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-   Checkpoints and Borders Policy Debate (https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/checkpoints-borders-policy-debate-687/)
-   -   EHD swabs and "false" detections (https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/checkpoints-borders-policy-debate/1381285-ehd-swabs-false-detections.html)

mulieri Sep 5, 2012 11:57 am


Originally Posted by TSORon (Post 19254824)
It was a mistake only if one is willing to reduce the idea that alarms always indicate something dangerous. ETD alarms indicate that there is a chemical present that is also present in explosives. In other words, something dangerous.

Splitting hairs serves no useful purpose, and neither makes the other right or wrong, it just makes the conversation inane when one party pretends obtuseness.


If am alarms sounds when there's no danger, what's the point? Isn't that the same as the Boy Who Cried Wolf???


Obviously you and your colleagues do not understand spectroscopy in the slightest. While it's true that the ETD technique will "flag" a number of functional groups present in compounds both benign and dangerous, all you get is a flashing red light.

The steps that a TSO takes to "resolve" the alarm does not involve any investigation of what caused the alarm to occur. Basically the methodology is 100% flawed. Rubbing my testicles does not help determine if I have actually handled anything explosive.


Water is a dangerous compound. In excess, it can kill, too. Oh wait, that's why we can only have water in 100 ml containers, otherwise, we all might drown waiting to go through screening.

RichardKenner Sep 5, 2012 12:40 pm


Originally Posted by Caradoc (Post 19258504)
So why haven't all of these terrorists chosen softer targets?

It's not like there's a shortage of targets that would obtain even higher moral outrage than blowing up a plane, or a checkpoint line.

That's a question I often ask, but it's well-known that Al Queda seems to have a fascination with airplanes, given how many times they've tried.

Carl Johnson Sep 5, 2012 2:15 pm


Originally Posted by RichardKenner (Post 19257827)
The problem with methodologies like that is that it ignores the deterrent effect, which is actually, in my opinion, the primary purpose of all checkpoint security.

The only deterrent effect is that the TSA is achieving the goal of terrorists - that of harming America. Nobody could look at the TSA clerks and believe that a real terrorist would have any trouble getting things past them.

Terrorists can attack the queue at the checkpoint anytime they want; the reason they don't is that they want the TSA to remain just as it is, and they are afraid that if they attack a checkpoint queue (or breeze past the checkpoint with weapons and attack an airplane) the TSA would be reformed so as to either provide some security, reduce it's cost to the taxpayer and burden on commerce, or both.

Caradoc Sep 5, 2012 2:18 pm


Originally Posted by Carl Johnson (Post 19259813)
Nobody could look at the TSA clerks and believe that a real terrorist would have any trouble getting things past them.

The going rate appears to be well under $200.

http://articles.courant.com/2012-03-...a-drug-dealers


One of the dealers who organized the ring said that he gave cash and gift cards worth $50 to $100 to the TSA officers who screened him, according to a DEA affidavit.

Carl Johnson Sep 5, 2012 2:23 pm


Originally Posted by Caradoc (Post 19259833)
The going rate appears to be well under $200.

That's only because they wanted to set up a stream of goods coming through. Terrorists only want to bring a few things through, on one occasion. They could easily take advantage of the laziness and inattentiveness of the clerks. For example, they could put an 8-ounce tube of toothpaste on top of the goods, so the clerk could find and confiscate the tube.

nachtnebel Sep 5, 2012 2:43 pm


Originally Posted by Carl Johnson (Post 19259869)
That's only because they wanted to set up a stream of goods coming through. Terrorists only want to bring a few things through, on one occasion. They could easily take advantage of the laziness and inattentiveness of the clerks. For example, they could put an 8-ounce tube of toothpaste on top of the goods, so the clerk could find and confiscate the tube.

Exactly. 60,000 lazy, dim bulbs who are easily corrupted constitute a massive security hole.

Caradoc Sep 5, 2012 3:07 pm


Originally Posted by nachtnebel (Post 19259999)
60,000 lazy, dim bulbs

Redundant. They already accept a paycheck from the TSA.

nachtnebel Sep 6, 2012 7:50 am


Originally Posted by RichardKenner (Post 19259104)
That's a question I often ask, but it's well-known that Al Queda seems to have a fascination with airplanes, given how many times they've tried.

yes, but tell me why that excuses test procedures and resolution protocols that are both useless and immoral.

Even under current administrative search rulings, the requirement for this being non invasive and effective, neither of which is true in this case, not when 100% of alarms result in no explosives being found and yet on account of this people are getting sexually abused.

spd476 Sep 6, 2012 8:36 am

I flew with a cast on my hand and forearm a couple of years ago. I thought it was great because I didn't have to try to opt opt. They just sent me through the WTMD and swabbed my cast. I'm glad there wasn't a false alarm. It makes me wonder what the TSA would have done in that situation.

Caradoc Sep 6, 2012 8:53 am


Originally Posted by nachtnebel (Post 19264387)
Even under current administrative search rulings, the requirement for this being non invasive and effective, neither of which is true in this case, not when 100% of alarms result in no explosives being found and yet on account of this people are getting sexually abused.

So far, I have found evidence of ONE actual find of explosives.

One half-ounce of C4 in a tobacco tin in checked baggage.

And this wasn't found by swabbing his hands, either.

Of course, they found the half-ounce in the checked bag, but missed the still-wrapped BRICK of C4 in Trey Atwater's carry-on. Twice.

nachtnebel Sep 6, 2012 11:11 am


Originally Posted by Caradoc (Post 19264774)
So far, I have found evidence of ONE actual find of explosives.

One half-ounce of C4 in a tobacco tin in checked baggage.

And this wasn't found by swabbing his hands, either.

Of course, they found the half-ounce in the checked bag, but missed the still-wrapped BRICK of C4 in Trey Atwater's carry-on. Twice.

One for three ain't bad. Better than 0 for N tens of thousands and countless unwanted genital probing from the useless ETD test.

Caradoc Sep 6, 2012 11:13 am


Originally Posted by nachtnebel (Post 19265654)
One for three ain't bad.

Except that it isn't one for three. Can't compare explosives NOT found in someone's possession by swabbing their hands to explosives found in checked baggage, after all...

RichardKenner Sep 6, 2012 1:17 pm


Originally Posted by nachtnebel (Post 19264387)
yes, but tell me why that excuses test procedures and resolution protocols that are both useless and immoral.

Where did I address that question on either side?

nachtnebel Sep 6, 2012 4:20 pm


Originally Posted by RichardKenner (Post 19266387)
Where did I address that question on either side?

You didn't. I was inviting your thoughts on the matter.

Pesky Monkey Sep 6, 2012 10:27 pm


Originally Posted by RichardKenner (Post 19259104)
That's a question I often ask, but it's well-known that Al Queda seems to have a fascination with airplanes, given how many times they've tried.

They've tried two times since 9/11. The absurd liquids thing was not only not tried, but could never work if it was.


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