B737 Max : CAA bans from UK airspace; Comair aircraft grounded
Mar 16, 2019, 2:03 pm
#256
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Mar 16, 2019, 2:08 pm
#257
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Mar 16, 2019, 2:17 pm
#258
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Then the mods can decide whether or not this discussion has become completely irrelevant to BA, CJ, MN and EZ.
Mar 16, 2019, 4:38 pm
#259
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Mar 16, 2019, 4:55 pm
#260
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Quite. And in any case, the loss of YMMM had little or nothing to do with the design of the frame, nor the positioning of the engines, nor the grandfathering of type certification
Mar 20, 2019, 12:38 am
#262
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Two things:
1. I highly commend the Seattle Times article also linked in the thread Kgmm77 flagged. https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
The article (and comments) really gets into the nitty gritty of overall governance failings; not just at the manufacturer but also the regulators and other checks & balances. Scary stuff too on some risk assessment and risk management failings. A rotten mess to clean up and one still wonders whether oversight methods will learn lessons.
2. There is to be a review of the Certification of the 737-MAX8 ...
https://www.transportation.gov/sites...-2012-2017.pdf
For me. It does seem MCAS, software, was a response to delivery timeline risk and not properly identified for significant focus in the certification process nor able to gain that focus (for example as other bodies saw the dossiers). Should not be that way.
1. I highly commend the Seattle Times article also linked in the thread Kgmm77 flagged. https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
The article (and comments) really gets into the nitty gritty of overall governance failings; not just at the manufacturer but also the regulators and other checks & balances. Scary stuff too on some risk assessment and risk management failings. A rotten mess to clean up and one still wonders whether oversight methods will learn lessons.
2. There is to be a review of the Certification of the 737-MAX8 ...
https://www.transportation.gov/sites...-2012-2017.pdf
For me. It does seem MCAS, software, was a response to delivery timeline risk and not properly identified for significant focus in the certification process nor able to gain that focus (for example as other bodies saw the dossiers). Should not be that way.
Mar 20, 2019, 2:24 am
#263
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Two things:
1. I highly commend the Seattle Times article also linked in the thread Kgmm77 flagged. https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
The article (and comments) really gets into the nitty gritty of overall governance failings; not just at the manufacturer but also the regulators and other checks & balances. Scary stuff too on some risk assessment and risk management failings. A rotten mess to clean up and one still wonders whether oversight methods will learn lessons.
1. I highly commend the Seattle Times article also linked in the thread Kgmm77 flagged. https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
The article (and comments) really gets into the nitty gritty of overall governance failings; not just at the manufacturer but also the regulators and other checks & balances. Scary stuff too on some risk assessment and risk management failings. A rotten mess to clean up and one still wonders whether oversight methods will learn lessons.
For me, the most chilling part of a disturbing read was:
"Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system."