MacLeanBarrier

As posted before: the RTCA DO-329 concluded that both methods, including yours, were ruled ineffective by the prepared aircrew and Federal Air Marshal test-teams and the "attacking" role-players unwilling to hurt themselves.

Boggie Dog

OK, so TSA didn't think the Air Marshal component needed the report. The FOP, AMA, and FLEOA have no decision responsibilities for how the airlines address security.

MacLeanBarrier

Just trying to clarify: You believe that flying Federal Air Marshals DO NOT have a need to know the results of the study?

Why should the law enforcement representative groups not be allowed into the study when the aircrew representative groups were allowed?

chollie

No disrespect intended, but you make it sound like this is a big deal. I don't pretend to know and understand the intricate hierarchies of the agencies and groups involved.

Presumably someone official has been asked exactly the question you are posing: what did that spokesperson say?

MacLeanBarrier

Both the TSA and FAA agreed that secondary barriers are needed:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/bu...-security.html

chollie

Actually, it looks like TSA thought secondary cockpit doors were more effective than FA + cart.

I wanted to know if someone in authority was ever asked:

If so, what was the reply?

Boggie Dog

Not what I said, TSA management had the study in hand and did not share with the FAM component of the TSA organization. So TSA must have made that decision.

Besides, isn't part of the air marshals duties to prevent this threat vector from being successful? Isn't that why when a marshal is aboard they hog a choice seat in F. How would this study change how the air marshals deploy its assets?

No, the FAA declined to mandate secondary doors. You're misstating what was reported n the article you referenced. The FAA and TSA only agreed that secondary doors provide additional security.

kyanar

No, I'm pretty sure I read all the references that stated a human blocking the way was largely ineffective, a human with a large obstructive object (such as a cart) was acceptably effective, however a secondary barrier was most effective. Which is pretty bleeding obvious, really. I don't see how in any world you could claim with a straight face that a galley cart (large, blocks the aisle, and usually relatively heavy) is an ineffective barrier against someone running down an aisle. What are they going to do, leap over it in a single bound, spear tackle the door before it closes, and roll to a stop before springing up and Vulcan neck pinching the pilot to seize control of the plane?

It requires a set of circumstances so unlikely that it's no surprise that FAA decided that it wasn't worth the hassle.

JamesBigglesworth

I believe the phrase you're looking for is "solution in search of a problem."

Because US carriers decided, in participation with the culture of fear that the US is going through right now, to do so as a way of Showing Things Are Safe. After all, no one has tried the attack vector you suggest in, what, 15+ years?




And, if anyone did try it, there is, these days, likely to 2-3 people gleefully following down the aisle to beat the crap out of the perp. Look at the person that had a psychotic episode on a trans-atlantic flight and in his panic tried to open a door at the back of the plane: taken down, restrained, and then beaten by half a dozen other pax to the point that the FA's had to intervene to stop them.

IIRC, the *only* thing a FAM has done in the last ~15 years is murder someone on a jetway that was also having a psychotic episode. Ruled justified, of course, because America.

MacLeanBarrier

The University of Newcastle and Ohio State University also concluded secondary barrier systems are needed:

Page 9:

PAGE 10:

PAGE 21:

http://fdx.alpa.org/Portals/26/docs/...nal%202012.pdf

Boggie Dog

Nowhere in those three quotes does it say additional barriers are needed.

"vulnerable to flight deck intrusions during door transition due to lack of training" Increase training.

"against highly skilled and lightfooted hijackers" Minimal problem, try running up the aisle of an airplane.

"brief and fleeting moments when the cockpit door is opened during flight" A good example of describing the non-problem.

If an imaginary hijacker doesn't know when the cockpit door may be opened then they cannot be primed to jump into action. Perhaps moving a galley cart or such to the aisle only gives a potential hijacker the preparatory time to act.

I would support the increased funding for and role of FFDO's and reducing FAM budget. Some training and a Sig Sauer, problem solved with cost born by the airlines not taxpayers. Alternatively FAM's could be seated with one in the cockpit jump seat and one in the aft galley jump seat on all flights reducing the FAM load on flights to no more than two people and freeing up revenue seats.

MacLeanBarrier

There are NUMEROUS short-comings in your guesses--that is why the RTCA, the universities, and the Department of Transportation / Office of Inspector General (just issued) commissioned their studies that secondary barriers must be required.

A hammer-less/double-action revolver locked into EVERY flight deck (cockpit) would significantly reduce the Federal Flight Deck Officers budget and provide 100% firearms protection for every flight.

Boggie Dog

I'm good with having a good semi-automatic pistol such as a Sig P320, in the cockpit at the ready, when the aircraft is manned as long as pilots are well trained and received regular refresher training.
A revolver would not be the an optimum choice.

MacLeanBarrier

You're exceptionally mistaken.

I have 26 years of military, executive protection, and federal law enforcement experience and a semi-automatic pistol is not an "optimum choice" because you have to train to take it apart (i.e., field-strip it), force ammunition into its spring-loaded magazine, insert its magazine until properly locked, manipulate its slide to load a round into the chamber, disengage/reengage a safety, learn double-action, learn single-action, learn double-to-single action, learn single-to-double action, de-cock actions, learn emergency failure-drills (i.e., tap-rack-press; stove-top; double-feed)...the list goes on with a semi-automatic.

A non-safety hammerless/double-action revolver requires NO TRAINING: Put the bullets into their round holes in the cylinder, push the cylinder closed, point, pull trigger...if it malfunctions...pull the trigger again...repeat.

WillCAD

No, that is NOT what the passages you quoted say at all.

The conclusions you quoted above are:
Page 10: Procedures such as galley trolleys blocking flight deck access are not fool-proof. Not ineffective, or even inadequate, just not fool-proof. And when used in combination with other measures such as improved training, increased passenger awareness, and the occasional FAM or FFDO, they are, in my opinion, adequate.

Page 21: Policies including IPSBs, more FFDOs, and fewer FAMs would be the optimal security mix. Anything less than optimal is not automatically innefective or inadequate, however, which is what you've been implying throughout this thread.

I am not a firearms expert, by any stretch of the imagination, but even with my limited knowledge I can see that you are absolutely correct about the benefits of a hammerless revolver vs a semi-auto pistol. An untrained, inexperienced shooter will have far less difficulty picking up a hammerless revolver and making it go BANG than they would picking up an auto pistol and making it go BANG.

However, choosing the firearm using the assumption that it will be used completely untrained personnel is absolutely ludicrous. Any firearm placed aboard a plane for use by the flight crew would require the intended users to undergo extensive training well in advance, not only on the mechanical operation of the weapon, but on the far more important topics of:
* Safe handling (so it doesn't go BANG when not intended)
* Secure storage and transport (so only the intended user can make it go BANG)
* Maintenance and upkeep (so it may be relied upon to go BANG every time)
* Confined-space weapon handling and marksmanship (so it will go BANG only in the intended and proper direction)
* Most importantly - situational evaluation and judgement of when to use the weapon and when not to use it (so it doesn't go BANG the first time a drunken idiot rattles the flight deck door thinking it's the loo).

Taken in that context, the difference in training between a hammerless revolver and a typical auto pistol is actually rather minimal. All of this is why there isn't, and never will be, a gun in every commercial carrier's cockpit.

This is very much akin to teaching someone how to drive. Learning which controls do what and how to make a car with automatic transmission go, stop, and turn are so simple they can be learned in an hour. Operation of a manual (stick shift) transmission is more complex and takes more time to learn. Learning how to safely negotiate the roads in the midst of other vehicular and pedestrian traffic, abide by the myriad traffic laws, and aquire proper situational awareness when behind the wheel - that's what takes a multi-week driver's education course and extensive live practice under the supervision of an experienced driver, before one can be licensed to operate a motor vehicle.