Rude Alaska Airlines Pilots
Dec 31, 2010, 10:51 am
#31
Join Date: Nov 2007
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Dec 31, 2010, 12:00 pm
#32
Join Date: May 2010
Location: PDX
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After having several flights delayed this month because their crews were having trouble getting through the airport, I really want crew to go to the front of the line. Even if they were late getting to the airport, this may not be their fault: twice in 2 months I've had hotel shuttle drivers just decide not to show up for work. These folks aren't rushing to get to the front of the overhead bin line; they're rushing to serve us. It's part of their jobs, I think we should expect them to move ahead of us, and while it's nice if say"Excuse me" as they do so, oh well if they don't.
Dec 31, 2010, 5:03 pm
#33
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Dec 31, 2010, 7:28 pm
#35
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Folks, please keep it friendly. If you have a problem with something another person has said, make your argument about what they said, not who they are. respect your fellow members and keep this a discussion about the issues, not an attack on the opposite side.
jackal
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Alaska Airlines Mileage Plan forum
jackal
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Alaska Airlines Mileage Plan forum
Jan 1, 2011, 5:55 am
#36
Join Date: Nov 2005
Programs: Delta Diamond
Posts: 92
I was at the security line at SEA yesterday, waiting to go through the metal detector. 2 Alaska Air pilots show up and without saying a word, put their stuff in bins pushing them through the scanner and cut right in front of me. They went through the metal detector without saying "excuse me or thanks". A guy right behind me said "that is so rude" and I told the pilots that this is why I don't fly Alaska Air. They didn't even respond and just moved on.
That does seem rude.
But to clarify, exactly what did they do? If there is space between a person filling their bins and the xray machine tunnel I'll put my bins there in front of them without a second thought.
Where did the "cut" occur?
But to clarify, exactly what did they do? If there is space between a person filling their bins and the xray machine tunnel I'll put my bins there in front of them without a second thought.
Where did the "cut" occur?
Actually there is a third state, but I try to keep it brief. That's the waiting state when the guy ahead of you is standing there trying to get his stuff to go in not realizing there is actually no force on earth that will prevent his stuff from going in as you are right in back of him and he's between you and where your stuff is going. I try to minimize this time by catching their attention and saying something like "I've got it, go ahead" while indicating that I'm pushing their stuff by pushing mine. And if the belt is backed up and no one is in back of you to be the "pusher" you can usually rely on the TSA agent to stuff your goodies into the machine just by leaving it there at the threshold and walking to the magnetometer.
So I don't give much thought about jumping "ahead" of someone on the fill track. Am I being rude also?
Last edited by graytidy; Jan 1, 2011 at 11:17 am
Jan 1, 2011, 1:29 pm
#37
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: SEA
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Actually there is a third state, but I try to keep it brief. That's the waiting state when the guy ahead of you is standing there trying to get his stuff to go in not realizing there is actually no force on earth that will prevent his stuff from going in as you are right in back of him and he's between you and where your stuff is going. I try to minimize this time by catching their attention and saying something like "I've got it, go ahead" while indicating that I'm pushing their stuff by pushing mine. And if the belt is backed up and no one is in back of you to be the "pusher" you can usually rely on the TSA agent to stuff your goodies into the machine just by leaving it there at the threshold and walking to the magnetometer.
So I don't give much thought about jumping "ahead" of someone on the fill track. Am I being rude also?
So I don't give much thought about jumping "ahead" of someone on the fill track. Am I being rude also?
Jan 3, 2011, 2:47 pm
#38
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The solution to this problem, of course, is for flightcrews to skip the security screening entirely. If their ID can be verified in real-time (and it can), there's absolutely no reason for them to be going through this charade. It screws the flow up for paying passengers (hence this thread), and really accomplishes nothing in terms of security.
They've already had their backgrounds checked and are trusted to drive an airplane around; the time and energy we waste on screening them should be aimed at the real threats out there.
They've already had their backgrounds checked and are trusted to drive an airplane around; the time and energy we waste on screening them should be aimed at the real threats out there.
Jan 3, 2011, 4:19 pm
#39
Ambassador: Alaska Airlines
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Seattle
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The solution to this problem, of course, is for flightcrews to skip the security screening entirely. If their ID can be verified in real-time (and it can), there's absolutely no reason for them to be going through this charade. It screws the flow up for paying passengers (hence this thread), and really accomplishes nothing in terms of security.
They've already had their backgrounds checked and are trusted to drive an airplane around; the time and energy we waste on screening them should be aimed at the real threats out there.
They've already had their backgrounds checked and are trusted to drive an airplane around; the time and energy we waste on screening them should be aimed at the real threats out there.
Security is always inconvenient; hopefully as a society we make the right tradeoff (of our civil liberties, time, money, and convenience) for the right level of security. As of now, we're wasting billions of dollars and hundreds of millions of hours for a whole lot of show and not a lot of actual security.
Jan 3, 2011, 10:54 pm
#40
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I disagree. There is a finite amount of money and resources that we can throw at security. Do we waste those resources on giving toddlers full-body xrays, or do we use them on more likely threats?
Who's to say the TSA screener can't be bribed to let something through? Or the baggage handler?
What I'm getting at is that at some point, we have to figure who is not a likely threat (via background checks, which all pilots must go through), and who's an unknown. Wasting resources on vigorously screening the trusted people is not effective security. The Israelis have figured this out long ago, and have far, far more effective airport security than the US because of it.
The subject of this thread-- the flight crew -- is a special case. By virtue of their ID and their job, they are already in the cockpit in control of an airliner. What possible nefarious benefit would be gained by them bringing, say, a knife to work? The whole point of prohibiting all these potential weapons is to prevent someone from taking control of an airplane again. The pilots are already in control of the airplane behind a locked door. If we trust them in that position, it truly doesn't matter what they bring to work.
That's my point. We could have more effective security, at a lower cost, by using more intelligence and less of the brute-force approach we're employing now.
Who's to say the TSA screener can't be bribed to let something through? Or the baggage handler?
What I'm getting at is that at some point, we have to figure who is not a likely threat (via background checks, which all pilots must go through), and who's an unknown. Wasting resources on vigorously screening the trusted people is not effective security. The Israelis have figured this out long ago, and have far, far more effective airport security than the US because of it.
The subject of this thread-- the flight crew -- is a special case. By virtue of their ID and their job, they are already in the cockpit in control of an airliner. What possible nefarious benefit would be gained by them bringing, say, a knife to work? The whole point of prohibiting all these potential weapons is to prevent someone from taking control of an airplane again. The pilots are already in control of the airplane behind a locked door. If we trust them in that position, it truly doesn't matter what they bring to work.
As of now, we're wasting billions of dollars and hundreds of millions of hours for a whole lot of show and not a lot of actual security.
Last edited by CA1900; Jan 3, 2011 at 11:11 pm Reason: typo
Jan 3, 2011, 11:02 pm
#41
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Of anyone, surely pilots should be the first and foremost to be able to do this!
Jan 3, 2011, 11:32 pm
#42
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Except that they're not. I've personally been escorted into the sterile area through a badged door and been able to skip security. Most CSA-level employees who need frequent access to the sterile area have this privilege.
Of anyone, surely pilots should be the first and foremost to be able to do this!
Of anyone, surely pilots should be the first and foremost to be able to do this!
If, on the other hand, our goal is to harass passengers enough to make it SEEM like we have effective security, then we should just focus on them and make it convenient for ground staff, airport employees, airline crews and TSA agents to come and go as they please. Guess which world we live in today.
I make no claim that the above are my original ideas; most of my views on the subject originate via Bruce Schneier, the Chuck Norris of security. Here's one of my favorite interviews of his (best excerpts below, but the whole thing is worth reading):
Bruce Schneier logs long hours trudging through airports [...]. By his own count, he will take 170 flights this year
WSJ: Are you of fan of registered traveler programs like the now defunct Clear as a speedier alternative?
Mr. Schneier: The registered traveler programs are great. The idea of paying some money and getting through airport security quicker is a perfectly reasonable thing to do. As a security measure, as a pre-screening measure, it's a waste of time.
WSJ: Why?
Mr. Schneier: Prescreening assumes that you have a list of the bad guys and can check if someone is not on that list. That's not a realistic assumption and when you have an easy way through security and a hard way through security, you invite the bad guys to take the easy way.
WSJ: Which parts of the airport screening process do you think are worth the hassle?
Mr. Schneier: Pre-9/11 screening is probably worth it, although I've seen good arguments that it isn't. There have been exactly two things since 9/11 that have improved airplane security: Reinforcing the cockpit doors and convincing passengers they have to fight back. Everything else has been a waste of time and money.
WSJ: Everything else should get the boot?
Mr. Schneier: Yep, because the way to think of it is airports are the last line of defense. And they're not a very good one. The goal is to catch the terrorist before they get to the airport. It's a waste of money if all we do is force the terrorist to make a minor change in their tactic or target.
WSJ: Are you of fan of registered traveler programs like the now defunct Clear as a speedier alternative?
Mr. Schneier: The registered traveler programs are great. The idea of paying some money and getting through airport security quicker is a perfectly reasonable thing to do. As a security measure, as a pre-screening measure, it's a waste of time.
WSJ: Why?
Mr. Schneier: Prescreening assumes that you have a list of the bad guys and can check if someone is not on that list. That's not a realistic assumption and when you have an easy way through security and a hard way through security, you invite the bad guys to take the easy way.
WSJ: Which parts of the airport screening process do you think are worth the hassle?
Mr. Schneier: Pre-9/11 screening is probably worth it, although I've seen good arguments that it isn't. There have been exactly two things since 9/11 that have improved airplane security: Reinforcing the cockpit doors and convincing passengers they have to fight back. Everything else has been a waste of time and money.
WSJ: Everything else should get the boot?
Mr. Schneier: Yep, because the way to think of it is airports are the last line of defense. And they're not a very good one. The goal is to catch the terrorist before they get to the airport. It's a waste of money if all we do is force the terrorist to make a minor change in their tactic or target.
Jan 3, 2011, 11:42 pm
#43
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Seattle, WA
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I disagree. There is a finite amount of money and resources that we can throw at security. Do we waste those resources on giving toddlers full-body xrays, or do we use them on more likely threats?
Who's to say the TSA screener can't be bribed to let something through? Or the baggage handler?
What I'm getting at is that at some point, we have to figure who is not a likely threat (via background checks, which all pilots must go through), and who's an unknown. Wasting resources on vigorously screening the trusted people is not effective security. The Israelis have figured this out long ago, and have far, far more effective airport security than the US because of it.
The subject of this thread-- the flight crew -- is a special case. By virtue of their ID and their job, they are already in the cockpit in control of an airliner. What possible nefarious benefit would be gained by them bringing, say, a knife to work? The whole point of prohibiting all these potential weapons is to prevent someone from taking control of an airplane again. The pilots are already in control of the airplane behind a locked door. If we trust them in that position, it truly doesn't matter what they bring to work.
That's my point. We could have more effective security, at a lower cost, by using more intelligence and less of the brute-force approach we're employing now.
Who's to say the TSA screener can't be bribed to let something through? Or the baggage handler?
What I'm getting at is that at some point, we have to figure who is not a likely threat (via background checks, which all pilots must go through), and who's an unknown. Wasting resources on vigorously screening the trusted people is not effective security. The Israelis have figured this out long ago, and have far, far more effective airport security than the US because of it.
The subject of this thread-- the flight crew -- is a special case. By virtue of their ID and their job, they are already in the cockpit in control of an airliner. What possible nefarious benefit would be gained by them bringing, say, a knife to work? The whole point of prohibiting all these potential weapons is to prevent someone from taking control of an airplane again. The pilots are already in control of the airplane behind a locked door. If we trust them in that position, it truly doesn't matter what they bring to work.
That's my point. We could have more effective security, at a lower cost, by using more intelligence and less of the brute-force approach we're employing now.
Outside of pilots (with due deference to our fine FAs) perhaps an argument could be made based on the possibility of coercion or the like that all other employees should go through security.
Jan 3, 2011, 11:52 pm
#44
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Jan 3, 2011, 11:59 pm
#45
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I've never minded any flight crews coming through screening before me, instead what has irritated me is that when I am in the gold lane for the ID check and have to wait while they move large groups of disabled or school groups ahead of everyone already in the premier lines. I no longer use the gold lanes at certain airports because it is faster to go through the regular lanes for the ID checks.
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