As usual, this ruling seems to raise all sorts of additional questions. Perhaps some could be answered with an understanding of the context of these appeals and the original charges/presecution:

1. "a passenger entering a secure zone at an airport may not leave the secure zone as an alternative to a required security search." Where does the "secure zone" begin? When do you begin entering it at which you can no longer withdraw consent? What is the court's signage requirements informing people what they will, by their actions, be submitting to?

2. "services special governmental needs, beyond ordinary law enforcement need." Does this mean that any evidence seized that fall into the realm of "law enforcement" outside of the "special governmental need" may not be seized under the special exception? (i.e.: drugs, bootleg software, "illegal" cash, fake IDs)?

The context of this ruling does not appear to have considered SPOTniks and their interrogations.

Of course, absent any contrary guidance or established/reaffirmed legal constraints, it's in Kippie's best interests to do anything he wants until someone tells him to stop.

If the playoff games this weekend are blow-outs, I may decide to find & read the United States v. Aukai decision. The best thing is that this was decided fairly recently, which means it was within the context of the present-day TSA.

How about the administrative search to which you submit while visiting a jail (visiting a prisoner or conducting official business)?

There is other case law on the inability to withdraw consent:

As with other administrative searches, concepts of implied consent and the ability to revoke that consent apply also to the security search situation. In the context of airports, consent is implied by entering public premises where searches are known to occur and have signs posted indicating the nature of searches.[27] Related specifically to airport security searches, the courts have split on whether once an administrative search has begun consent can be revoked.[28]

The holding that consent cannot be revoked, and that consent is implied by going to a security checkpoint, is United States v. Skipwith (5th Cir. 1973), whose reasoning focused mainly on the consequences of policy of allowing revocation.[29] The court noted that it is bad public policy to allow a would-be security threat to leave when faced with a search, only to allow them to return in the future for further attempts at breaching security, stating that it would encourage such attempts.[30] Best said in United States v. Herzbrun, (11th Cir.1984), a broad right to leave would constitute a one-way street for the benefit of a party planning airport mischief, since there is no guarantee that if he were allowed to leave he might not return and be more successful.[31] In contrast to Skipwith, United States v. Miner (9th Cir. 1973) held that implied consent could be revoked if done verbally and affirmatively. In such cases the person would be denied the ability to board the aircraft, and further searching would only be justified if the person reinstated implied consent by wanting to board the aircraft.[32]

A more recent case in the post-9/11 world has followed the Skipwith logic and present an interesting question regarding Blob Analysis. United States v. Hartwell (E.D. Pa. 2003) followed Skipwith stating that the Fourth Amendment does not require the TSA agents to give a prospective passenger who has triggered an alarm the option of avoiding a secondary search by choosing not to fly.[33] Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir.2002) follows this logic as well, where beginning to go through security procedures constituted implied consent, even to further scrutiny after one’s belongings had passed through the x-ray machine.[34]

Source: http://law.case.edu/student_life/org...ent.asp?id=177

This is a search incidental to arrest, not an administrative search. Covered as an exception to the 4th Amendment search warrant requirement.

I forgot about that, but yes, under the cloak of an administrative search, one could discover illegal activities and report to law enforcement. Law enforcement would have to obtain a search warrant, but the underlying facts and circumstances would certainly support the reason(s) for the warrant.

Thank you for the research - I was unaware this very issue had been covered by the courts for such a long period of time, and 9/11 was not the driver for these decisions, although it appears to be steering the courts away from the Miner decision. Personally, I consider the Miner decision to be correct and the others to be flawed. Public policy of this nature should not violate the rights of individuals. If someone continued to enter the checkpoint and then refused to complete a search, a better argument could be made to allow the airport or airline to use civil means to exclude that person from further attempts to enter the checkpoint regardless of their intent - "you can leave, but you can't come back again".

Do these decisions establish when an individual is subject to a search? For example:

Can someone be forcibly searched in a non-sterile area (ticket counter, baggage claim, gift shop, restaurant) because they are present in an environment where searches are known to occur?

Did this case establish an answer to the above question - when is consent given by 'going to a security checkpoint' - getting in line, presenting a boarding pass and ID, approaching the actual search devices, or passing through a search device?

TSA policy seems to support withdrawing from a search prior to the actual search commencing, even if someone is standing in line and has presented themselves to the checkpoint or even search device.

Why doesn't this doctrine apply at airports? If the fruits of an administrative search are transfered to a criminal search, the individual should be able to refuse the criminal search until a warrant is secured.

Again, I hold the view that an administrative search can never be converted to a criminal search without the complete consent of the individual being searched. I am beginning to the grow the opinion that this concept cannot be over-ridden by a warrant. If the individual refuses the criminal search, the fruits of the administrative search cannot be used as the basis for any further proceeding against that individual - no probable cause, arrest, detention, warrant or otherwise.

Unless it's an inventory search, correct?

If it were LE instead of another agency, this would be covered in two parts:
1. exigent circumstances led to the LEO being there (fire in the building and the first responder goes in to get everyone out)
and
2. plain view doctrine (so long as the LEO had a right to be there (see above) then anything the LEO views in plain view is admissible)

That's as my memory serves, at least. It's been a while since I've been on patrol.

If I had to take a guess, I'd say inherent mobility. Stuff at a checkpoint can be taken away, and would be, before a warrant could be drawn up. At the home, not unless the offender knew the jig was up. And even if they did there is the exception provided for (exigent circumstance) destruction or movement of evidence.

Correct-amundo.

Yes, but I believe the comment was in the context of the search of a person.

Very good question to which I don't have a good answer. I think LEO would be summoned and a search would commence under "exigent circumstances" or an overwhelming public safety interest.

From what I'm reading, the conveyor belt seems to be the committal point.

In that case it would be a search incident to arrest.

Or Terry, perhaps, if it was weapon-related.

Correct, although the officer would have to articulate specific observations in order to invoke Terry.