![]() |
I can't speak for others, but this video sums up my emotions over LK's departure:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbM8Iu-547k |
Originally Posted by HeathrowGuy
(Post 12902898)
I can't speak for others, but this video sums up my emotions over LK's departure:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbM8Iu-547k |
Originally Posted by GTITAN
(Post 12902518)
Soc you should start an analogous thread in the NW sub-forum of the DL Forum asking what the legacy of Doug Steenland is. Let me start with my thoughts on that: :rolleyes:
Soc PS nah - wont start this same type of discussion over in the DL forums....theirs too many Koolaid drinkers out there that believe the world is all right as long as there's widgets painted everywhere (afterall didn't know you widgets will solve world peace?) |
What a joke
Originally Posted by pbarnette
(Post 12899820)
Indeed. You have stated it more eloquently than I did, but I was trying to convey the same point. I don't think either Bethune or LK did enough to fundamentally change CO in a way that enables them to make money over the long-term. Maybe it was cowardice or maybe it was lack of imagination or maybe it was simply being hamstrung by bad labor agreements, lousy fleets, and over-expanded networks. Whatever the reason, I think that LK's biggest failing is that he hasn't done anything, one way or the other, to better position CO for the long-haul. He's applied some nice band-aids, but I'm not going to throw a parade for a guy who's big accomplishment was narrowly avoiding bankruptcy.
Of course, this is the failing of pretty much all of the legacy airlines. Certainly UA and US are in even worse shape, followed closely by AA. About the only US carrier that might be argued to have acted aggressively to change the fundamentals of their business is DL, but I seriously wonder if their big bet will ever pay off, or if they have simply doubled down on a losing strategy. Regardless, CO stands today where it stood at the beginning of LK's term - a small full-service carrier, lacking the reach to compete aggressively with the big boys, and lacking the cost structure to compete with the LCCs. It was a lousy strategy for the past decade and I think it will remain a lousy strategy for the next one. If even one thing (oil price increases, sustained decline in premium travel) doesn't break CO's way, it will be an even worse strategy than it was during the relatively good market of the past 10 years. It would be one thing if this arm chair CEO was even entertaining. It's just redundant complaining with a complete lack of macro understanding of the industry and it's challenges. |
Originally Posted by airzim
(Post 12905262)
It would be one thing if this arm chair CEO was even entertaining. It's just redundant complaining with a complete lack of macro understanding of the industry and it's challenges.
"LK's biggest failing is that he hasn't done anything, one way or the other, to better position CO for the long-haul" As I demonstrated the business has stumbled along at breakeven over a 5 year period, without significant change, while a major competitor (WN) has grown slightly faster while making a reasonable return. The result is CAL has pretty close to zero nett worth in the balance sheet today, so it's vulnerable to pretty much any unforseen event - terrorism, rising fuel prices, a prolonged grounding for technical reasons, a significant strike, a failure of a credit card processor - pretty much any of these (and others) could drive the business back into bankruptcy. You can ride out these problems if you have a profitable business and a buffer in the balance sheet. CAL has neither. |
Originally Posted by airzim
(Post 12905262)
Thank god you, channa, or TWA don't run an airline. You have clearly no idea what you're talking about.
It would be one thing if this arm chair CEO was even entertaining. It's just redundant complaining with a complete lack of macro understanding of the industry and it's challenges. |
Originally Posted by TWA Fan 1
(Post 12905671)
It's funny, though, isn't it that the only airlines that are doing better are the ones who've resisted falling into lockstep with the rest of the legacy carriers and into the resulting inevitable swamp of mediocre product and mediocre results.
|
Originally Posted by Steph3n
(Post 12899623)
Playing devil's advocate here a bit...Maybe the board wants to go the near LCC direction, and Kellner was 'not under my watch' but it was done anyway as he was on the way out.
|
Originally Posted by bernardd
(Post 12905710)
It's a perfect demonstration that if you follow the herd you can only ever achieve mediocrity. If you aspire to excellence, by definition you have to try something a little different.
Although it still maintains some of its exceptional features (especially its great people), Kellner's influence was to water this down so that CO looks more like all the other legacies than it did when he took over as CEO. And, as he has morphed the airline into just another mediocre legacy carrier, its financial perfomance has worsened and now mirrors that of the other legacy carriers. One more note: There is soooo much more that could be done with the airline product, in terms of target marketing the product, monetizing product based on added value (not reduced value), but it's simply stunning how profoundly visionless all these airline managers are. I can only think of my own business, broadcasting. I came into the industry in the 80's, at the tail end of its so-called glory days. It's horrifying to see how far network TV has fallen in that time and how deeply uninnovative and narrow most network management has been in all that time. While some have engaged in a certain-to-fail race to the bottom with reality TV and talk shows in primetime, one man, the great Leslie Moonves, has stood out. Not only has he retained audiences with great programming, he's made a mint doing it. As long as you're giving people garbage, garbage it what you'll get back in return. It's a lot harder to take risks, break the mold, spend money to make money than to just follow the fold, lemming-like, and declare you're a genius because you're charging customers to check bags. |
Kind of like you following the herd?
Originally Posted by bernardd
(Post 12905710)
It's a perfect demonstration that if you follow the herd you can only ever achieve mediocrity. If you aspire to excellence, by definition you have to try something a little different.
Plus I love how you ignore that they fly some of their initiatives over the years; new airplanes, upgraded BusinessFirst, joined Star Alliance, added Live TV, launched more international flights to India and China (and still the only ones to offer daily nonstops when everyone else reduced or pulled out), launched the PDA site for frequent fliers, continued to provide meals and mealtimes, and gained access to LHR etc. If you somehow think merging with another carrier is somehow innovative, especially when it stresses labor relations, customer experiences, IT integration issues, and product consistency, and has yet to demonstrate any significant cost savings for either US Airways or Delta. Have a gander over on the DL and US boards and see how they like all their "innovation" And of course you whipped out the old, "well Southwest is better" rebuttal. Southwest only succeeds by keeping expectations low, providing basic service, not interlining, no first class, meals, common fleet, no long haul flying etc. Not saying that's a bad thing, it just doesn't work everywhere. Plus you ignore that WN is having labor issues, and they're losing money. Wow so innovative. So tell me when you're handicapped with historical legacy labor contracts (and you already pay lousy salaries), with high fixed costs (pension, health care, salaries), high variable costs (oil, aircraft), high government imposed ticket taxes, shrinking customer and yield base, and an uneven market playing field (foreign competition), what other magic rabbit you think you can pull out of your hat? Oh I know, arm chair 101, rip seats out of economy class to give me more leg room. Dump the RJ's and Q400's and fly 737 on all short hops. And fly wide bodies interhub and to the West Coast from EWR with three cabin service. And have SWU and easier access to premium seating and upgrades for all elite levels. Oh and you're expected to find a way to maintain your "profit margins" at the same time despite the fact that every initiative has been tried before and failed, multiple times. Or you could stop the whining and chose to fly another carrier. But silly me, what would be the point in life if I couldn't complain endlessly on Flyertalk? I might actually have to speak to my wife occasionally. |
Originally Posted by TWA Fan 1
(Post 12905671)
It's funny, though, isn't it that the only airlines that are doing better are the ones who've resisted falling into lockstep with the rest of the legacy carriers and into the resulting inevitable swamp of mediocre product and mediocre results.
B6 is vaguely profitable right now and they charge for checked bags (2nd or more), pillows/blankets, headphones, more legroom, etc. Are they truly different? They don't seem too much so to me. Maybe in their willingness to drop service to smaller destinations. Allegient is the only carrier that remains consistently profitable and they don't meet my needs at all. So which are the special carriers that have broken free from mediocrity and are raking in the dough? CO has certainly taken a measured approach to all their changes in recent years. With the exception of throwing dozens of 752s across the Atlantic they haven't really been first at anything. I'm not sure that makes them mediocre or not, but they have survived. And while they may not be ideally situated for the next 3 years they do seem to still be above the mean-line when compared to other US-based carriers. Is that really failing? |
Originally Posted by airzim
(Post 12905262)
Thank god you, channa, or TWA don't run an airline. You have clearly no idea what you're talking about.
It would be one thing if this arm chair CEO was even entertaining. It's just redundant complaining with a complete lack of macro understanding of the industry and it's challenges. Setting the international and flag carrier market aside, as it plays by different rules, the US domestic market has a challenge - extract more yield from each seat mile. If they invest in the product, the only way to reclaim those costs is by extracting more yield on the revenue side, which means higher fares. Unfortunately, *most* (not all) customers are unwilling to pay more to get more - they go to online sites and look for the bare bottom lowest fare and flip airlines by their personal equation of money vs. time (do I spent $25 more for a nonstop?). Loyalty programs are a good way for airlines to combat flipping - if you don't fly the airline whose program you belong, you "lose" something - miles, points, promotions, benefits or some other item whose perceived value is designed to outweigh the actual difference in fare a customer might be asked to pay. The problem is, product differentiation in itself is not sufficient to stop flipping or attract new customers - it might encourage *some* to pay more, or some to buy their ticket on a particular airline, but not enough to make the investment in product worthwhile. Whereas some airlines looked at this situation and say 'screw the customer' (i.e. USAir), other airlines made attempts at differentiation and failed (AA MRTC) because they didn't touch the right customer nerve. Larry looked at this problem in another way (and I believe we helped shape this vision) - spend $1 extra on product if it brings in $1.10 in revenue. Other ways he thought out of the box - the LiveTV arrangement which cost CO nothing. So yes - running an airline and designing an airline product are difficult challenges when your planes are full (of lower yielding customers) and people are unwilling to spend more. I believe the concept of 'fees' began as a way to 'ambush' customers - it's really a form of bait and switch. Sell your customers a cheap ticket for transportation, but surprise them (many are still surprised) after-sale when they discover their bags will cost an extra $100 and they have no choice but to pay. This trend of 'unbundling' is designed to allow airlines to advertise one cost, and charge another - the 'transportation' cost covers you in the seat, and can be lower than it needs to be because if you want to take bags, eat, drink, watch TV or pee (Ryanair), it will cost you extra - and some experts have calculated that an airline can collect $300 in revenue from a passenger while still selling them a $200 plane ticket. If they advertised that $300 plane ticket, they wouldn't sell any seats because their competitor is advertising a $200 ticket (plus fees). Unbundling is a like a drug to a revenue-hungry company operating in a hypercompetitive market because it masks the true cost of the ticket. So the bottom line is you can either join the herd (as most majors do), or figure out a way to stand out from it. WN found a way - instead of harping on fare differences, it attracted customers frustrated by ambush fees with their 'bags fly free' marketing campaign. It turned bag fees into an issue and capitalized on it. B6 developed a 'mystique' around its low fares - think jetBlue and you think 'low fares'. The truth is, B6's fares on many routes aren't as low as many think. Continental needs its own issue to break out from the herd and capitalize - and that is the only way it can get fares up and yields up without losing ticket sales or constantly shrinking capacity. AA found that extra legroom doesn't resonate enough. VX is now undercutting everyone with a tech and feature-savvy product while its able to maintain low Y fares as a low cost carrier. I don't have an easy answer - but what CO needs is a visionary leader who can find that missing connection with frustrated or uncomfortable customers and tap into it. Riding the 'hub-hostage' horse won't work forever. They need to figure out what items they can spend a $1 on that will bring in $1.10 or more. |
Originally Posted by sbm12
(Post 12905896)
Which are those?
B6 is vaguely profitable right now and they charge for checked bags (2nd or more), pillows/blankets, headphones, more legroom, etc. Are they truly different? They don't seem too much so to me. CO has certainly taken a measured approach to all their changes in recent years. With the exception of throwing dozens of 752s across the Atlantic they haven't really been first at anything. I'm not sure that makes them mediocre or not, but they have survived. And while they may not be ideally situated for the next 3 years they do seem to still be above the mean-line when compared to other US-based carriers. Is that really failing? You get a more comfortable seat on DL, UA, AA, or even US. You get free TV and "snacks" on DL. For the non-Elite flyer, I'd say among the legacies that DL probably is a hair above the rest, while the others all more or less equally suck. |
Originally Posted by channa
(Post 12905989)
Extra legroom as an option, free TV, free first bag. CO has none of that. Compared to industry average, B6 seem to be above average for the Y flyer.
Originally Posted by channa
(Post 12905989)
CO has indeed been conservative, but aside from the "meal," I'm not sure what puts them above the mean-line at this point.
Originally Posted by channa
(Post 12905989)
You get a more comfortable seat on DL, UA, AA, or even US.
Originally Posted by channa
(Post 12905989)
You get free TV and "snacks" on DL. For the non-Elite flyer, I'd say among the legacies that DL probably is a hair above the rest, while the others all more or less equally suck.
|
Originally Posted by bocastephen
(Post 12905920)
And what makes you the expert? Do you run an airline? Have a degree in aviation management?
Setting the international and flag carrier market aside, as it plays by different rules, the US domestic market has a challenge - extract more yield from each seat mile. If they invest in the product, the only way to reclaim those costs is by extracting more yield on the revenue side, which means higher fares. Unfortunately, *most* (not all) customers are unwilling to pay more to get more - they go to online sites and look for the bare bottom lowest fare and flip airlines by their personal equation of money vs. time (do I spent $25 more for a nonstop?). Loyalty programs are a good way for airlines to combat flipping - if you don't fly the airline whose program you belong, you "lose" something - miles, points, promotions, benefits or some other item whose perceived value is designed to outweigh the actual difference in fare a customer might be asked to pay. The problem is, product differentiation in itself is not sufficient to stop flipping or attract new customers - it might encourage *some* to pay more, or some to buy their ticket on a particular airline, but not enough to make the investment in product worthwhile. Whereas some airlines looked at this situation and say 'screw the customer' (i.e. USAir), other airlines made attempts at differentiation and failed (AA MRTC) because they didn't touch the right customer nerve. Larry looked at this problem in another way (and I believe we helped shape this vision) - spend $1 extra on product if it brings in $1.10 in revenue. Other ways he thought out of the box - the LiveTV arrangement which cost CO nothing. So yes - running an airline and designing an airline product are difficult challenges when your planes are full (of lower yielding customers) and people are unwilling to spend more. I believe the concept of 'fees' began as a way to 'ambush' customers - it's really a form of bait and switch. Sell your customers a cheap ticket for transportation, but surprise them (many are still surprised) after-sale when they discover their bags will cost an extra $100 and they have no choice but to pay. This trend of 'unbundling' is designed to allow airlines to advertise one cost, and charge another - the 'transportation' cost covers you in the seat, and can be lower than it needs to be because if you want to take bags, eat, drink, watch TV or pee (Ryanair), it will cost you extra - and some experts have calculated that an airline can collect $300 in revenue from a passenger while still selling them a $200 plane ticket. If they advertised that $300 plane ticket, they wouldn't sell any seats because their competitor is advertising a $200 ticket (plus fees). Unbundling is a like a drug to a revenue-hungry company operating in a hypercompetitive market because it masks the true cost of the ticket. So the bottom line is you can either join the herd (as most majors do), or figure out a way to stand out from it. WN found a way - instead of harping on fare differences, it attracted customers frustrated by ambush fees with their 'bags fly free' marketing campaign. It turned bag fees into an issue and capitalized on it. B6 developed a 'mystique' around its low fares - think jetBlue and you think 'low fares'. The truth is, B6's fares on many routes aren't as low as many think. Continental needs its own issue to break out from the herd and capitalize - and that is the only way it can get fares up and yields up without losing ticket sales or constantly shrinking capacity. AA found that extra legroom doesn't resonate enough. VX is now undercutting everyone with a tech and feature-savvy product while its able to maintain low Y fares as a low cost carrier. I don't have an easy answer - but what CO needs is a visionary leader who can find that missing connection with frustrated or uncomfortable customers and tap into it. Riding the 'hub-hostage' horse won't work forever. They need to figure out what items they can spend a $1 on that will bring in $1.10 or more. I would just add one comment about the "spend $1 to make $1.10" slogan Kellner employed so often. I know this made for a good sound bite but I hope he didn't really believe it, or more precisely, that he didn't create a linear correlation between a dollar spent and $1.10 earned. First of all, what could that possibly mean in an enterprise as complex and inscrutable as a major airline? Where do you identify the dollar spent? In a dozen different departments? How do you correlate that to the revenue earned? What if you need to spend $1.50 in the short term to earn $1.00 but this invesemtent results in a $2.00 long-term ROI? And so on. But if Kellner really believed this was the right approach then we gain a window on the lack of risk-taking, the lack of boldness. And when you will not take risk or be bold, then clearly the only way to increase return is to nickel and dime. Which is what he did. One would hope that Mr Smisek will take a broader, bolder approach that will appreciate how much value is not being monetized in the most lucrative tranche of the demand right now, the sub-premium business traveler. |
| All times are GMT -6. The time now is 11:09 pm. |
This site is owned, operated, and maintained by MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. Copyright © 2026 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Designated trademarks are the property of their respective owners.