TSA's bomb-sniffing dogs
Jan 9, 2019, 8:09 am
#316
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: WAS
Programs: enjoyed being warm spit for a few years on CO/UA but now nothing :(
Posts: 2,505
There are a number of reasons why a cop might want to "interact" with someone despite a lack of either probable cause or articulable suspicion. Off the top of my head, I see harassment, coercion, bigotry, and blind fishing expeditions being pretty common without the protection of the 4th Amendment.
The idea that a TSA canine might alert on someone's drug stash because The Terr'ists decided that it would be clever to secret explosives into some unsuspecting stoner's weed or coke is ludicrous on its face. Aside from the volume issue that Boogie Dog mentioned, there is also the stupidity of hiding explosives inside another prohibited substance that might get a person arrested before they get on the plane, not to mention the difficulty of Mr. Bad Actor somehow secretly stealing someone's drug stash, planting explosives in it, and then somehow returning to them for smuggling through the checkpoint...
As I said: Ludicrous on its face.
On the other hand, the idea that TSA secretly mixes drug-sniffing dogs into the ranks of the bomb-sniffing dogs, paranoid as it might sound, is not nearly as far-fetched (no pun intended).
The idea that a TSA canine might alert on someone's drug stash because The Terr'ists decided that it would be clever to secret explosives into some unsuspecting stoner's weed or coke is ludicrous on its face. Aside from the volume issue that Boogie Dog mentioned, there is also the stupidity of hiding explosives inside another prohibited substance that might get a person arrested before they get on the plane, not to mention the difficulty of Mr. Bad Actor somehow secretly stealing someone's drug stash, planting explosives in it, and then somehow returning to them for smuggling through the checkpoint...
As I said: Ludicrous on its face.
On the other hand, the idea that TSA secretly mixes drug-sniffing dogs into the ranks of the bomb-sniffing dogs, paranoid as it might sound, is not nearly as far-fetched (no pun intended).
What does happen is that the DEA, FBI, CBP, and the local airport police dept's are also deploying other detection canines, some of which may be narcotics detection dogs. But TSA's NEDCP provided dogs ARE NOT trained in drug detection.
Of course, one does not have to accept that in much the same way one does not have to believe that the lunar landings were not filmed in the desert southwest...
One thing about the NEDCP that is absurd: the program touts that it's more than 900 active teams had "...more than 214,000 canine utilization hours..." in 2018. Sounds impressive - that's a lot of hours. Except: that is not even 12% of the total annual scheduled work hours of those teams and just barely over 14% of the contracted 80% of a handler's duty time in the respective transportation environment. The utilization hours ought to be well upward of 1,000,000 hours (unlike machines, detection dogs need breaks, too).
Jan 9, 2019, 8:24 am
#317
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,083
It is as far-fetched as it sounds because it is simply not necessary. There are plenty of law enforcement agencies working at any major airport having their own narcotics and other category of detection dogs in service that there is no need to TSA to train and secretly mix in drug detection dogs. It is just simply nonsensical (of course, TSA does do many things that are nonsensical in other areas, but we digress).
What does happen is that the DEA, FBI, CBP, and the local airport police dept's are also deploying other detection canines, some of which may be narcotics detection dogs. But TSA's NEDCP provided dogs ARE NOT trained in drug detection.
Of course, one does not have to accept that in much the same way one does not have to believe that the lunar landings were not filmed in the desert southwest...
One thing about the NEDCP that is absurd: the program touts that it's more than 900 active teams had "...more than 214,000 canine utilization hours..." in 2018. Sounds impressive - that's a lot of hours. Except: that is not even 12% of the total annual scheduled work hours of those teams and just barely over 14% of the contracted 80% of a handler's duty time in the respective transportation environment. The utilization hours ought to be well upward of 1,000,000 hours (unlike machines, detection dogs need breaks, too).
What does happen is that the DEA, FBI, CBP, and the local airport police dept's are also deploying other detection canines, some of which may be narcotics detection dogs. But TSA's NEDCP provided dogs ARE NOT trained in drug detection.
Of course, one does not have to accept that in much the same way one does not have to believe that the lunar landings were not filmed in the desert southwest...
One thing about the NEDCP that is absurd: the program touts that it's more than 900 active teams had "...more than 214,000 canine utilization hours..." in 2018. Sounds impressive - that's a lot of hours. Except: that is not even 12% of the total annual scheduled work hours of those teams and just barely over 14% of the contracted 80% of a handler's duty time in the respective transportation environment. The utilization hours ought to be well upward of 1,000,000 hours (unlike machines, detection dogs need breaks, too).
edit to add:
900 canine teams and 214,000 utilization hours. Break that out over a full year and it doesn't add up to much of anything per day.
Jan 9, 2019, 11:37 am
#318
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: WAS
Programs: enjoyed being warm spit for a few years on CO/UA but now nothing :(
Posts: 2,505
I think it is generally accepted that the dogs are effective for up to two hours before they need a break, depending upon the breed and particular animal. But they work for reward and working too long without a reward can make the dog feel discouraged. A short break that includes receiving the reward (whether ball oriented or food oriented) re-energizes the dog's motivation.
Jan 9, 2019, 11:49 am
#319
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Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,083
Exactly.
I think it is generally accepted that the dogs are effective for up to two hours before they need a break, depending upon the breed and particular animal. But they work for reward and working too long without a reward can make the dog feel discouraged. A short break that includes receiving the reward (whether ball oriented or food oriented) re-energizes the dog's motivation.
I think it is generally accepted that the dogs are effective for up to two hours before they need a break, depending upon the breed and particular animal. But they work for reward and working too long without a reward can make the dog feel discouraged. A short break that includes receiving the reward (whether ball oriented or food oriented) re-energizes the dog's motivation.
Jan 9, 2019, 12:58 pm
#320
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Baltimore, MD USA
Programs: Southwest Rapid Rewards. Tha... that's about it.
Posts: 4,331
Getting back to the point of 214,000 utilization hours for 900 teams is really discouraging. That works out to just under 238 hours per team per year yielding just over 30 minutes per day per team based on a 365 day year. I'm not sure that justifies the investment in the dogs or the handlers. Those 900 bodies would be better utilized screening people with current equipment.
Assuming the teams get a two-week vacation each year, that leaves 50 working weeks.
238/50=4.76
Meaning that a team who takes a two-week vacation per year is working an average of 4.76 hours per week. That's not even a whole shift.
Something is off about those numbers. There must be more hours, or fewer teams in the field, otherwise these averages don't make any sense.
Jan 9, 2019, 1:26 pm
#321
Original Poster
Join Date: Aug 2012
Posts: 3,526
Getting back to the point of 214,000 utilization hours for 900 teams is really discouraging. That works out to just under 238 hours per team per year yielding just over 30 minutes per day per team based on a 365 day year. I'm not sure that justifies the investment in the dogs or the handlers. Those 900 bodies would be better utilized screening people with current equipment.
The bomb-sniffing dogs work in half-hour to one hour shifts at the main security checkpoint, sniffing passengers, their bags and the air for any hint of explosive materials.
It’s tough work, Jones said.
‘They’re pretty exhausted’
“As many people as Atlanta pushes past these dogs, they’re trying to catch each one, they’re pretty exhausted,” he said. “You can see it… [The dog’s] tail is not wagging like it used to be, he’s dropping his head a little bit more.”
It’s tough work, Jones said.
‘They’re pretty exhausted’
“As many people as Atlanta pushes past these dogs, they’re trying to catch each one, they’re pretty exhausted,” he said. “You can see it… [The dog’s] tail is not wagging like it used to be, he’s dropping his head a little bit more.”
Jan 9, 2019, 3:09 pm
#322
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,083
I'm sure canine teams don't work a 7-day week, nor do they work 52 weeks a year.
Assuming the teams get a two-week vacation each year, that leaves 50 working weeks.
238/50=4.76
Meaning that a team who takes a two-week vacation per year is working an average of 4.76 hours per week. That's not even a whole shift.
Something is off about those numbers. There must be more hours, or fewer teams in the field, otherwise these averages don't make any sense.
Assuming the teams get a two-week vacation each year, that leaves 50 working weeks.
238/50=4.76
Meaning that a team who takes a two-week vacation per year is working an average of 4.76 hours per week. That's not even a whole shift.
Something is off about those numbers. There must be more hours, or fewer teams in the field, otherwise these averages don't make any sense.
May 12, 2020, 10:11 am
#323
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: WAS
Programs: enjoyed being warm spit for a few years on CO/UA but now nothing :(
Posts: 2,505
Latest OIG report on the dog program - in particular the Passenger Screening Canine teams. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/defaul...0-28-Apr20.pdf (public, redacted version).
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
May 12, 2020, 5:51 pm
#324
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: DFW
Posts: 28,083
Latest OIG report on the dog program - in particular the Passenger Screening Canine teams. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/defaul...0-28-Apr20.pdf (public, redacted version).
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
May 15, 2020, 4:58 am
#325
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Chicago
Posts: 11,513
Latest OIG report on the dog program - in particular the Passenger Screening Canine teams. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/defaul...0-28-Apr20.pdf (public, redacted version).
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
No surprise to this forum, OIG takes TSA to task for incompetent management - to (half) wit:
"TSA
- has not determined the number of teams needed to provide security and mitigate risks because it does not identify and document mission needs, capability gaps, and operational goals for deploying the teams;
- may not be allocating PSC teams to the highest risk airports because it does not properly justify and document allocation decisions;
- has not determined whether the limited use of PSC teams provides sufficient security because it cannot justify the teams as the best, most cost-effective checkpoint security; and
- cannot be assured airports are using PSC teams properly because it does not adequately oversee TSA management operations at airports."
I like how OIG staff also took this audit opportunity to stick it to TSA on its own covert testing results (page 4):
TSA relies on multiple layers of security to detect and prevent catastrophic aviation events. However, work performed by DHS OIG and other oversight entities disclosed shortfalls within many of the security layers.6 For example, our prior covert testing efforts identified vulnerabilities in TSA's checkpoint screening effectiveness and access controls to airport secure areas. TSA has yet to show significant progress in preventing security risks exposed through our covert testing.
Much of the comments in this forum above are not just substantiated in this report it's almost as if the OIG office reads this forum....(wink).
Read, get incensed at the lack of management, and let's have fun discussing!
