Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Apr 10, 2019, 11:52 am
#2461
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What a bizarre question. If the name "maneuvering characteristics augmentation system" doesn't pique your interest, you must be a very incurious or technically disinterested person. I can't imagine any airline pilot not wanting to know what it is and what it does, not to mention that mechanics need to know about the system to be able to maintain it.
I regularly ship to clients copy/pasted templates of engagement journals and routinely skip the definition section, and expect they do to. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE TEMPLATE INCLUDES THAT, and there is not a lawyer on the planet who can explain why some things ARE IN ALL CAPS. Granting that I never deal with anything nearly life threatening as a commercial jets owners manual, the same logic applies. As does the standard for writing a, er, standards document.
Definitions are not what would be considered a "nominative" part of a standard. A definition, never needed to be referred to by the normative standard is an irrelevant aside. Boeing might drop the definition of a theodolite into their pilots manual. If none of the processes that the pilot ever train on refer to such an instrument, its inclusion is irrelevant. The content of that is as relevant to anything as the text if An Act Relating to Railways.
Definitions are not what would be considered a "nominative" part of a standard. A definition, never needed to be referred to by the normative standard is an irrelevant aside. Boeing might drop the definition of a theodolite into their pilots manual. If none of the processes that the pilot ever train on refer to such an instrument, its inclusion is irrelevant. The content of that is as relevant to anything as the text if An Act Relating to Railways.
Apr 10, 2019, 12:05 pm
#2462
Join Date: Jan 2017
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Recall the two business drivers of the MAX: fuel efficiency, same type certificate. From this, you get "new engine" and "same flying characteristics for the pilots"
If Boeing could have created the MAX by retrofitting a better engine and keeping the same characteristics for the pilots, they would have, and not written a single line of code.
Could Boeing design a different aircraft with better fuel efficiency? Sure.
If Boeing could have created the MAX by retrofitting a better engine and keeping the same characteristics for the pilots, they would have, and not written a single line of code.
Could Boeing design a different aircraft with better fuel efficiency? Sure.
Apr 10, 2019, 2:30 pm
#2464
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Posts: 23,802
Compared with 2020 expectations. Probably even with 1970 expectations. Original 737 did not exhibit a recurrence period between accidents of the order of a year, as far as I remember. (And yes, I did fly on -100 and -200 series, on a regular basis.)
The question Boeing will need to demonstrate is the fix sufficient, and will this convince the Minister of Transport, who come November may be someone else, possibly with a different political stripe to change TC policy towards the MAX.
One would hope politics stays out of this. And anyway, now that the EASA, TC, The Chinese, Brazilian and other certification authorities apparently are playing together, I would not expect poilitics will really enter the picture. But then neither do I expect Boeing will be able to indulge in further wishful thinking.
You are free to choose to fly MAX or not when it comes back into service...although too early to tell if this bird is gone the way of the Dodo, but Tylenol made it back, certainly Boeing will make a go of it.
I would expect Boeing will do everything they can to bring the 737 back. However, I would expect the changes will be more significant than the bean counters were trying to get away with. And if I were their spin doctors, I would retire the Max name and the version number and introduce the fixed model as a different one with a different name. And no doubt I would fly on a satisfactorily fixed one. While I did fly (only once) on the Max in the period between the two crashes, I confess it was reluctantly so.
Apr 10, 2019, 2:38 pm
#2465
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: YVR
Programs: UA Premier Platinum
Posts: 3,759
No, fly-by-wire was a technological advancement that came with trade-offs, but also benefits. MCAS has no benefits to anyone except Boeing's bottom line.
Apr 10, 2019, 2:48 pm
#2466
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Location: YYZ
Programs: AC*SE 2MM
Posts: 16,646
I am not certain the fact an airline was a previous operator or not would be all that critical. I think corporate culture would be the biggest factor. Many years ago, I was involved in a control system platform, we were looking at using it in a completely different application, however it was originally designed for intelligent military ships. Looking at what the supplier went through selling it into different countries was enlightening. Some customers accepted the manufacture documentation at face value. Others viewed it as the starting point for their own acceptance testing, while others treated the entire system as a black box and never wanted to look under the hood. Would airlines be any different?
AC has a long history of buying aircraft from every major western supplier. They probably have the benefit of having people who know how this problem is solved in every major manufacture and being able to compare and contrast. What I don't know is if AC has the culture to deep dive into questioning the details on this aircraft as part of the process of being it into the fold.
AC has a long history of buying aircraft from every major western supplier. They probably have the benefit of having people who know how this problem is solved in every major manufacture and being able to compare and contrast. What I don't know is if AC has the culture to deep dive into questioning the details on this aircraft as part of the process of being it into the fold.
I am amazed that up to now there has been no real attempt by Boeing to take the high road on this. But instead, apparently ignoring that they will end up getting hurt pretty bad and merely believing the spin doctors will handle it. Independently of the safety issue, and the public perception of the max as damaged good, that the design process at Boeing ended up with a lemon that will likely be grounded for six months at the very least will surely result in loss of trust by their customers, namely the airlines now forced to deal with the mess.
- "legal" who basically promote the idea of deny, deflect and shut up because anything you say will be used against you in a lawsuit
- Marketing and crisis communications consultants urge you to get ahead of the story, own up to problems, do right by your customers and move on
The second group are usually right but get trumped by the legal guys in the boardroom until the stuff really hits the fan, by which time it is too late for the "own it" crew to get ahead of the story. Somewhat out of context, but the train wreck of the SNC-Lavvalin affair for Justin Trudeau has everything to do with choosing the first path.
Of late, Boeing is beginning to assume some level of accountability for their issues; but it's rather late in the game. I think there will need to be a wholesale housecleaning of the board and leadership team. The most senior executives need to own the fact that they created a culture that took shortcuts to meet demands of making a 50 year old airframe perform like it did 50 years ago and yet be almost as efficient as a clean sheet design.
https://www.rt.com/news/455587-boein...-lost-crashes/
Apr 10, 2019, 6:13 pm
#2467
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I think we all agree that a huge part of the problem is that the MCAS was designed to depend on a single sensor, and not two.
This article
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ed-on-the-jet/
claims that the reason for that single point of failure was not a simple oversight on the part of Boeing... but an intentional decision that was made to reduce the MAX pilot training costs.
Makes the wholewhole situation sound more like the Pinto...
This article
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ed-on-the-jet/
claims that the reason for that single point of failure was not a simple oversight on the part of Boeing... but an intentional decision that was made to reduce the MAX pilot training costs.
Makes the wholewhole situation sound more like the Pinto...
Apr 10, 2019, 6:17 pm
#2468
Join Date: Jan 2017
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And announcing going with Airbus, even without canceling with Boeing, that airline would lose any leverage they might have with Boeing, having already shown their hand.
Apr 10, 2019, 6:19 pm
#2469
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I won't get dragged again on semantic discussions on the concept of stability and relying on trim. However on the main issue, MCAS won't ever be good enough. Primary devices are inherently too unreliable to provide an adequate level of safety. Consider pitot devices, on airbus systems. When the issues (which happen) go beyond a cerain point uncertaintywise, they just return control to the pilots, which is the proper thing to do. Doing something similar with the MCAS would defeat the purpose.Even with two sensors connected to the MCAS, the risk of failure, while significantly less than currently, would still not be at the level one has currently the right to expect, and the risk of accidents due to MCAS failure would likely still be higher than the risk of stall that the MCAS is supposed to prevent. Add to that that aoa sensors are relatively complex mechanically hence more prone to failure and to breakdown than pitot.
Apr 10, 2019, 6:39 pm
#2472
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I work for a large company that makes things that go in ships, almost everything, except for the ship itself. To say that our customers (which include names that are widely recognizable to practically everyone) are very knowledgeable about operating and maintaining our products is a massive understatement. In that context, it would be inconceivable for their engineering and operations staff to not know about a system like MCAS. In particular, a captain and the navigation staff would be asking a lot of questions if we provided something called "maneuvering characteristics augmentation system". I think you are selling airlines short.
Apr 10, 2019, 6:45 pm
#2473
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Apr 10, 2019, 8:49 pm
#2475
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