I think that the intervening 5-1/2 years has shown conclusively that passengers are now extremely willing to take positive action and if someone tries rushing the cockpit door, that person is going to be beaten senseless, perhaps lifeless, before he can do much more than scratch the paint. I am a 100 percent FAN of that plan, too. The plain and simple fact is that a terrorist is not going to be able to fight off 100 or more passengers. If the object of the game is ever to use an airplane as a guided missile again, that's not going to get past the snap of the ball before pax put it down with extreme prejudice. If anything, the FAs may have to stop the resulting retaliation against the offending terrorist before he winds up with his head and his shoulders in two different lavatories at landing.

As for keeping a bomb off the airplane, we need to be a hell of a lot more worried about cargo than we are about shampoo.

--PP

Where's the evidence for this? So far when people have identified themselves as air marshals, the passengers have just sat quietly, with the one exception of the guy who got shot (and wasn't mentally right in the first place). Otherwise there are a number of stories of pax sitting for an hour or more with their hands above their heads while FAM(s) hold guns on them.

What do you mean who cares? It makes a difference whether the guy trying to control the passengers is a FAM who wants to land the plane safely or a terrorist who wants to crash the plane into a building, doesn't it?

Radioing the ground might work (though initially that's only going to tell you if the airline knows whether there's supposed to be FAMs on the flight, not who the FAMs are). FAs may know what their ID is supposed to look like, but IDs can be faked.

But that doesn't answer the question. As I mention a few lines up, so far when someone pulls a gun and claims to be a FAM, the pax sit quietly. It's unlikely that the pax are going to try to beat senseless someone claiming to be a FAM who also has a gun.

If a fake FAM pulls this routine and the crew, especially the FAs, don't know whether he's legit or not, he's probably going to get the same deference as a real FAM, giving him (and presumably his partner(s)) quite an advantage. By the time anyone starts to figure out that these guys are lying, it could be too late.

No, I mean everyone on this board says that checking ID is not security. So why is checking FAMs ID somehow security? :confused:

It's not. That's exactly what I said in my response to you - that there has to be something more than an offline ID card to securely authenticate that someone is who he claims to be and is authorized to do something (e.g. carry a gun on a plane).

For example, in my educational institution, when I swipe my ID card the computer not only verifies that it's still valid, but it shows a picture of me to the security guard so he can make sure that I'm using my ID. This stops me from making a fake ID because there would be no record of it in the computer, and stops me from using someone else's valid ID that I've stolen because my face wouldn't match their picture. And this all happens at the same time. If the database is sufficiently secure, this is reasonable security.

Or think of a LEO. If you get pulled over by a cop he calls your drivers license in. Just because the card says you're licensed to drive, it doesn't mean that it's not fake, revoked or that something else hasn't happened in the months or years since you got that piece of plastic that materially changes the situation. These are things he can verify in realtime using a database.

On the other hand, someone showing up at the airport with ID that isn't checked in any way except by someone looking at it to see if the picture matches is not security.

Also, you're mixing up the "ID isn't security" argument. That's usually applied to passengers when the argument is made that by just showing a piece of plastic to someone security is increased. This isn't security because, among other reasons, IDs don't say "terrorist" or "non-terrorist" on them, so there's no value here.

Now I got you. Many LEOs have been asking for a biometric form of ID that could be used at all airports that would work like SIDA access (thereby bypassing security which is pretty obvious for LEOs) and that would transmit the data you're talking about. The problem is cost. Its pretty prohibitive.

This is just par for the course of TSA spending money in stupid things that won't help security (shoe carnivals, water carnivals, etc) while ignoring something that could have a more tangible effect on security.

If cost isn't a concer when it comes to decorating offices, handing out lifetime achievement awards to a then 2 year old agency, why would it balk at spending money on real security?

I think the answer to that question is rhetorical though.

Hand geometry readers with PIN pads are pretty old hat by now. A reasonable credential for FAMs would be a combination of a difficult to counterfeit ID card (holograms, RFID) and a one-time ticket generated from the hand geometry/pin reader with a daily code which would match a code on the FA's flight manifest. If the FAM had to identify him/herself, they could authenticate by comparing the one-time code on their daily ticket to that on the FA's manifest. That's just one way. This sort of technology is routinely used for data center access.

Another is a one-time pad authentication token (changes daily) which is incorperated into the FAM's credentials and could be compared to the manifest. That technology is being tested in credit cards now.

Everything I just described is off the shelf. A fake FAM who doesn't authenticate properly either gets nabbed by a real FAM (and yes, they should know who each other are) or by the other passengers, if necessary, after the FA raises the alarm.

I agree that "tin" is useless, but we civilians are strangely reassured by it. Please accept our TV-fueled love for badge-wielding cops. Marshall Dylon would never be caught without his tin star, after all.

This is probably something that could be rolled into TWIC, no? (If/when that happens.)

Ok - enough about the debate on ID's & FAM's - get your own thread! ;)

The topic is have you noticed a flight to/from DCA where there was not a FAM in F?

As usual, there were two FAMs in F across the aisle from each other on my 100% full 9 PM flight from ORD to DCA. They never spoke while on the flight, but I saw them walking together and chatting after deboarding. Why does DHS follow this ridiculous routine on every flight? The FAMs stick out like sore thumbs and are easily recognized by any terrorist. The FAMs SHOULD move around on the plane and board with regular passengers if they truly want to surprise a terrorist. :td:

OTOH, I have little confidence that the government (or private contractors spending taxpayer money, like Lockheed-Martin is to the tune of hundreds of millions on TSA ID's) coming up with a tenable ID solution even for such a limited-scope problem as ID'ing FAMs and other officials permitted to carry firearms aboard planes. Just seeing the results of the IC's attempts to come up with inter-agency ID badges that can be used at different facilities has convinced me there's little hope at this point. :(

Bopsie Twins, IMO.

They are visible and identifiable, to any trained observer, because they are supposed to be visible and identifiable to such people.

Think about it: if you had a choice of:
a) using FAM's to kill terrorists after they start an attack on a plane (with possible collateral loss of life, property and/or bad publicity); or,
b) using FAM's to deter terrorists from even planning an attack on a plane;
which one would you select?

Do you have any evidence that says they are supposed to be undercover? (It isn't even possible unless they make a number of fundamental changes I have suggested in other threads.)

Then why not have them announce during pushback, "Hello, everyone, Mr. X and I are your FAMs for this flight!" :rolleyes: Or wear badges, carry firearms openly, etc.?

The obvious reason they're supposed to be undercover is to prevent potential terrorists from knowing who they are / where they are seated on the plane, as with that knowledge, terrorists would certainly have their first targets picked out as well as potential access to known firearms.

The fact that terrorists "don't know" whether or not FAMs are onboard is arguably a reasonable deterrent in and of itself, at least as much as knowing they ARE there and knowing which people they are, and lacks the dangers to the FAMs and the passengers of the terrorists knowing who has the guns.

The problem, of course, is that the existing policies and procedures in place don't let FAMs blend in very well. See someone in F when you're the first to board? Pretty good odds that's a FAM. See someone showing credentials to the GA prior to boarding, then being escorted down the jetway ahead of everyone else? Another giveaway sign.

Two things:

1) If they're not supposed to be undercover, why aren't they in uniform or like other "open" LEO's?

2) The whole program makes no sense unless they are undercover (and even then it makes little sense). If the hypothetical terrorists can quickly and reliably spot the two FAM's aboard, how hard do you think it would be for them to cap those two guys in one lightning-fast move as they commence their hijacking?