kokonutz

Oy, one more reason to choose DCA over IAD.

bsmnsr

Here's another article on the topic.

http://www.freep.com/article/2012041...heck-in-system

cordelli

At this time it's supposedly not connected to outside database.

It compares the written text to the coded information in the barcode, stripe, etc. It supposedly checks for the security feature of the ID like the ones at bars that use them (that cost way less money). It also compares the information in the barcode on the boarding pass to the printed information on the boarding pass, and compares the information on the ID to that on the boarding pass.

It's supposed to detect a fake ID, an altered ID (unless you alter the barcode/stripe too), and an altered boarding pass, and prevent the ID checker from not noticing the ID and Boarding Pass are not to the same person.

VelvetJones

There is nothing to reverse engineer. Most DLs use an standard encoding method. It is a published standard. In the TSAs defense, they're not the only stupid government agency who has fell for this BS. For some reason state and federal bureaucrats think the front of an ID, with the various layers of holograms and other anti-counterfeit devices, are easy to fake, but a simply bar code or magnetic strip and the back is completely tamper proof and impossible to fake. This speaks volumes about the intelligence and technical competence of the people in charge of these agencies.

spd476

How long will it be before there is a news story about someone missing a flight because one of these machines incorrectly says an ID or boarding pass is not valid? Even though an ID is not technically needed to fly, I can see some TDC's making it difficult to get through security if the machine malfunctions. Talk about an expensive solution to a problem that doesn't exist. As long as everyone is screened properly, who cares if bad people are on the flight.

Global_Hi_Flyer

Or wrongfully arrested.

FliesWay2Much

After several statements that the system "is not configured" to store personal information, there is this gem in section 9:

This doesn't say that the system cannot store information. It says it "is not configured" to store personal information -- a huge difference. With a software command, this system can be networked throughout an airport or even through the TSA.

Remember: The Cancer boxes "aren't configured to store or transmit images" either.

-- More after I review the specs a little more in depth.

FliesWay2Much

Did they still have the clerks 5' behind the ID checking clerks checking IDs a second time?

goalie

This newest waste of our tax dollars is already being discussed over here:

http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/check...hines-iad.html

WillCAD

Remember - when the AIT scanners were first deployed, TSA told us flat out that they were incapable of storing or transmitting images.

It was only later, when someone proved them wrong, that they admitted, "Oh, what we meant was that the store/transmit functions are turned off, and they're not capable of storing or transmitting images as long as those functions are turned off."

Today, the ATR software is being deployed. According to articles I've read, the ATR software doesn't work on a finished image, it works on the raw data from the scan.

This makes me wonder is we've been duped yet again - sure, AIT scanners, even those with ATR, never store or transmit the images. But do they store, archive, and transmit the raw data from which the images are formed? Meaning that, at any time, the raw data from any scan could be pulled, run through about 2 seconds of software, and create the image in vivid detail?

I sound paranoid, even to myself, but after the lies, half-truths, lies-by-omission, and intentional deceptions that TSA has pulled over the last few years, I have difficulty trusting anything the agency says, particularly when it comes to safeguarding - or simply not invading - the privacy, rights, and freedoms of the general public.

GUWonder

CAT-BPSS info to be found there:

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportun...s&tabmode=list

The TSA is telling the public that it will speed up things. Of course they said that about the strip search machines too, and there's plenty that shows it wastes more time too.

mikeef

As William Randolph Hearst said, "You provide the pictures and I'll furnish the war."

Why they didn't just get a simple scanner. Oldie (and falsie) but goodie here.

Mike

wayan

And the day has come - here they are in action today, which by the long lines and slow processing, would seem to be the first day in use: http://www.flickr.com/photos/dcmetro...in/photostream

GUWonder

"Not configured to do ABC" and "not capable to do ABC" are indeed two different things. Re-configuration can be done to turn on capabilities that are already present, at least with other systems.

How are system updates going to be done? Networked (periodical or otherwise) or not?

One of the things the government has been doing to get around privacy rights is to "ignore" backdoors in certain systems that can be used by "trusted" partners -- foreign government or private sector parties -- abroad that then use the network's information to do what the US wants done but cannot be done domestically in a legal manner by the US government directly itself.

Between government offshoring and public-private partnerships, a lot of dirty tricks have been done by governments afraid of transparency necessary for there to be due scrutiny and accountability.

That all ignored for a moment, this is just more money wasted on expensive junk that results in slowing down or hassling people more intentionally -- not a good thing.

ID is not security, and the government needs to get out of the business of hassling free people for ID to merely travel in one's own country.

Critic

All of this is wonderful, except that checking for the validity of personal identity documents was never in the TSA's mandate. And even if it were...didn't the 9/11 hijackers travel on GENUINE driver licenses (albeit by fraudulent means, thereby prompting REALID)? So ultimately, were there to be a replay in 2012, neither the TDC nor the machine would have any reason to stop the hijackers from entering the checkpoint.

TSA: Full of Sound & Fury, Signifying Nothing Since 2001.