Just How Safe Is TSA Security?
#1
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Just How Safe Is TSA Security?
TSA gropes the genitals of men, women, and children looking for WEI which includes knives yet airport workers have free access, almost no chance of screening, and can carry in almost any kind of weapon they wish.
Why is it that TSA claims to protect air travelers when the reality is that TSA doesn't even come close to meeting its mandated obligations to the public?
Man knifed on tarmac at Philadelphia airport.
Box cutter!! The exact same weapon that was used on 9/11 to take over the aircraft that day and here 17 years later the exact same weapon is in the secure area of this airport.
Exactly what does the public get from the $8,000,000,000.00 taxpayer dollars that TSA gets each year?
TSA's answer to date when asked about screening airport workers: "It's too hard."
Why is it that TSA claims to protect air travelers when the reality is that TSA doesn't even come close to meeting its mandated obligations to the public?
Man knifed on tarmac at Philadelphia airport.
"Police say a fight in a break room on the tarmac between three Worldwide Flight Services employees, who are contracted by Frontier Airlines to clean planes, led to the fatal stabbing."
"Police say a 35-year-old man stabbed his 28-year-old co-worker in the stomach, most likely with a box cutter."
Exactly what does the public get from the $8,000,000,000.00 taxpayer dollars that TSA gets each year?
TSA's answer to date when asked about screening airport workers: "It's too hard."
#3
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Serious question? Aircraft cleaners would need box cutters to do exactly what? Stash one under a seat cushion for later recovery during a flight by a bad guy? The issue in my mind is the feces that TSA puts passengers through while airport workers go about their business without notice by TSA.
If I have a house with two doors but only lock one is the house secure? Is an airport secure if a subset of all people entering are not searched?
TSA constantly tells us how "the terrorist" are constantly probing for security weaknesses. It would be a pretty dumb person who can't see through the hole in TSA's security plan.
Last edited by Boggie Dog; May 4, 2018 at 7:36 am
#4
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 962
The issue in my mind is the feces that TSA puts passengers through while airport workers go about their business without notice by TSA.
However, I don't believe that box cutters pose any threat to aviation whatsoever, given the presence of secured cockpit doors, FAMs, and the willingness of passengers to rush & subdue any attacker.
For the same reason, I don't believe that airport workers having utility knives — which are tools with tons of perfectly legitimate uses — poses any threat to aviation.
Yes, it can pose an interpersonal threat (as in the case you linked), but that is not within TSA's legitimate purposes. People can get beat up, tased, stabbed with a pencil, etc. in an airport or airplane, just like they can anywhere else. So what? That's simply not relevant unless it can take down or hijack a plane, cause mass casualties, or the like.
(Note that this is different from e.g. the security needs of a courthouse, where interpersonal violence is the main thing they need to prevent.)
So in short: yes, criticize the hypocrisy. But don't accept the implicit premise that this is necessary for security.
#5
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I wonder just exactly real time security TSA provides to the air side. Sure they more or less....mostly less....screen employees entering concourses but what about other areas? For example, several times while waiting for my wife in baggage claim I’ve watched baggage handlers move between the air side and the baggage claim area with no more security than using their access cards or punching in a security code to a door lock. I’ve seen no indication of any other security like TSA or airport security personnel at those doors.
#6
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… to cut boxes? Open bags? Cleaning supplies? Replacement barf bags etc?
I agree with this in the abstract.
However, I don't believe that box cutters pose any threat to aviation whatsoever, given the presence of secured cockpit doors, FAMs, and the willingness of passengers to rush & subdue any attacker.
For the same reason, I don't believe that airport workers having utility knives — which are tools with tons of perfectly legitimate uses — poses any threat to aviation.
Yes, it can pose an interpersonal threat (as in the case you linked), but that is not within TSA's legitimate purposes. People can get beat up, tased, stabbed with a pencil, etc. in an airport or airplane, just like they can anywhere else. So what? That's simply not relevant unless it can take down or hijack a plane, cause mass casualties, or the like.
(Note that this is different from e.g. the security needs of a courthouse, where interpersonal violence is the main thing they need to prevent.)
So in short: yes, criticize the hypocrisy. But don't accept the implicit premise that this is necessary for security.
I agree with this in the abstract.
However, I don't believe that box cutters pose any threat to aviation whatsoever, given the presence of secured cockpit doors, FAMs, and the willingness of passengers to rush & subdue any attacker.
For the same reason, I don't believe that airport workers having utility knives — which are tools with tons of perfectly legitimate uses — poses any threat to aviation.
Yes, it can pose an interpersonal threat (as in the case you linked), but that is not within TSA's legitimate purposes. People can get beat up, tased, stabbed with a pencil, etc. in an airport or airplane, just like they can anywhere else. So what? That's simply not relevant unless it can take down or hijack a plane, cause mass casualties, or the like.
(Note that this is different from e.g. the security needs of a courthouse, where interpersonal violence is the main thing they need to prevent.)
So in short: yes, criticize the hypocrisy. But don't accept the implicit premise that this is necessary for security.
I wonder just exactly real time security TSA provides to the air side. Sure they more or less....mostly less....screen employees entering concourses but what about other areas? For example, several times while waiting for my wife in baggage claim I’ve watched baggage handlers move between the air side and the baggage claim area with no more security than using their access cards or punching in a security code to a door lock. I’ve seen no indication of any other security like TSA or airport security personnel at those doors.
I don't begrudge an employee of having plenty of beverage to drink on a hot Texas day but I do object that they can have those items unscreened while I'm not allowed over 100ml even with screening.
TSA simple does not provide effective security if they lock the front door while leaving the back door standing wide open with a lighted "Welcome, Come In" sign shinning brightly.
Last edited by Boggie Dog; May 4, 2018 at 7:37 am
#7
Join Date: May 2010
Posts: 3,461
Bingo! You and I can't bring liquids but airport employees can...
After all an airport employee is not going to do anything wrong... Oh wait, one of the original "liquid" bomb plotters worked for the airport.
Hmm.. Well I am sure the rest of the airline and airport employees in the world are all safe.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-a6909891.html
Homeland Security arrests airline employee at JFK for allegedly smuggling cocaine
https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/cr.../275-490990880
Maui Now : Firearm Theft Investigation: 3 Hawaiian Airlines Employees Arrested
Thousands Standing Around wasting our tax $$$.
After all an airport employee is not going to do anything wrong... Oh wait, one of the original "liquid" bomb plotters worked for the airport.
Hmm.. Well I am sure the rest of the airline and airport employees in the world are all safe.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-a6909891.html
Homeland Security arrests airline employee at JFK for allegedly smuggling cocaine
https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/cr.../275-490990880
Maui Now : Firearm Theft Investigation: 3 Hawaiian Airlines Employees Arrested
Thousands Standing Around wasting our tax $$$.
#8
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 962
I don't begrudge an employee of having plenty of beverage to drink on a hot Texas day but I do object that they can have those items unscreened while I'm not allowed over 100ml even with screening.
TSA simple does not provide effective security if they lock the front door while leaving the back door standing wide open with a lighted "Welcome, Come In" sign shinning brightly.
TSA simple does not provide effective security if they lock the front door while leaving the back door standing wide open with a lighted "Welcome, Come In" sign shinning brightly.
The first is unfairness from unequal treatment. The second is a question of what's actually a security concern.
Let's be honest, the extreme supermajority (like 99.9999%) of things pose no security risk whatsoever. In fact I would bet that more people will be killed by bathtubs per year, no matter how lax or nonexistent the airport screening is, no matter if it's waived for employees or passengers or both.
So your second part is just not true. There is no "more than bathtub level" security-to-aviation threat from allowing employees to come and go without getting groped, even if they're taking their liters of drink or boxcutters or whatever.
There also isn't any from passengers. And that's unfair and wasteful. So don't be pissed at the part where they're not doing the stupid thing, be pissed at the part where they are.
#9
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Those are two totally different things, though.
The first is unfairness from unequal treatment. The second is a question of what's actually a security concern.
Let's be honest, the extreme supermajority (like 99.9999%) of things pose no security risk whatsoever. In fact I would bet that more people will be killed by bathtubs per year, no matter how lax or nonexistent the airport screening is, no matter if it's waived for employees or passengers or both.
So your second part is just not true. There is no "more than bathtub level" security-to-aviation threat from allowing employees to come and go without getting groped, even if they're taking their liters of drink or boxcutters or whatever.
There also isn't any from passengers. And that's unfair and wasteful. So don't be pissed at the part where they're not doing the stupid thing, be pissed at the part where they are.
The first is unfairness from unequal treatment. The second is a question of what's actually a security concern.
Let's be honest, the extreme supermajority (like 99.9999%) of things pose no security risk whatsoever. In fact I would bet that more people will be killed by bathtubs per year, no matter how lax or nonexistent the airport screening is, no matter if it's waived for employees or passengers or both.
So your second part is just not true. There is no "more than bathtub level" security-to-aviation threat from allowing employees to come and go without getting groped, even if they're taking their liters of drink or boxcutters or whatever.
There also isn't any from passengers. And that's unfair and wasteful. So don't be pissed at the part where they're not doing the stupid thing, be pissed at the part where they are.
I think a careful review of TSA screening requirements when applied to the operational side of airports would drastically change what TSA suddenly finds allowable. The end result would be of benefit to passengers where only WEI should be interdicted, not breast milk, soda pop, water, pudding, hand lotion, cupcakes in jars, purses with leather embossed images of pistols, body jewelry and so on.
The other possibility is that TSA intentionally exaggerates the threat posed to commercial aviation. Got to keep that funding coming in along with growing the agency each and every year. If TSA is exaggerating the threat then again there is a need to validate the current screening requirements and having those standards applied to airport workers would help on that front.
#10
Join Date: Aug 2012
Posts: 3,526
The U.S. “doesn't have a system to provide air security. It has a system to bother people.”
https://tinyurl.com/yc3ux74b
~~
“The illusion of security doesn’t actually make anyone safer, and it’s more aptly called a false sense of security.” https://tinyurl.com/ydegeq22
~~
“There are two fundamental flaws in our approach (to screening):
The first is a strategy that looks upon every single person who flies — old and young, fit and infirm, domestic and foreign, pilot and passenger — as a potential terrorist.” tinyurl.com/p6w3r8h
https://tinyurl.com/yc3ux74b
~~
“The illusion of security doesn’t actually make anyone safer, and it’s more aptly called a false sense of security.” https://tinyurl.com/ydegeq22
~~
“There are two fundamental flaws in our approach (to screening):
The first is a strategy that looks upon every single person who flies — old and young, fit and infirm, domestic and foreign, pilot and passenger — as a potential terrorist.” tinyurl.com/p6w3r8h
#11
Join Date: Dec 2010
Posts: 962
The other possibility is that TSA intentionally exaggerates the threat posed to commercial aviation. Got to keep that funding coming in along with growing the agency each and every year. If TSA is exaggerating the threat then again there is a need to validate the current screening requirements and having those standards applied to airport workers would help on that front.
I've highlighted the parts that TSA redacted. (Except p. 43/36 fn. 15, which is an image already highlighted in gray.)
Notice a trend in what they wanted to hide?
Now compare to, say, 49 USC 114(r)(4)(B)…
What I've seen is mere hypotheticals. There's not even a claim to take at face value, let alone any value to that face.
If a 150 ml bottle of x is potentially harmful it doesn't matter who has it.
I think a careful review of TSA screening requirements when applied to the operational side of airports would drastically change what TSA suddenly finds allowable. The end result would be of benefit to passengers where only WEI should be interdicted, not breast milk, soda pop, water, pudding, hand lotion, cupcakes in jars, purses with leather embossed images of pistols, body jewelry and so on.
The other possibility is that TSA intentionally exaggerates the threat posed to commercial aviation.
Last edited by TWA884; May 5, 2018 at 6:28 pm Reason: Merge consecutive posts by the same member; please use the multi-quote function
#12
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Do they in fact make such claims? Under oath? Please show me where. I'd love to impeach them. See Corbett brief above.
What I've seen is mere hypotheticals. There's not even a claim to take at face value, let alone any value to that face.
Yes. IF.
This would also be the result of my litigation. Although it'll take years, my bet is that I'm the more likely and faster means of achieving that objective.
What I've seen is mere hypotheticals. There's not even a claim to take at face value, let alone any value to that face.
Yes. IF.
This would also be the result of my litigation. Although it'll take years, my bet is that I'm the more likely and faster means of achieving that objective.
Edit to add:
Not sworn.....
Pekoske's remarks
We can no longer focus only on preventing the bad guys from getting into the secure area of an airport. More and more we must focus on both sides of the checkpoint and in the public areas where airport and surface transportation systems intersect. We face ambitious adversaries who are continuously looking for a point of attack and waiting for their opportunity. Our job is to make sure they never have that opportunity.
Last edited by Boggie Dog; May 5, 2018 at 6:54 pm
#13
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Bingo! You and I can't bring liquids but airport employees can...
After all an airport employee is not going to do anything wrong... Oh wait, one of the original "liquid" bomb plotters worked for the airport.
Hmm.. Well I am sure the rest of the airline and airport employees in the world are all safe.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-a6909891.html
Homeland Security arrests airline employee at JFK for allegedly smuggling cocaine
https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/cr.../275-490990880
Maui Now : Firearm Theft Investigation: 3 Hawaiian Airlines Employees Arrested
Thousands Standing Around wasting our tax $$$.
After all an airport employee is not going to do anything wrong... Oh wait, one of the original "liquid" bomb plotters worked for the airport.
Hmm.. Well I am sure the rest of the airline and airport employees in the world are all safe.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-a6909891.html
Homeland Security arrests airline employee at JFK for allegedly smuggling cocaine
https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/cr.../275-490990880
Maui Now : Firearm Theft Investigation: 3 Hawaiian Airlines Employees Arrested
Thousands Standing Around wasting our tax $$$.
Let's not forget the DL baggage handlers who were caught smuggling guns (IIRC including automatic assault weapons), roughly about a hundred of them from ATL to NYC over a period of months.
#14
Join Date: Aug 2012
Posts: 3,526
If we take TSA's claims that terrorist organizations are testing and probing airport security daily as true then my position is valid. ......
The other possibility is that TSA intentionally exaggerates the threat posed to commercial aviation. Got to keep that funding coming in along with growing the agency each and every year. If TSA is exaggerating the threat then again there is a need to validate the current screening requirements and having those standards applied to airport workers would help on that front.
The other possibility is that TSA intentionally exaggerates the threat posed to commercial aviation. Got to keep that funding coming in along with growing the agency each and every year. If TSA is exaggerating the threat then again there is a need to validate the current screening requirements and having those standards applied to airport workers would help on that front.
As for exaggerating the threat, it's not only TSA that does so but also the security-industrial complex. Security has become a cash cow for so many (think Chertoff) that they are not going to give it up willingly.
#15
Join Date: Aug 2012
Posts: 3,526
I couldn't open Sai's link above, highlighted the parts that TSA redacted. I think this is what that link contains:
p. 27:
No terrorist has attempted to take an explosive on board an airplane through a U.S. airport since approximately 35 years ago. Exhibit K, "American Airlines Flight 444," Wikipedia (Last Updated Sept. 28, 2013). All of the explosives brought on board airplanes discussed in the administrative record happened outside of the United States. And, even on the global scale, including Middle Eastern countries with extreme civil unrest and a high prevalence of improvised explosive devices in use on the ground, explosives on airplanes are extremely rare. For example, the TSA analyzed hijackings in 2007, and found 7 hijacking incidents across the globe, but none of them involved actual explosive devices. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doe. 136, p. 2196 (U//FOUO).
The hijackers on 9/li had no explosives; only knives. Notwithstanding, the government concedes that it would be difficult to have a repeat of 9/11 due to hardened cockpit doors and the willingness of passengers to challenge hijackers rather than assume a hijacking merely means a diversion to Cuba. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 136, p. 2197 (U//FOUO). The government also credits updated pre-flight security for that difficulty assessment, but the assessment was written before the en masse deployment of body scanners and before the update to the pat-down procedure. Id. Further, the government admits that there have been no attempted domestic hijackings of any kind in the 12 years since 9/11. Id.
This begs the question, then, of what evidence the government possesses to rationalize that we should be so afraid of non-metallic explosives being brought aboard flights departing from the U.S. that we must sacrifice our civil liberties. The answer: there is none. "As of mid-2011, terrorist threat groups present in the Homeland are not known to be actively plotting against civil aviation targets or airports; instead, their focus is on fundraising, recruiting, and propagandizing." Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).
p. 31:
For the reasons explained herein, both the nude body scanners and the pat-downs are more extensive and intensive than necessary to detect non-metallic explosives in light of available alternatives. Additionally, they are ineffective at addressing the threat at hand and are incredibly invasive, which is to be balanced against the risk of a threat for which the TSA has admitted there is no evidence. Accordingly, both procedures are independently unconstitutional.
p. 35:
The TSA has conceded that it is aware of no one who is currently plotting a terror attack against our aviation system using explosives (non-metallic or otherwise). The TSA has conceded that other changes in aviation security, implemented before the invasive pat-downs, have made another 9/11 difficult [15].
[15]: It would be more reasonable to say that another 9/11 would be impossible. If five men with box cutters on a flight of 200 passengers stood up and announced a hijacking in 2013, they would be lucky to survive the beatings they would immediately receive by a travelling public that has learned the lessons of 9/11. Further, the armored cockpit doors, as well as the Federal Flight Deck Officer program that arms pilots with firearms, make targeting an aircraft in such a manner to be the definition of insanity.
p. 42:
The documents that the TSA has labeled "FOUO" are two threat assessments that are 2 and 5 years old, respectively. These documents contain no information relevant to a specific criminal investigation, and would not qualify for any law enforcement exemption under the Freedom of Information Act. It is in the public interest to release these documents because they contain the bombshell revelation that the TSA has literally zero evidence that anyone is plotting to blow up an airplane leaving from a domestic airport. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).
No terrorist has attempted to take an explosive on board an airplane through a U.S. airport since approximately 35 years ago. Exhibit K, "American Airlines Flight 444," Wikipedia (Last Updated Sept. 28, 2013). All of the explosives brought on board airplanes discussed in the administrative record happened outside of the United States. And, even on the global scale, including Middle Eastern countries with extreme civil unrest and a high prevalence of improvised explosive devices in use on the ground, explosives on airplanes are extremely rare. For example, the TSA analyzed hijackings in 2007, and found 7 hijacking incidents across the globe, but none of them involved actual explosive devices. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doe. 136, p. 2196 (U//FOUO).
The hijackers on 9/li had no explosives; only knives. Notwithstanding, the government concedes that it would be difficult to have a repeat of 9/11 due to hardened cockpit doors and the willingness of passengers to challenge hijackers rather than assume a hijacking merely means a diversion to Cuba. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 136, p. 2197 (U//FOUO). The government also credits updated pre-flight security for that difficulty assessment, but the assessment was written before the en masse deployment of body scanners and before the update to the pat-down procedure. Id. Further, the government admits that there have been no attempted domestic hijackings of any kind in the 12 years since 9/11. Id.
This begs the question, then, of what evidence the government possesses to rationalize that we should be so afraid of non-metallic explosives being brought aboard flights departing from the U.S. that we must sacrifice our civil liberties. The answer: there is none. "As of mid-2011, terrorist threat groups present in the Homeland are not known to be actively plotting against civil aviation targets or airports; instead, their focus is on fundraising, recruiting, and propagandizing." Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).
p. 31:
For the reasons explained herein, both the nude body scanners and the pat-downs are more extensive and intensive than necessary to detect non-metallic explosives in light of available alternatives. Additionally, they are ineffective at addressing the threat at hand and are incredibly invasive, which is to be balanced against the risk of a threat for which the TSA has admitted there is no evidence. Accordingly, both procedures are independently unconstitutional.
p. 35:
The TSA has conceded that it is aware of no one who is currently plotting a terror attack against our aviation system using explosives (non-metallic or otherwise). The TSA has conceded that other changes in aviation security, implemented before the invasive pat-downs, have made another 9/11 difficult [15].
[15]: It would be more reasonable to say that another 9/11 would be impossible. If five men with box cutters on a flight of 200 passengers stood up and announced a hijacking in 2013, they would be lucky to survive the beatings they would immediately receive by a travelling public that has learned the lessons of 9/11. Further, the armored cockpit doors, as well as the Federal Flight Deck Officer program that arms pilots with firearms, make targeting an aircraft in such a manner to be the definition of insanity.
p. 42:
The documents that the TSA has labeled "FOUO" are two threat assessments that are 2 and 5 years old, respectively. These documents contain no information relevant to a specific criminal investigation, and would not qualify for any law enforcement exemption under the Freedom of Information Act. It is in the public interest to release these documents because they contain the bombshell revelation that the TSA has literally zero evidence that anyone is plotting to blow up an airplane leaving from a domestic airport. Admin. Rec., Vol 3, Doc. 137, p. 2219 (U//FOUO).