Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Mar 17, 2019, 6:40 pm
#2146
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Boeing Chairman, President and CEO Dennis Muilenburg issued the following statement regarding the Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges’s report today.
Mar 17, 2019, 7:32 pm
#2147
Formerly known as tireman77
Join Date: Dec 2013
Posts: 5,488
Source: https://avherald.com/h?article=47d74074
Incident: Lufthansa A321 near Bilbao on Nov 5th 2014, loss of 4000 feet of altitude
A Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIDP performing flight LH-1829 from Bilbao,SP (Spain) to Munich (Germany) with 109 people on board, was climbing through FL310 out of Bilbao about 15 minutes into the flight at 07:03Z, when the aircraft on autopilot unexpectedly lowered the nose and entered a descent reaching 4000 fpm rate of descent. The flight crew was able to stop the descent at FL270 and continued the flight at FL270, later climbing to FL280, and landed safely in Munich about 110 minutes after the occurrence.
The Aviation Herald learned that the loss of altitude had been caused by two angle of attack sensors having frozen in their positions during climb at an angle, that caused the fly by wire protection to assume, the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full back stick input. The crew eventually disconnected the related Air Data Units and was able to recover the aircraft.
Hmmmm. Sounds familiar. I think its a design issue and all A321s should be grounded.
Incident: Lufthansa A321 near Bilbao on Nov 5th 2014, loss of 4000 feet of altitude
A Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIDP performing flight LH-1829 from Bilbao,SP (Spain) to Munich (Germany) with 109 people on board, was climbing through FL310 out of Bilbao about 15 minutes into the flight at 07:03Z, when the aircraft on autopilot unexpectedly lowered the nose and entered a descent reaching 4000 fpm rate of descent. The flight crew was able to stop the descent at FL270 and continued the flight at FL270, later climbing to FL280, and landed safely in Munich about 110 minutes after the occurrence.
The Aviation Herald learned that the loss of altitude had been caused by two angle of attack sensors having frozen in their positions during climb at an angle, that caused the fly by wire protection to assume, the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full back stick input. The crew eventually disconnected the related Air Data Units and was able to recover the aircraft.
Hmmmm. Sounds familiar. I think its a design issue and all A321s should be grounded.
Mar 17, 2019, 7:48 pm
#2148
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,782
Source: https://avherald.com/h?article=47d74074
Incident: Lufthansa A321 near Bilbao on Nov 5th 2014, loss of 4000 feet of altitude
A Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIDP performing flight LH-1829 from Bilbao,SP (Spain) to Munich (Germany) with 109 people on board, was climbing through FL310 out of Bilbao about 15 minutes into the flight at 07:03Z, when the aircraft on autopilot unexpectedly lowered the nose and entered a descent reaching 4000 fpm rate of descent. The flight crew was able to stop the descent at FL270 and continued the flight at FL270, later climbing to FL280, and landed safely in Munich about 110 minutes after the occurrence.
The Aviation Herald learned that the loss of altitude had been caused by two angle of attack sensors having frozen in their positions during climb at an angle, that caused the fly by wire protection to assume, the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full back stick input. The crew eventually disconnected the related Air Data Units and was able to recover the aircraft.
Hmmmm. Sounds familiar. I think its a design issue and all A321s should be grounded.
Incident: Lufthansa A321 near Bilbao on Nov 5th 2014, loss of 4000 feet of altitude
A Lufthansa Airbus A321-200, registration D-AIDP performing flight LH-1829 from Bilbao,SP (Spain) to Munich (Germany) with 109 people on board, was climbing through FL310 out of Bilbao about 15 minutes into the flight at 07:03Z, when the aircraft on autopilot unexpectedly lowered the nose and entered a descent reaching 4000 fpm rate of descent. The flight crew was able to stop the descent at FL270 and continued the flight at FL270, later climbing to FL280, and landed safely in Munich about 110 minutes after the occurrence.
The Aviation Herald learned that the loss of altitude had been caused by two angle of attack sensors having frozen in their positions during climb at an angle, that caused the fly by wire protection to assume, the aircraft entered a stall while it climbed through FL310. The Alpha Protection activated forcing the aircraft to pitch down, which could not be corrected even by full back stick input. The crew eventually disconnected the related Air Data Units and was able to recover the aircraft.
Hmmmm. Sounds familiar. I think its a design issue and all A321s should be grounded.
Ah, that one. First, two of the three aoa sensors failed because they froze. Second, the measures required to control the plane were relatively straightforward, would just have been to return to a more direct law model, inter alia. So much so that the crew did regain control. A solution was readily implemented in the subsequent airworthiness directive. Also note that it happened once, was properly diagnosed and properly resolved. And no one died.
Mar 17, 2019, 8:08 pm
#2149
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I just read this interesting article, Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system. Sorry in advance if someone already posted a link.
Here are a few money quotes:
There are many more interesting statements in the article. If this article reflects what actually happened, the FAA is broken and needs to be fixed.
Here are a few money quotes:
Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.
The safety analysis:
The document, “developed to ensure the safe operation of the 737 MAX,” concluded that the system complied with all applicable FAA regulations.
The safety analysis:
- Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
- Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
- Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.
The document, “developed to ensure the safe operation of the 737 MAX,” concluded that the system complied with all applicable FAA regulations.
Mar 17, 2019, 8:14 pm
#2150
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I just read this interesting article, Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system. Sorry in advance if someone already posted a link.
......
......
https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/30897727-post2144.html
Jack commented on it and some discussion followed with Jack posting additional quotes
https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/30897805-post2147.html
Mar 17, 2019, 8:26 pm
#2151
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Source of quote: https://www.pprune.org/10422076-post1869.html
WSJ: DOT IG investigating FAA Approvals of 737MaxWSJ: FAA’s 737 MAX Approval Is Probed
Quote:
...The Department of Transportation inquiry, which hasn’t been previously reported, focuses on a Seattle-area FAA office that certifies the safety of brand new aircraft models and subsequent versions, as well as a separate office in the same region in charge of mandating training requirements and signing off on fleetwide training programs, people familiar with the matter said.
Files and documents covered by the directive also pertain to the FAA’s decision that extra flight-simulator training on the automated system wouldn’t be required for pilots transitioning from older models, according to people familiar with the matter.
Officials in those offices have been told not to delete any emails, reports or internal messages pertaining to those topics, people familiar with the matter said, adding that the probe also is scrutinizing communication between the FAA and Boeing.
The Department of Transportation inquiry is casting a wide net for documents about potential agency lapses just as House and Senate committees prepare for public hearings in the coming weeks that are expected to grill the FAA’s senior leadership on the same topics.
The DOT investigation is likely to raise more questions about how Boeing designed the airliner, how pilots are trained to fly it and the decisions the FAA took approving the model. The result could be changes to how the FAA certifies aircraft models, particularly giving more scrutiny to design changes from earlier models.
WSJ: DOT IG investigating FAA Approvals of 737MaxWSJ: FAA’s 737 MAX Approval Is Probed
Quote:
...The Department of Transportation inquiry, which hasn’t been previously reported, focuses on a Seattle-area FAA office that certifies the safety of brand new aircraft models and subsequent versions, as well as a separate office in the same region in charge of mandating training requirements and signing off on fleetwide training programs, people familiar with the matter said.
Files and documents covered by the directive also pertain to the FAA’s decision that extra flight-simulator training on the automated system wouldn’t be required for pilots transitioning from older models, according to people familiar with the matter.
Officials in those offices have been told not to delete any emails, reports or internal messages pertaining to those topics, people familiar with the matter said, adding that the probe also is scrutinizing communication between the FAA and Boeing.
The Department of Transportation inquiry is casting a wide net for documents about potential agency lapses just as House and Senate committees prepare for public hearings in the coming weeks that are expected to grill the FAA’s senior leadership on the same topics.
The DOT investigation is likely to raise more questions about how Boeing designed the airliner, how pilots are trained to fly it and the decisions the FAA took approving the model. The result could be changes to how the FAA certifies aircraft models, particularly giving more scrutiny to design changes from earlier models.
Mar 18, 2019, 10:33 am
#2154
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Programs: AC SE100K-1MM, NH, DL, AA, BA, Global Entry/Nexus, APEC..
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Thanks to @Bohemian1 for the link
Sensor cited as potential factor in Boeing crashes draws scrutiny
March 17 at 7:47 PM
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin...=.b9df74af9cb0
QUOTES:
"In 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829 took off from Bilbao, Spain, and was ascending normally when the plane’s nose unexpectedly dropped. The plane — an Airbus A321 with 109 passengers on board — began to fall. The co-pilot tried to raise the nose with his controls. The plane pointed down even further. He tried again. Nothing, according to a report by German investigators.
As the Lufthansa plane fell from 31,000 feet, the captain pulled back on his stick as hard as he could. The nose finally responded. But he struggled to hold the plane level.
A call to a ground crew determined the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors — which detect whether the wings have enough lift to keep flying — must have been malfunctioning, causing the Airbus’s anti-stall software to force the plane’s nose down. The pilots turned off the problematic unit and continued the flight. Aviation authorities in Europe and the United States eventually ordered the replacement of angle-of-attack sensors on many Airbus models.
Today, aviation experts say that the angle-of-attack sensor on Boeing jets will get fresh scrutiny after two Boeing 737 Max airplanes crashed, in Ethiopia last week and in Indonesia in October.
Accident investigators have raised concerns about the role of the sensor — a device used on virtually every commercial flight — in the October crash of Lion Air Flight 610. There are concerns it may have sent the wrong signals to new software on the flight that automatically dips the plane’s nose to prevent a stall."
......."Most commercial pilots today know how to respond to a malfunctioning sensor, said Shem Malmquist, a Boeing 777 captain and a visiting professor at the Florida Institute of Technology.
But potential complications arise with how software interprets what the sensor tells it."......
........"One important difference between the Lufthansa incident and the two 737 Max accidents, aviation experts said, was where they occurred.
The Lufthansa plane was soaring at 31,000 feet when it launched into a steep dive. It dropped 4,000 feet in less than a minute before the pilots wrestled back control.
If the sensor problem had hit soon after departure, as investigators suspect it did with the Lion Air crash, that incident could have ended in disaster."
***
Interesting info on the sensors, the vanes, the problems some pilots have had and about the manufacturers/suppliers of the sensors installed on Boeing aircraft.
Sensor cited as potential factor in Boeing crashes draws scrutiny
March 17 at 7:47 PM
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin...=.b9df74af9cb0
QUOTES:
"In 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829 took off from Bilbao, Spain, and was ascending normally when the plane’s nose unexpectedly dropped. The plane — an Airbus A321 with 109 passengers on board — began to fall. The co-pilot tried to raise the nose with his controls. The plane pointed down even further. He tried again. Nothing, according to a report by German investigators.
As the Lufthansa plane fell from 31,000 feet, the captain pulled back on his stick as hard as he could. The nose finally responded. But he struggled to hold the plane level.
A call to a ground crew determined the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors — which detect whether the wings have enough lift to keep flying — must have been malfunctioning, causing the Airbus’s anti-stall software to force the plane’s nose down. The pilots turned off the problematic unit and continued the flight. Aviation authorities in Europe and the United States eventually ordered the replacement of angle-of-attack sensors on many Airbus models.
Today, aviation experts say that the angle-of-attack sensor on Boeing jets will get fresh scrutiny after two Boeing 737 Max airplanes crashed, in Ethiopia last week and in Indonesia in October.
Accident investigators have raised concerns about the role of the sensor — a device used on virtually every commercial flight — in the October crash of Lion Air Flight 610. There are concerns it may have sent the wrong signals to new software on the flight that automatically dips the plane’s nose to prevent a stall."
......."Most commercial pilots today know how to respond to a malfunctioning sensor, said Shem Malmquist, a Boeing 777 captain and a visiting professor at the Florida Institute of Technology.
But potential complications arise with how software interprets what the sensor tells it."......
........"One important difference between the Lufthansa incident and the two 737 Max accidents, aviation experts said, was where they occurred.
The Lufthansa plane was soaring at 31,000 feet when it launched into a steep dive. It dropped 4,000 feet in less than a minute before the pilots wrestled back control.
If the sensor problem had hit soon after departure, as investigators suspect it did with the Lion Air crash, that incident could have ended in disaster."
***
Interesting info on the sensors, the vanes, the problems some pilots have had and about the manufacturers/suppliers of the sensors installed on Boeing aircraft.
Mar 18, 2019, 11:20 am
#2155
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,782
No matter what sensors will always be the weakest link. And given their relative complexity, angle of attack ones have to be less reliable than pitot probes, which themselves are not that great. Even the best ones can freeze in some conditions. System must be designed to be resistant to probe issues. In the Max case, one must wonder what these guys, at both Boeing and the FAA ad been smoking; clearly the remedy introduced a much, much larger risk than the risk it was meant to remedy. In the LH airbus case quoted by both Tireman and 24left, two of them froze but they managed to regain control, and an airworthiness directive resolved the matter of that scenario. Note that the probability of two devices to malfunction is the square of one if under independent causes (not the case though in the LH scenario: two out of three froze because the conditions led to freezing.)
Mar 18, 2019, 11:40 am
#2156
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Posts: 6,209
Level flight at cruise altitude is one thing, but having aircraft be this vulnerable to defective sensors during take off or landing removes an incredible amount of available time for even a well trained crew to correctly recognize, diagnose and act on an issue.Talk about a risk multiplier.
Mar 18, 2019, 9:22 pm
#2157
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,782
Justice dept getting involved. Odds of the Max back in the air soon going down by the hour it seems:
Mar 18, 2019, 10:06 pm
#2158
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: YYC
Programs: BA bronze, Aeroplan peon
Posts: 4,742
Pardon my ignorance, but does the AofA sensor need to be outside the fuselage and subject to freezing? If all it measures is the angle of the fuselage relative to the ground, could it not be inside and protected? It's basically just a gyroscope isn't it?
Mar 18, 2019, 10:18 pm
#2159
Join Date: Dec 2008
Location: Delta, BC
Posts: 1,646
I just read this interesting article, Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing, FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system. Sorry in advance if someone already posted a link.
Here are a few money quotes:
There are many more interesting statements in the article. If this article reflects what actually happened, the FAA is broken and needs to be fixed.
Here are a few money quotes:
There are many more interesting statements in the article. If this article reflects what actually happened, the FAA is broken and needs to be fixed.
Are they are there to oversee processes? To validate outcomes? If the latter by re-doing all the engineering, spot-checking, random inspection and analysis or some other variety of tests?
Unless the FAA repeats every last calculation and analysis there is always the possibility of a problem arising. There has to be a balance between trusting the manufacturer to have strong-enough internal processes and the FAA have deep, embedded oversight. Maybe there was just too much comfort both in Boeing and the FAA with the idea that it was a "737" and not digging deep enough into some of the assumptions around engineering and design choices that resulted in aerodynamic, weight distribution and thrust force complexities that combined to create unanticipated hazards to flight safety.
Mar 18, 2019, 10:21 pm
#2160
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
Maybe there was just too much comfort both in Boeing and the FAA with the idea that it was a "737" and not digging deep enough into some of the assumptions around engineering and design choices that resulted in aerodynamic, weight distribution and thrust force complexities that combined to create unanticipated hazards to flight safety.
