72 DHS Employees on Terrorist Watch List
 

http://freebeacon.com/national-secur...st-watch-list/

Just thinking of the various agencies a person might encounter when traveling by air, when entering the United States, crossing a land border or even one of the internal checkpoints.

I wonder just what purpose DHS serves.

Why they didn't fired or arrested the terrorist? What are they supposed to be? My, my, my, they didn't passed the background check. You're failed!

Aren't they mostly union members? Do they even all know that they are on a terrorist watchlist? Does the government not want them to know they are being watched as a suspected terrorist? Is it part of the "keep your friends close but your enemies even closer" approach? Should people lose their livelihood just because the government has administratively decided someone is suspicious enough to blacklist but not on grounds enough to prosecute and convict for a crime?

These blacklisting of free persons should either be done in an open court of law upon being found guilty in a criminal trial, or the blacklisting should end.

Alienating people who aren't criminals by treating them as criminals (or as close to being criminals) increases the likelihood of persons becoming criminals.

Governments playing Dr. Frankenstein.

And now they won't be able to buy a gun legally.

Do you reject the concept of Terrorist Warch List in general or just the placement of government employees on such list?

Slow day for the news? This was known in June of 2015. If the media gave darn, why wait 6 months?

And how about some accuracy in reporting? Is anyone interested in what the Inspector General had to say:

"Despite these layered controls, our testing showed that TSA did not identify 73 individuals with terrorism-related category codes. According to TSA data, these individuals were employed by major airlines, airport vendors, and other employers."

Where is the evidence that these individuals were DHS employees?

There is no evidence that the individuals were government employees.

The available evidence, which has been out since june 2015, is that the individuals were employeed by airlines or other contractor service (baggage handling, janitorial, etc.)

Possibility that this is a different report that has never made it to the public domain?

I would be surprised if there aren't separate focuses on government and non-government employees.

The USG has become increasingly paranoid about even those in its own ranks. ;)

Very unlikely. What are the chances that 72 - 73 is the same number in two separate reports?

Further the Congressman cited in the article you posted seems terribly uniformed.

Lych is quoted as stating "“The director had to resign because of that,”

Jeh Johnson is the current Head of DHS, he has been in the position since 2013. Napolitano was the former.

In another article Lynch claims "Then we went further and did and eight-airport investigation. We had staffers go into eight different airports to test the department of homeland security screening process at major airports."

The testing was conducted by DHS Inspector General employees not "staffers" - and the implication being Congressional staffers.

Director = TSA FSD? Johnson and Napolitano = Secretaries of DHS, present and past.

An FSD would not be involved with the airport employees vetting process. The vetting process is run behind the scenes and is based apparently on US Government watch list. The 73 individuals were on list that TSA did not have access too.

Johnson has been the Head of DHS since 2013, and is currently the Head of DHS.

Napolitano left in fall of 2013 - apparently she was offered a position at a University.

I thought that proposal failed so now if you are on the watch list you can't fly but can buy a gun.

I think that comment was based on Obama's remarks from 12/06/15.

Ginger is completely on point on this in all respects - this is the product of a lazy reporter and editor(s) regurgitating the inaccurate and facetious comments by a duplicitous congresscritter regarding 15-98.

There are real issues of what/how much information should be provided to TSA for use in the review/adjudication of credentialing suitability decisions.
These issues continue to be most appropriately addressed by the IPC which is quite aware of the vulnerabilities its policies on information sharing incurs.

There are valid, competing viewpoints on all sides and the IG said "damn the torpedoes" on this one - maybe not incorrectly.