canadiancow

I suspect they received a special exemption from the ban from Canada, but it wasn't worth even requesting it from the US.

RangerNS

The US airspace restriction, with exceptions for ferry flights might not include overflights.

Or speed doesn't matter and NAVCANADA is cheaper than FAA.

5mm

expert7700

FAA will not require actual B737MAX pilot training on actual B737MAX simulators.

AA has announced they will go above and beyond and require this. Bravo. It is worth mentioning that AA was the only carrier that insisted on the optional $80k AOA indicator when they initially ordered their planes.

AC and CTA -- next move is yours. Choose carefully.

smoothride

All AC MAX FINs have the optional AOA disagree, and AOA display on the PFD installed.

To go one step further, AC for some time now has been installing dual heads-up guidance displays (HGS, or HUD) of which I am not sure there is another airline in the world that is installing this as a dual system on the 7M8 (Boeing only offers a single HGS system, requiring AC to get a specialty install done). This is a massive investment in safety, which will require even more training simulator sessions on how to use this technology.

Air Canada is one of the only airlines in the world to have actual MAX simulators (two on site).

AC's MAX simulators have been running 19 hours per day, 7 days a week (with the remaining hours scheduled only for sim maintenance) with AC pilots training flight control scenarios since April 01.

When this is all done, AC will be shown to be a world-wide leader in getting the planes back in the sky safely, and having the best trained pilots to do so (with more than one simulator session under every pilot's belt).

While the others are debating sim time for pilots, AC has already been doing this for over 3 weeks, and plans to continue this into May (simulators running 19hrs/day) with each and every MAX pilot, for a second time.

Bravo, AC Flight Ops management, ahead of the pack, with quality training for their pilots.

canopus27

Thanks. That's interesting.

And, as you said, a mixed bag.

• The first two reports (involving an uncommanded descent) read to me as two reports of the same incident - one from the Captain and one from the FO. Not 100% sure, but that's my interpretation. In addition to a very similar description, both reports were in November 2018, both reports as day three of a cycle, both reports the airport is at 2000 MSL, etc.
• The third report is not a flight control incident at all, there is a MAINT annunciation on the ground and neither the Captain nor FO can understand the issue.
• The fourth report is not even an incident - it's a 737 captain complaining about the fact that the MCAS is not documented.
• The fifth report is a flight issue, albeit with no obvious similarity to the MCAS; it's about an unexpected autothrottle movement.
• The sixth and final report is not a flight issue at all, it's an FO feeling unprepared for first flight in the MAX.

I'm not second guessing the fact that any of those reports were made - this is how the industry has become as safe as it has.

However, only three of those six reports even involved an actual in-flight incident, only two of them sound even superficially similar to the MCAS issues, and those two appear to be two reports of the same incident. Even that one incident seems likely not to be caused by MCAS, as it occurred after the autopilot was engaged (which, we're told, disables MCAS).

Again, it's all good, and all interesting - but it's not supportive of claims that numerous pilots have encountered an MCAS issue and been able to fly their way out of it.

To date, the only flights where we know that happened (MCAS was trying to fly them into the ground but the pilots successfully overrode) was with the Lion Air flights prior to the incident. Which also means, interestingly, that the only pilots who are known to have demonstrated the ability to survive an MCAS incident, are Indonesian pilots.

Anyway, this was very interesting reading, thanks @Bohemian

5mm

AA was not the only airline to buy the 2 options. AC also bought these options, well WS only bought 1.

Stranger

RangerNS

How many other operators of the MAX are new to the 737 series entirely?

Are Air Canada's "MAX Simulators" a MAX simulator, or, since the MAX is supposed to be the same as the <MAX, just a <MAX simulator with a new sticker? (two questions, really: what was it the day it was installed, and what is it now?) I find it hard to believe that the simulator people (pre-accidents) had simulated the MCAS as Boeing suppressed its existence.

Not to be critical of AC in all of this, just the reporting on their actions. Starting from scratch, their simulator & training process would be, by necessity, different. Obviously transitioning from a 320 to a MAX takes more than a couple of hours with an iPad.

But different, even more, does not mean sufficient.

smoothride

They are B737-MAX simulators (with LEAP-1B engines) built as one of the first non-NG simulators, and was driven down the highway from CAE in Montreal and then assembled at AC Flight Operations. After install and initial certification, it took a further year of data and testing to be a certified Level 'D' simulator by Transport Canada.

Images are available publicly, I found this from a google search:

https://pizzainmotion.boardingarea.c...ght-simulator/

expert7700

from Airliners.net: That adds a bit of pause to the position that 'since the 737max is a new type to AC, all pilots have the advantage of operating just the MAX and not switching between variants such as 737NG.'

tracon

C-FSOC YVR-YQG

RangerNS

One can only simulate what you know to simulate is what I'm saying. The MCAS was undocumented. Did CAE simulate accurately the aircraft described in the documents they got from Boeing? I would presume so.

Did CAE simulate a MAX, which includes the MCAS, before October?

tracon

C-FSNU YQG-YVR

The Lev

While Boeing's CEO has apologized, I don't recall anyone in an official capacity at Boeing calling MCAS deeply flawed. They are just making an already safe plane even safer.

I don't think there are too many people in the aviation industry who would claim that two catastrohpic events over the course of "thousands" or even hundreds of thousands of flights to be an acceptable failure rate.

In addition to the three widely reported MCAS incidents (two with Lionair and one with Ethiopian), based on what has been dredged up on this thread, there appear to be a handful of other incidents where MCAS may have malfunctioned. To be generous, let's assume a total of 10 incidents (I suspect it is closer to 5). That means that in 20% or more of the cases where MCAS severely malfunctioned due to AoA sensor issues the aircraft crashed. Other than engine failure on a single engine aircraft, there aren't very many situations I can think of where failure of a single part has a 20-67% likelihood of a crash being the outcome.