should this really be called "Checkpoints and Borders Policy Debate
 

So far i see no 'debate' about Checkpoints and Borders Policy.......i only see one side, those who want to complain about it

Maybe it should be called "Checkpoints and Borders Policy Complaints"....

Is there anyone here that is for tough or even tougher screening etc? Or am i all alone.....

You claim that "Most pax want tough security".

How can that be true if you feel the need to post the above?

You're certainly in the minority here. I'm for completely eliminating government involvement in airline/airport security.

Should you search the forum, you'll find a lot more than just complaints - there have been suggestions for improving security while eliminating passenger harassment posted here for over a decade.

Help us out and explain a bit more what you mean by "tough" or "even tougher".

Unless i miss-understand your post......you are saying that this board is a representation of the general flying population?

Because i think it is not and that is why i posted this thread.....i think that this board is skewed to the CON side tremendously. I feel most pax want tough/safer screening, but in here it seems the opposite.

Now certainly that point could be argued ("Most pax want tough security"). I will do some digging and see if i can bring forth some data as opposed to just my interactions with my own flying demographic and my opinion.

But are you then saying this board represents the overall and general views of the flying public?

OK fair enough i will take some time to search the forum.

OK .... i see tough as the current standard but properly enforced as i see things beginning to slide....eg, ex LHR last week i get carry on hand checked as does another pax ahead of me. This pax has travel size liquids, NP....but he has 30 or 40 of them. LHR screeners did not take them, they just put them in zip locks.....5 of them. To me they should have confiscated them and patted him down etc.

I see the toughest end as in EL Al type (disclosure; admittedly i have never flown them or to Israel).

So tougher is somewhere in between, closer to todays standards but with more resources at the security points to get people through faster and the issues that arise dealt with more deeply. Yes it would cost more. I am for the increased costs tacked on to my ticket.

As for government VS private sector screening that would make for another great discussion. Governments do very little well but private sector is to profit driven......combo maybe?

And as stated elsewhere i like pre if the proper work is done ahead of time but not the random aspect at the checkpoint that has apparently begun.

I don't equate 'tough' with 'inconsistent, disrespectful and rude, completely lacking in security value'.

"Inconsistent" leads to carelessness and confusion - for screeners, as well as pax. That leads to an 'anything goes' work environment where some screeners make the judgment call that looking their cellphone screens instead of the xray is OK because there's little likelihood of missing anything anyway. It leads to pax ostomy bags being ruptured and pax getting groin chopped - neither of which contribute to security in any way. It leads to false positives and distraction and confusion and wasted resources because screeners don't all follow proper protocol in testing and keeping materials free from cross-contamination. It leads to allowing pumpkin pies at Christmas while challenging and contaminating and refusing baby food.

"Disrespectful and rude" - whether it is the screener or the pax - leads to distraction and a hostile environment. People who are wound up and angry are simply not as capable of focusing on the task at hand and the mission as calm and collected people. Further, security experts continually warn (not just at airports) about the very real threat of a two-pronged attack, where the first 'prong' is a diversion designed to distract from the real attack.

"Completely lacking in security value" - arabic language flash cards, a 2-inch toy gun on a keychain, several personal checks in a woman's pocket - these are not threats to aviation security or even anyone's personal security. Focusing on these things distracts from the real mission. When field tested, TSOs repeatedly have high failure marks on obvious things like guns - perhaps because they're so distracted by non-security related items that they miss the big stuff in plain sight.

For starters, I would like security to be practiced as it is in most of the rest of the world where not controlled by the US (for example, European flights going to South America).

Since 9-11, there have been no aviation security catastrophes in these countries either. If it's pure luck or lack of interest by the bad guys, then how can you be sure that the same isn't true for the US? If it's because their security practices are adequate to prevent all but the most determined, professional attack, then why should we be subject to more harassment and waste at our checkpoints when it is no more effective?

We still have gaping holes in our security that are not addressed. A BDO in Buffalo (who had already been fired and rehired once) was caught the second time because she was allowing drug smugglers to bypass security checkpoints. She was only caught because the drug smugglers were caught - not at the airport or by TSA. TSA and airport employees have been involved in smuggling drugs and guns, but both still enjoy unlimited access to secure areas of the airport and the airplanes themselves on a regular basis. I think they are a more likely source of something bad getting on the plane than my trousers are.

Why? It's a stupid rule with no basis in science or reality. Idiotic practices should be eliminated and the money used to enforce such nonsense repurposed or returned to the stakeholders.

You made the claim that people want tougher airport screening not I. Is FT a representative cross-section of the general flying population? That would depend on how you define that group of people. People who fly often, people who fly a couple of times a year or some other measurement.

Based on comments here and at other places on TSA screening I think you will have a hard time finding a majority of people who fly wanting tougher security. If that was the case then there would be no call for Pre Check.

"The current standard" doesn't tell us much. From what you've said and how you phrase it I assume you're American and/or assuming US 'security' norms, yes?


Why should they have confiscated them? Are you wanting the standards applied without exception? What actual threat was there if the pax had been pre-screened & presumably passed prior to travel, which the UK does?


And yet they are very different from the US. As is security in, say, NZ or Oz or Japan or China. Personally, I don't see the paranoid nutcase security the Israelis apply as useful or needed outside of Israel. Do you feel the rest of the world has the same threats as they do?


What resources would they be? US checkpoints are already chronically overstaffed (& the staff are equally chronically under-utilized & under trained) whereas, to use a contrast many here will understand, China staffs checkpoints with about half the numbers and yet achieves much more consistent (& higher) throughput rates and, arguably, higher levels of security.

Technologically, there's not much else out there that could be added or improved on the speed side of things. A different use ratio of equipment would speed things considerably in the US, but I assume you're not asking for more people through WTMD's because that would not be "tougher".


The initial assumption you make about governments is simply wrong. It might be a cultural "truth" in the US, but that doesn't make it true in reality. Governments are perfectly capable of running security well, and many do. That said, the public/private question is important, and especially so when you're advocating "tougher" screening: put aside the profit motive, why would you trust a private entity with more information than a government?


Except that pre-screening does little to ensure or add to safety, while random screening (genuinely random) is the single most effective process when coupled with WTMD's and trace detection. Nothing else is really needed. Everything else, in the US at least, is simply theatre.

The real problem is that you're focusing on methods and processes, not goals. Security screening for transport is best achieved on a goal based approach. Personally, & I realize this is a gross generalization, my own observation is that Americans don't like goal based methodologies. They prefer system and process methods. In fact, IMO they prefer them to the point that they interfere with the actual goals. The entire DHA and TSA in particular are paradigm examples of it: unthinking, unreasoned, and incompetently applied processes and toys combine to overwhelm the goal of actual security. You want to see real security that is actually effective? Try Germany, China, or Japan. IMO if you want real security then you need to change your entire point of view.

(bolding mine)

^^^^

I don't think Israel need to harass passengers in the manner that they do, which is why I refuse to travel there.

Please define "tough." And I'm not being sarcastic. I'd really like to know what "tough" is.

I think what most people want is the second half: safer screening. Because nothing that the TSA does makes us any safer. I assure you, there is not a single person on this board who wants zero security to get on a plane. We all want to be safe. But the "Security Theater" that we presently have has nothing to do with tough, safe or any other kind of security.

Mike

I suspect that for some people, if you don't see it and/or you aren't inconvenienced in some way, it isn't 'tough'.

One can only hope. What we have now is a theatrical farce and the threat of another 9/11 ended with the introduction of reinforced cockpit doors and new protocols for handling a hijacking.

I'm personally of the opinion that a bag x-ray and WTMD is more than enough to prevent any reasonable threat. TSA itself is an enormous government boondoggle that did little to improve security and the liquid and gels ban is an utterly unnecessary inconvenience, as is the shoe carnival.

Despite all of the paranoia and fear generated by 9/11, the risk of dying in a terror attack is far less than that involved in driving to the airport. Frankly, I think TSA increases rather than decreases risk. People who drive rather than deal with airport hassles are a demonstrable cost of the current security regime and long security lines themselves present a risk of attack with hundreds of people crowded into compact spaces at some of the nation's largest airports.

Too often, the focus becomes one of "risk elimination" which is unachievable. Life is full of risk and the proper approach is "risk management" that seeks to manage risk to an appropriately low level. No human activity is ever entirely risk-free, yet we try to attain that time and again in various areas meeting with failure. I find it noteworthy that the two unconventional bombing attempts, the Richard Reid shoe bombing and the Detroit-bound "underwear bomber" failed -- stopped by the best security there is -- attentive passengers and crew acting to prevent a bad actor from following through.

Finally, there is a basic element of protecting rights, privacy and human dignity. Those things are important to me; they are the fundamental elements of a civilized and decent society. Those are values that have been cast by the wayside since 9/11 in order to make us "safe". While I can only speak for myself on this, the infinitesimally minor marginal increase in safety from these extraordinary measures are not worth the cost in damage to what had heretofore been very basic and widely held values.

You are, of course, free to disagree with me. And that's why this is the "Checkpoints and Borders Policy Debate" forum.

I, as with others here, am unsure about what you mean by "tough" security.

Personally, I think security should be as effective and as unobtrusive as possible. I believe that we would have much more effective AND unobtrusive security if the officers stopped wasting their attention on non-threats (shoes and the liquid state of matter, for example), scrapped the full body scanner and returned to metal detectors (because full body scanners make it easier to get guns on board and generate too many false positives) and invested in developing effective trace chemical scans (not the current ETD used, that false-positives on common soap components). I also think they have to rethink their hiring policy - you can´t expect the current level of staff they hire to be effective (something that El Al, which by the way does not care about liquids nor uses full body scanners as primary, knows how to do much better).

Finally, I don´t think most people want more or "tougher" (whatever that is) security - from looking at commentary on full body scanners and media articles lately (which are a community of people different from us here), people are very fed up with the whole TSA spiel.