gsoltso

The shooting at LAX was a different animal. I see many comments here that make it seem like the STSO in the checkpoint is supposed to stand up and tell everyone to form a line here, and we will evacuate through the doors over there, that's right folks, the blue door with green stripes - an active shooter situation is madness in a confined space. The shooter is intent on shooting things, the people that realize what is going on are a unique mixture of people frozen by terror, motivated to get out in any way possible, outright fleeing with no regard or thought, that one dude that thinks he is Jean Claude Van Damme and is just looking for an opening to take the shooter out with 2 paper clips, just like they did in the movie, and then there is the increase in terror as the shooter begins to have success, blood, gore, people screaming for help and begging and praying and trying to hide behind something... The primary concern of all unarmed people in an active shooter situation, should be to safely extract themselves, shelter in place if no extraction route provides itself, and to fight like they are fighting for their lives if there is simply no other choice - because they really are fighting for their lives. The process back then was simply run, then meet up at designated rallying points.

When an active shooter comes into play, screening passengers stops, and the local LEOs are in charge of the response. Essentially, everyone just needs to get out of the way in as quick and safe of a manner as possible, after that, TSA has to wait until the LEOs release the scene before they even contemplate the steps required for securing and reopening the checkpoints. There is the lockdown that comes after the conclusion of the actual incident, then the evidence gathering in the wake of the event, and finally, the cleaning/reconditioning of any areas that need it. After all of that, it takes a bit to get things settled, and reorganized - especially if you have a large portion of your workforce that are hurt/dead/shellshocked from the event. The plan in place worked, but not as efficiently as the one that I would think is in place now. That event actually triggered much of the current format of active shooter training and drills that civilian corporations and government organizations use alike.

If the same thing happened a month from now, I would *hope* that the response would be better, but no one knows what the future holds. My fervent hope is that we never have to deal with this type of a scenario again - anywhere.

Boggie Dog

Since TSA claims to be on the front lines of the war on terror is it not reasonable to think TSA workers would stand fast against any attack or abnormal event?

Sometimes duty calls for extreme personal sacrifice.

chollie

I don't see the additional risk in doing something like stopping the trams and making sure the secure area stays secure so a terminal dump and the ensuing predictable risk created by masses of people crammed together isn't necessary. If the police can do a better job of securing the scene with minimum disruption, then that should happen.

Boggie Dog

No, but at airports like DFW the exit of TSA screening dumps right in the gate areas with access to all terminals via tram. To stop contamination of the sterile areas would require something like an emergency stop button which would in turn actuate drop barriers and lock the doors of the trams preventing access.. For a few moments our uniformed, badge carrying TSA screeners are going to be required to protect the exit of the screening area if at risk of injury.

gsoltso

This is quite possibly the most ridiculous thing I have ever seen you post, and that covers the more than a decade of us posting back and forth.

This would be like expecting a paper towel to try and stop a flash flood - the paper towel was not designed to be a part of flash flood prevention or reaction, it was designed to clean up smaller spills . TSOs are designed to prevent unauthorized entry of WEIs and in some cases individuals into secured areas - not respond tactically to an armed invader bent on the destruction of life and/or property. TSOs, (at least a majority of them) have had no tactical training at all. They do not understand fire maneuvers or how to counterbalance against a better armed enemy. Heck, at this point, a large portion of the younger TSOs have probably never been in a physical conflict of any kind. To expect them to make a stand against an armed opponent, with no training is just plain silly.

Side note, you and I grew up different than the kids we are working with today (for the most part). When we had a dustup or threw knuckles at school, (for the most part) it happened, then you may serve a day or two in in school suspension, then everyone was over it. Many of the younger people we work with have never had to deal with a physical confrontation of any sort. They also are not as likely to be educated about firearms basics and targeting geometry in a real time event. The vast majority have played Call of Duty, but have never seen or learned how to use things against someone wielding a firearm.

gsoltso

Agreed, and that was one of the points we were discussing earlier. The powers that be at MCO are already holding security program/response reviews in order to see what they can do to respond better and more efficiently in the future. Having a "stop the trams" program to respond to something like this is most likely on the table - whether it will be a part of the program moving forward, is anyones guess.

General consensus here seems to be that stopping the trams would be a good addition to the security plan for MCO, as well as other locations with similar designs.

WillCAD

Yes, and the thing that sickens me is that nobody ever thought of it before.

MCO's terminal has had this split, tram-connected landside/airside configuration since it opened in 1981. TSA has operated the two checkpoints since late 2001 or early 2002 - seventeen or more years. And in that time, despite the many breach situations that have occurred throughout the US, nobody at MCO TSA has thought, "Hey, we outta figure out a way to quickly shut off the trams and isolate the five buildings from each other if somebody bum rushes the checkpoint, or if there's an active shooter incident like at LAX, or if there's a bomb threat or a fire or any other kind of emergency in any one of the five buildings..."

Instead, TSA stood around after this incident and allowed the trams to keep running, leaving them with no choice but to do a terminal dump on two airside buildings. I believe I read that it was thirty minutes after the incident before someone at TSA decided, "Oops, unscreened pax got through the c/p, better screen 'em... wait, they're already in the airside buildings? Darny darn darn, I guess we better dump the terminals and delay a hundred flights! Abundance of caution! 9/11! 9/11! 9/11!" Had the TSM on site simply said, "Breach! Isolate the checkpoint!" and pushed a panic button that stopped the trams and returned any in transit to the landside building for rescreening, one hundred flights and thousands of travelers would not have needed to endure three hours of hell - right next to the scene of this unfortunate man's suicide.

They say that 9/11 was caused partly by a lack of imagination on our part; this is why TSA focuses on so many ludicrous theoretical threats like liquid explosives, sheet explosives, underwear bombs, lightsabers, and purses with embossed guns, because they are letting their imagination run wild with them, trying to imagine and interdict any and all theoretical and potential threats. But in the process, they're completely missing many proven, likely threats, such as guns and undisguised explosives, and also neglecting or ignoring the need for contingency plans for stuff that has ALREADY HAPPENED and will likely happen again, such as active shooters and checkpoint breaches.

I've often castigated TSA for their unconscionable (and in my view, un-Constitutional) violations of travelers' individual rights and personal freedoms. I've occasionally pontificated on isolated incidents of utter stupidity, and on the complete uselessness of so many of the activities in which the agency engages. But this one shows complete and utter incompetence at an extremely busy international tourist hub (number 12 in the US by emplanements in 2017). I am flabbergasted by the lack of a quick breach response, and dismayed to think that my security when I fly through MCO is in the hands of an agency with so little ability to do the most basic things it exists to do.

chollie

At Sandy Hook, an unarmed school teacher got flamed for taking cover and not coming out until it was over.

She wasn't armed or trained, but like all of our teachers, she was expected to put herself between the students and danger. It's a responsibility that comes with the job.

If LE is supposed to step in and take charge, then it's incumbent on TSA to have designated people who have the responsibility to summon LE. It isn't at all clear to me that the MCO screeners contacted LE immediately as they were running away, nor is it clear that LE had a plan in place to coordinate the dump and orderly re-screening.

Besides, a significant percentage of the screeners are vets. They should have had more training and possibly experience in keeping cool during hot situations than the average screener. There sure was no sign of ex-military calm under fire.

Boggie Dog

I think we agree that screeners are suppose to control entry into the secure area. Why is it "quite possibly the most ridiculous thing I have ever seen you post" expecting screeners to do their job and control access to the secure area?

petaluma1

Click to open the entire string of tweets.

MSPeconomist

WillCAD

I do recall seeing articles about other terminal dumps following a breach (someone ran through the c/p and into the terminal), where a cursory search by TSOs did take place before re-opening the terminal. From the pics I saw in the article, and the text I vaguely recall reading, it seemed that TSOs were peering inside trash cans and and looking under seats, but the search seemed to be more like a sweep, with TSOs walking the terminal from one end to the other in about twenty minutes.

Of course, my memory of these incidents is fuzzy; I can't remember in which airports they took place or exactly when, I only remember reading that the traveling public was outraged at the lengthy delay over a single person running through the c/p.