Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
#2281
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SE MM, Bonvoy Plat, Hilton G,Nexus, Amex MR Plat,IHG Plat
Posts: 4,422
I'm moving my prediction to post-October.
"FAA spokesman Greg Martin said that “time is needed for additional work by Boeing as the result of an ongoing review of the 737 MAX Flight Control System to ensure that Boeing has identified and appropriately addressed all pertinent issues.”"
https://globalnews.ca/news/5119425/b...oftware-delay/
Boeing 737 MAX 8 software fix delayed by a few weeks, FAA says
"FAA spokesman Greg Martin said that “time is needed for additional work by Boeing as the result of an ongoing review of the 737 MAX Flight Control System to ensure that Boeing has identified and appropriately addressed all pertinent issues.”"
https://globalnews.ca/news/5119425/b...oftware-delay/
#2282
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Vancouver, BC
Programs: Aeroplan 75K | Latitude Flight Pass junkie
Posts: 1,548
Are these things going to be written off? Like, is this a possible scenario?
The problem is that this software “fix” just allows MCAS to be disabled and returns the airplane to the state of instability that made the FAA require the MCAS to begin with.
The problem is that this software “fix” just allows MCAS to be disabled and returns the airplane to the state of instability that made the FAA require the MCAS to begin with.
#2283
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
The Max aircraft are not unstable, they are just fine, they just handle differently than the NG, MCAS is supposed to make flying the Max feel the same as flying the NG, MCAS was not mandated/required by the FAA - not sure where anyone is getting that idea from.
#2284
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
There are dozens of regulating agencies, hundreds of airlines, thousands of pilots and the families of 346 people who would dispute the notion that "they are just fine". I know you likely understand a little bit about certain aspects of aviation, so to claim the Max "are not unstable" is being disingenuous to readers with a lesser appreciation of aerodynamics. The entire point of designing and installing MCAS is because the newest version of the 737 is NOT inherently stable. Many aircraft (think fighter jets and aerobatic aircraft) are designing to exhibit flight instability as a functional advantage. Instability in a commercial airliner is not generally advantageous, as has sadly been demonstrated.
#2285
Join Date: Jan 2016
Location: YYZ
Programs: Only J via Peasant Points, 777HDPeasant or The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance and Narcissism.
Posts: 5,951
Written off? There is nothing to write off.
The Max aircraft are not unstable, they are just fine, they just handle differently than the NG, MCAS is supposed to make flying the Max feel the same as flying the NG, MCAS was not mandated/required by the FAA - not sure where anyone is getting that idea from.
The Max aircraft are not unstable, they are just fine, they just handle differently than the NG, MCAS is supposed to make flying the Max feel the same as flying the NG, MCAS was not mandated/required by the FAA - not sure where anyone is getting that idea from.
#2286
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
Oh wow, has this thread descended to the point of being little more than a cesspool of misinformation and poorly drawn conclusions based on misunderstandings of how the industry works and misguided attempts at trying to draw parallels to industries for which no parallels to aviation exist.
Such a face-palm of a thread that just goes to show that most "enthusiasts, FFs, avgeeks, etc" have a hard time understanding the significant subtleties of the aviation world, how it is regulated and how aviation operates within those regulations.
That being said, there are a couple of buried nuggets of accurate information in this thread, but some of the conclusions drawn are inaccurate or incomplete.
There is no more of an inherent instability of the 737Max design than there is for the 737NG. The handling characteristics of the Max can be quite different than the handling characteristics of the NG under similar flight conditions.
The real crux of the issue is the desire (by the airlines) for the Max to have the same pilot type rating as the 737NG aircraft. This means that a pilot flying a 737NG would have the same feel is if they were flying a 737Max and vice versa. I guess an analog many could relate to would be making driving a motor-coach bus feel them same as driving a city-bus. This common type rating means that airlines do not have to maintain different pools of pilots which means greater operational flexibility and cheaper operation costs for airlines. The idea was a NG pilot could start the day in an NG, finish the day in a Max and not notice any difference.
There's just one problem, it is physically impossible to make flying the Max "feel" like flying a NG, the larger diameter, further forward engines will make the handling characteristics (the feel) quite different than the NG. Enter MCAS, a good idea that probably should have never seen the light of day, an idea I have fundamental issues with (I'll explain) and issues with its implementation, which I'll also explain, as the two are not related. IMHO, the Max should not have been given the same type rating as the NG, but here we are.
MCAS - I have an issue with its purpose: It goes against the basic Boeing philosophy (Airbus & Boeing have differing philosophies related to control authority) which is that the pilot always has final control authority. MCAS is the opposite of this, and instead of proverbially saying "human this is happening, do something" it just takes an action and does not inform the pilot, which is more of an Airbus type of control philosophy.
MCAS - my issue with its implementation: All systems require a SFHA (System Function Hazard Analysis), Boeing has stated that the MCAS was rated hazardous, which means it is classified as a DAL-B (Design Assurance Level B) system, DAL-B systems have to meet a failure rate of 1e-7 per flight hour or less. I have personally performed more than a dozen SFHA's and supported a half dozen more, I can not for the life of me figure out how a DAL-B system can rely on a single sensor and would love to see what the other mitigating conditions Boeing listed for the MCAS SFHA that permitted its reliance on a single sensor.
Now the regulation piece that a lot of people seem to be jumping on, there is no "Fox in the hen house". It is an industry norm where the OEMs have their own specifically designated people perform some of the certification work, I performed that function myself as well for several aircraft systems. However, the FARs (regulations) still apply, and those OEM designated people need to follow and enforce the FARs, in fact, we are empowered to do so by law. In addition, the FAA (as well as EASA, CASA, TCCA, etc) are supposed to ask the OEMs to prove that their engineering and safety attestations are accurate, valid and in compliance with all applicable regulations.
So when it comes to MCAS, Boeing made some assertions, did the FAA challenge those assertions? That is really what I am waiting to see.
As for all the discussions regarding software engineering etc - oh man, just so much lack of understanding about how aviation software and systems are designed and tested. All I can say is read up on DO-178B/C and DO-1254 before any sort of intelligent discussion can be had on that topic. Suffice it to say, that until someone has worked on the design and testing of an aviation system, they will have no understating of just how complex, comprehensive the ordeal is and how every line of code can be traced back to a requirement that is tested against.
Now for the Air Canada spin on all of this. Air Canada did not have any 737 type rated pilots, so the training that AC pilots received for the Max is the complete several weeks long training that all new type rating pilots have to receive. In addition, it is the operator that defines and creates the pilot training programme, not the OEM. The OEM provides a room full of binders which comprises the owners manual, and it is up the operator to read the owners manual and create the pilot training programme, just as you receive an owners manual when you purchase a car. GM, Ford, Toyota, Honda, etc do not teach you how to drive/operate your car, same goes for aviation.
Such a face-palm of a thread that just goes to show that most "enthusiasts, FFs, avgeeks, etc" have a hard time understanding the significant subtleties of the aviation world, how it is regulated and how aviation operates within those regulations.
That being said, there are a couple of buried nuggets of accurate information in this thread, but some of the conclusions drawn are inaccurate or incomplete.
There is no more of an inherent instability of the 737Max design than there is for the 737NG. The handling characteristics of the Max can be quite different than the handling characteristics of the NG under similar flight conditions.
The real crux of the issue is the desire (by the airlines) for the Max to have the same pilot type rating as the 737NG aircraft. This means that a pilot flying a 737NG would have the same feel is if they were flying a 737Max and vice versa. I guess an analog many could relate to would be making driving a motor-coach bus feel them same as driving a city-bus. This common type rating means that airlines do not have to maintain different pools of pilots which means greater operational flexibility and cheaper operation costs for airlines. The idea was a NG pilot could start the day in an NG, finish the day in a Max and not notice any difference.
There's just one problem, it is physically impossible to make flying the Max "feel" like flying a NG, the larger diameter, further forward engines will make the handling characteristics (the feel) quite different than the NG. Enter MCAS, a good idea that probably should have never seen the light of day, an idea I have fundamental issues with (I'll explain) and issues with its implementation, which I'll also explain, as the two are not related. IMHO, the Max should not have been given the same type rating as the NG, but here we are.
MCAS - I have an issue with its purpose: It goes against the basic Boeing philosophy (Airbus & Boeing have differing philosophies related to control authority) which is that the pilot always has final control authority. MCAS is the opposite of this, and instead of proverbially saying "human this is happening, do something" it just takes an action and does not inform the pilot, which is more of an Airbus type of control philosophy.
MCAS - my issue with its implementation: All systems require a SFHA (System Function Hazard Analysis), Boeing has stated that the MCAS was rated hazardous, which means it is classified as a DAL-B (Design Assurance Level B) system, DAL-B systems have to meet a failure rate of 1e-7 per flight hour or less. I have personally performed more than a dozen SFHA's and supported a half dozen more, I can not for the life of me figure out how a DAL-B system can rely on a single sensor and would love to see what the other mitigating conditions Boeing listed for the MCAS SFHA that permitted its reliance on a single sensor.
Now the regulation piece that a lot of people seem to be jumping on, there is no "Fox in the hen house". It is an industry norm where the OEMs have their own specifically designated people perform some of the certification work, I performed that function myself as well for several aircraft systems. However, the FARs (regulations) still apply, and those OEM designated people need to follow and enforce the FARs, in fact, we are empowered to do so by law. In addition, the FAA (as well as EASA, CASA, TCCA, etc) are supposed to ask the OEMs to prove that their engineering and safety attestations are accurate, valid and in compliance with all applicable regulations.
So when it comes to MCAS, Boeing made some assertions, did the FAA challenge those assertions? That is really what I am waiting to see.
As for all the discussions regarding software engineering etc - oh man, just so much lack of understanding about how aviation software and systems are designed and tested. All I can say is read up on DO-178B/C and DO-1254 before any sort of intelligent discussion can be had on that topic. Suffice it to say, that until someone has worked on the design and testing of an aviation system, they will have no understating of just how complex, comprehensive the ordeal is and how every line of code can be traced back to a requirement that is tested against.
Now for the Air Canada spin on all of this. Air Canada did not have any 737 type rated pilots, so the training that AC pilots received for the Max is the complete several weeks long training that all new type rating pilots have to receive. In addition, it is the operator that defines and creates the pilot training programme, not the OEM. The OEM provides a room full of binders which comprises the owners manual, and it is up the operator to read the owners manual and create the pilot training programme, just as you receive an owners manual when you purchase a car. GM, Ford, Toyota, Honda, etc do not teach you how to drive/operate your car, same goes for aviation.
Last edited by jaysona; Apr 1, 2019 at 11:29 pm
#2287
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
There are dozens of regulating agencies, hundreds of airlines, thousands of pilots and the families of 346 people who would dispute the notion that "they are just fine". I know you likely understand a little bit about certain aspects of aviation, so to claim the Max "are not unstable" is being disingenuous to readers with a lesser appreciation of aerodynamics. The entire point of designing and installing MCAS is because the newest version of the 737 is NOT inherently stable. Many aircraft (think fighter jets and aerobatic aircraft) are designing to exhibit flight instability as a functional advantage. Instability in a commercial airliner is not generally advantageous, as has sadly been demonstrated.
As for the 346 dead people - well, aviation is not 100% risk free, and people will always die, given the number of people that fly everyday and the number that will fly over the life span of the aircraft program, the 346 dead can not even be called a statistical rounding error. Cold, I know, but that is the approach to safety - nothing but cold hard numbers. There is no place for emotion when performing safety work - it is all about the numbers.
#2288
Join Date: Jan 2016
Location: YYZ
Programs: Only J via Peasant Points, 777HDPeasant or The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance and Narcissism.
Posts: 5,951
Oh wow, has this thread descended to the point of being little more than a cesspool of misinformation and poorly drawn conclusions based on misunderstandings of how the industry works and misguided attempts at trying to draw parallels to industries for which no parallels to aviation exist.
Such a face-palm of a thread that just goes to show that most "enthusiasts, FFs, avgeeks, etc" have a hard time understanding the significant subtleties of the aviation world, how it is regulated and how aviation operates within those regulations.
That being said, there are a couple of buried nuggets of accurate information in this thread, but some of the conclusions drawn are inaccurate or incomplete.
There is no more of an inherent instability of the 737Max design than there is for the 737NG. The handling characteristics of the Max can be quite different than the handling characteristics of the NG under similar flight conditions.
The real crux of the issue is the desire (by the airlines) for the Max to have the same pilot type rating as the 737NG aircraft. This means that a pilot flying a 737NG would have the same feel is if they were flying a 737Max and vice versa. I guess an analog many could relate to would be making driving a motor-coach bus feel them same as driving a city-bus. This common type rating means that airlines do not have to maintain different pools of pilots which means greater operational flexibility and cheaper operation costs for airlines. The idea was a NG pilot could start the day in an NG, finish the day in a Max and not notice any difference.
There's just one problem, it is physically impossible to make flying the Max "feel" like flying a NG, the larger diameter, further forward engines will make the handling characteristics (the feel) quite different than the NG. Enter MCAS, a good idea that probably should have never seen the light of day, an idea I have fundamental issues with (I'll explain) and issues with its implementation, which I'll also explain, as the two are not related. IMHO, the Max should not have been given the same type rating as the NG, but here we are.
MCAS - I have an issue with its purpose: It goes against the basic Boeing philosophy (Airbus & Boeing have differing philosophies related to control authority) which is that the pilot always has final control authority. MCAS is the opposite of this, and instead of proverbially saying "human this is happening, do something" it just takes an action and does not inform the pilot, which is more of an Airbus type of control philosophy.
MCAS - my issue with its implementation: All systems require a SFHA (System Function Hazard Analysis), Boeing has stated that the MCAS was rated hazardous, which means it is classified as a DAL-B (Design Assurance Level B) system, DAL-B systems have to meet a failure rate of 1e-7 per flight hour or less. I have personally performed more than a dozen SFHA's and supported a half dozen more, I can not for the life of me figure out how a DAL-B system can rely on a single sensor and would love to see what the other mitigating conditions Boeing listed for the MCAS SFHA that permitted its reliance on a single sensor.
Now the regulation piece that a lot of people seem to be jumping on, there is no "Fox in the hen house". It is an industry norm where the OEMs have their own specifically designated people perform some of the certification work, I performed that function myself as well for several aircraft systems. However, the FARs (regulations) still apply, and those OEM designated people need to follow and enforce the FARs, in fact, we are empowered to do so by law. In addition, the FAA (as well as EASA, CASA, TCCA, etc) are supposed to ask the OEMs to prove that their engineering and safety attestations are accurate, valid and in compliance with all applicable regulations.
So when it comes to MCAS, Boeing made some assertions, did the FAA challenge those assertions? That is really what I am waiting to see.
As for all the discussions regarding software engineering etc - oh man, just so much lack of understanding about how aviation software and systems are designed and tested. All I can say is read up on DO-178B/C and DO-1254 before any sort of intelligent discussion can be had on that topic. Suffice it to say, that until someone has worked on the design and testing of an aviation system, they will have no understating of just how complex, comprehensive the ordeal is and how every line of code can be traced back to a requirement that is tested against.
Now for the Air Canada spin on all of this. Air Canada did not have any type 737 rated pilots, so the training that AC pilots received for the Max is the complete several weeks long training that all new type rating pilots have to receive. In addition, it is the operator that defines and creates the pilot training programme, not the OEM. The OEM provides a room full of binders which comprises the owners manual, and it is up the operator to read the owners manual and create the pilot training programme, just as you receive an owners manual when you purchase a car. GM, Ford, Toyota, Honda, etc do not teach you how to drive/operate your car, same goes for aviation.
Such a face-palm of a thread that just goes to show that most "enthusiasts, FFs, avgeeks, etc" have a hard time understanding the significant subtleties of the aviation world, how it is regulated and how aviation operates within those regulations.
That being said, there are a couple of buried nuggets of accurate information in this thread, but some of the conclusions drawn are inaccurate or incomplete.
There is no more of an inherent instability of the 737Max design than there is for the 737NG. The handling characteristics of the Max can be quite different than the handling characteristics of the NG under similar flight conditions.
The real crux of the issue is the desire (by the airlines) for the Max to have the same pilot type rating as the 737NG aircraft. This means that a pilot flying a 737NG would have the same feel is if they were flying a 737Max and vice versa. I guess an analog many could relate to would be making driving a motor-coach bus feel them same as driving a city-bus. This common type rating means that airlines do not have to maintain different pools of pilots which means greater operational flexibility and cheaper operation costs for airlines. The idea was a NG pilot could start the day in an NG, finish the day in a Max and not notice any difference.
There's just one problem, it is physically impossible to make flying the Max "feel" like flying a NG, the larger diameter, further forward engines will make the handling characteristics (the feel) quite different than the NG. Enter MCAS, a good idea that probably should have never seen the light of day, an idea I have fundamental issues with (I'll explain) and issues with its implementation, which I'll also explain, as the two are not related. IMHO, the Max should not have been given the same type rating as the NG, but here we are.
MCAS - I have an issue with its purpose: It goes against the basic Boeing philosophy (Airbus & Boeing have differing philosophies related to control authority) which is that the pilot always has final control authority. MCAS is the opposite of this, and instead of proverbially saying "human this is happening, do something" it just takes an action and does not inform the pilot, which is more of an Airbus type of control philosophy.
MCAS - my issue with its implementation: All systems require a SFHA (System Function Hazard Analysis), Boeing has stated that the MCAS was rated hazardous, which means it is classified as a DAL-B (Design Assurance Level B) system, DAL-B systems have to meet a failure rate of 1e-7 per flight hour or less. I have personally performed more than a dozen SFHA's and supported a half dozen more, I can not for the life of me figure out how a DAL-B system can rely on a single sensor and would love to see what the other mitigating conditions Boeing listed for the MCAS SFHA that permitted its reliance on a single sensor.
Now the regulation piece that a lot of people seem to be jumping on, there is no "Fox in the hen house". It is an industry norm where the OEMs have their own specifically designated people perform some of the certification work, I performed that function myself as well for several aircraft systems. However, the FARs (regulations) still apply, and those OEM designated people need to follow and enforce the FARs, in fact, we are empowered to do so by law. In addition, the FAA (as well as EASA, CASA, TCCA, etc) are supposed to ask the OEMs to prove that their engineering and safety attestations are accurate, valid and in compliance with all applicable regulations.
So when it comes to MCAS, Boeing made some assertions, did the FAA challenge those assertions? That is really what I am waiting to see.
As for all the discussions regarding software engineering etc - oh man, just so much lack of understanding about how aviation software and systems are designed and tested. All I can say is read up on DO-178B/C and DO-1254 before any sort of intelligent discussion can be had on that topic. Suffice it to say, that until someone has worked on the design and testing of an aviation system, they will have no understating of just how complex, comprehensive the ordeal is and how every line of code can be traced back to a requirement that is tested against.
Now for the Air Canada spin on all of this. Air Canada did not have any type 737 rated pilots, so the training that AC pilots received for the Max is the complete several weeks long training that all new type rating pilots have to receive. In addition, it is the operator that defines and creates the pilot training programme, not the OEM. The OEM provides a room full of binders which comprises the owners manual, and it is up the operator to read the owners manual and create the pilot training programme, just as you receive an owners manual when you purchase a car. GM, Ford, Toyota, Honda, etc do not teach you how to drive/operate your car, same goes for aviation.
Feels far from " just fine" tbh.
#2289
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
#2290
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
No where in my more detailed post do I state that the Max is not fine, the plane is fine to fly. I do question the common type rating, which by inference means Max specific training is required. I also question the actual need for MCAS in the first place, which would mean an amended type rating and associated training due to the different handling characteristics for the Max is required.
#2291
Join Date: Jan 2016
Location: YYZ
Programs: Only J via Peasant Points, 777HDPeasant or The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance and Narcissism.
Posts: 5,951
You clearly have either not understood what I wrote or have not fully read all of what I wrote, I cannot tell which.
No where in my more detailed post do I state that the Max is not fine, the plane is fine to fly. I do question the common type rating, which by inference means Max specific training is required. I also question the actual need for MCAS in the first place, which would mean an amended type rating and associated training due to the different handling characteristics for the Max is required.
No where in my more detailed post do I state that the Max is not fine, the plane is fine to fly. I do question the common type rating, which by inference means Max specific training is required. I also question the actual need for MCAS in the first place, which would mean an amended type rating and associated training due to the different handling characteristics for the Max is required.
Okay so I think we have a difference in view. I consider the common type rating to be part of the aircraft. I also consider MCAS to be part of it as well (wether its needed or not is not relevant because it is in effect up and until days after the 2nd crash). You did not just ask why MCAS was needed but also had thoughts about the way it was implemented.
Is a truck "just fine" if it grouped together in a rating class which contain buses for example? Is a truck just fine if people driving it did not know it can drive you off a cliff under certain situations?
#2292
Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Why? Why? Zed! / Why? You? Elle! / Gee! Are You!
Programs: Irrelevant
Posts: 3,543
Not quite, more like motor-coach bus and city bus. As for driving off a cliff, that's an over dramatic and disingenuous statement to make as well. A more accurate analogous statement, would be a change in steering control under certain conditions. As long as the change in steering control in mentioned in the manual, then it is fine, as it is up to the human operating the machine to be properly trained on how to use the machine.
As for the manuals, the 737Max manual already had a mention of the MCAS - albeit a brief mention - in the original manual, and Boeing issued an update to all operators on November 6, 2018 to emphasize the procedures provided in the runaway stabilizer non-normal checklist (NNC).
Look for a copy of TBC-19 issued by The Boeing Company on 06-NOV-2018, it very clearly provides information for pilot actions to be taken and under which conditions those actions need to be taken.
#2293
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: FRA
Programs: AC SE 1MM, UA 1K, Hilton Lifetime Diamond, Marriott Gold Elite, Hertz PC
Posts: 2,934
#2294
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
Posts: 4,097