227, 234-235, 239. In assessing when a search is not a search, the Court has adapted a principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361: A "search" does not occur-even when its object is a house explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment-unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched object, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable, see, e. g., California v. Ciraolo, supra, at 211. Pp. 31-33.
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One might think that the new validating rationale would be that examining the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it is a "search" 1 despite the absence of trespass, is not an "unreasonable" one under the Fourth Amendment. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83, 104 (1998) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment).

But in fact we have held that visual observation is no "search" at all perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U. S. 227, 234-235, 239 (1986).

In assessing when a search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth-a location not within the catalog ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. We held that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because he "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of the telephone booth. Id., at 353. As Justice Harlan's oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. See id., at 361

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Title 49

§ 1540.1 Applicability of this subchapter and this part.

This subchapter and this part apply to persons engaged in aviation-related activities

§ 1540.5 Terms used in this subchapter

Sterile area means a portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that provides passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by TSA, or by an aircraft operator under part 1544 of this chapter or a foreign air carrier under part 1546 of this chapter, through the screening of persons and property.

§ 1540.107 Submission to screening and inspection.

(a) No individual may enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to the screening and inspection of his or her person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this subchapter.

§ 1540.105 Security responsibilities of employees and other persons.

(a) No person may:

(2) Enter, or be present within, a secured area, AOA, SIDA or sterile area without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas.

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Francine said: “As Chief Counsel, I firmly believe that TSA's ID requirements are warranted from a security perspective and entirely legal. Under a TSA regulatory provision, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2), a person may not enter the sterile area “without complying with the systems, measures, or procedures” applied to control access to the restricted area in question. Verifying the identity of passengers who access the sterile area falls within this rubric and is, in fact, part of TSA’s screening process. It is true that an earlier regulatory provision, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5, which sets forth definitions, states that access to the sterile area is “generally” controlled through the “screening” of persons and property and that “screening function means the inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries.” The definition of “screening function,” which focuses on physical inspection—the most intrusive form of screening—cannot be read to limit the Administrator’s broad expanse of authority under the operative language of section 1540.105(a)(2) to establish “systems, measures or procedures” governing sterile area access, including an ID screening process. Certainly, the common definition of screening encompasses methods other than physical intrusion. One definition of screening listed by Google reads as follows: “Is the person on a watch-list? Biometric information can be used to determine if a person is cleared to be in a restricted area, or if the person is on a watch list (eg the FBI Most Wanted list).” Similarly, under section 1602(a)(5) of the 9/11 Implementation Act, H.R. 1, the definition of cargo “screening” includes methods other than physical inspection. Given the Administrator’s fundamental statutory responsibility pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44901 to secure the aviation transportation system, a unduly narrow construction of § 1540.105(a)(5) cannot be justified.”


My response: A basic rule of construction concerning the interpretation of CFR’s is breached in your analysis. CFR’s are to be interpreted in the strictest sense especially when the regulation involves restrictions on individuals and their actions. The agency that promulgates the regulation also is the drafter. As such, if the agency wanted to make the rule broader, it should have drafted it as such.

49 C.F.R. §1540.105(a)(2) addresses not only the “sterile area” as related to systems, measures and procedures. It also includes secured areas, AOA’s and SIDA’s. For that reason, the other “systems, measures, or procedures being applied to control access to, or presence or movement in, such areas” are dependent on the particular area at issue. So, for example, in the case of SIDA’s an acceptable system would be the checking of ID’s. On the other hand the definition of sterile area sets forth the specifics for those systems, measures and procedures, which is the screening of persons and property. How is that screening accomplished – through the screening function, which is defined as “inspection of individuals and property for weapons, explosives, and incendiaries.” Until the CFR is amended, that is your limit for the sterile area.

You also conveniently left out two words (among others) when you state “that access to the sterile area is ‘generally’ controlled through the ‘screening’ of persons and property.” After the word “controlled”, the words “by TSA” were not included. As such, you give the impression that the word “generally” refers to the screening process when in fact the reference is to the TSA. That is not only disingenuous, but wrong. Boundaries are set for screening of persons and property.

We also don’t have a reason to go to Google for definitions of “screening.” It is contained in the CFR itself. If that definition is too restrictive, you just can’t conveniently ignore it; you need to go through the process of amending the regulation. In that manner the Google definition can then be included if you feel it is appropriate to accomplishing the TSA mission. Are you not amenable to that?

I had a very seasoned attorney once tell me that if he was given the opportunity to draft a document, as long as he was able to have free reign over the definitions section, then he would let the other side’s attorneys draft the rest of the document. Definitions are a critical and integral part of a legal instrument.

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