Sep 19, 2017, 10:25 am
Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
Mar 17, 2019, 2:01 pm
#2131
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Source: https://www.pprune.org/10421474-post1756.html
From the Seattle Times
Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing and FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
QUOTE:
Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.
The safety analysis:
From the Seattle Times
Flawed analysis, failed oversight: How Boeing and FAA certified the suspect 737 MAX flight control system
QUOTE:
Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.
The safety analysis:
- Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
- Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
- Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.
I disagree with the comments a finance trained professional would inherently place $ over safety vs an engineering trained professional.
I have seen my own share of garbage from both disciplinaries, In fact I have seen more students from the eng side making some very immoral/questionable decisions.
FYI Boeing's current CEO came from Aerospace background.
Mar 17, 2019, 2:10 pm
#2132
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I disagree with the comments a finance trained professional would inherently place $ over safety vs an engineering trained professional.
I have seen my own share of garbage from both disciplinaries, In fact I have seen more students from the eng side making some very immoral/questionable decisions.
FYI Boeing's current CEO came from Aerospace background.
I have seen my own share of garbage from both disciplinaries, In fact I have seen more students from the eng side making some very immoral/questionable decisions.
FYI Boeing's current CEO came from Aerospace background.
Whereas the PMs or finance people are expecting the engineers to actually evaluate the design to ensure it's reasonable.
Mar 17, 2019, 2:11 pm
#2133
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He has not been an engineer for quite a while. Plus, he comes the military side of things, where safety is secondary to the mission. Bottom line: it sure feels like there were some very unhappy engineers at Boeing. Shades of the Challenger disaster, managers overruling engineers over safety concerns, until the engineers let themselves be brownbeaten into going along. The Boisjoly tapes remain good material.
Mar 17, 2019, 2:16 pm
#2134
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He has not been an engineer for quite a while. Plus, he comes the military side of things, where safety is secondary to the mission. Bottom line: it sure feels like there were some very unhappy engineers at Boeing. Shades of the Challenger disaster, managers overruling engineers over safety concerns, until the engineers let themselves be brownbeaten into going along. The Boisjoly tapes remain good material.
It might have merit if in the challenger disaster - these managers who override the concerns (or I guess the industry term is "Risk-Accept") actually are MBAs from Wharton - and were not promoted from the existing engineer pool.
I just think there is a danger in generalizations such as this.
But back to the 737Max topic - there is def a trend now at Boeing with both the issues we saw with 787 & 737Max that concerns me.
Mar 17, 2019, 2:29 pm
#2135
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Lets be very clear though that an engineer who is promoted into a People Leader position is still from the engineering background. (No matter how long ago it has been)
It might have merit if in the challenger disaster - these managers who override the concerns (or I guess the industry term is "Risk-Accept") actually are MBAs from Wharton - and were not promoted from the existing engineer pool.
I just think there is a danger in generalizations such as this.
But back to the 737Max topic - there is def a trend now at Boeing with both the issues we saw with 787 & 737Max that concerns me.
It might have merit if in the challenger disaster - these managers who override the concerns (or I guess the industry term is "Risk-Accept") actually are MBAs from Wharton - and were not promoted from the existing engineer pool.
I just think there is a danger in generalizations such as this.
But back to the 737Max topic - there is def a trend now at Boeing with both the issues we saw with 787 & 737Max that concerns me.
As for the endless debate about engineers versus finance people, it's not one or the other, it's not one group that is responsible for the current issues with the 7M8. All types of professions were part of the group that either made the decisions at Boeing that have us all where were are today. It doesn't matter at this point if the engineers pointed out the risks or if the accountants and the CEO chose to disregard them, or if the risk assessment done by Boeing was wrong.
There are plenty of mistakes and poor judgement to go around.
And let's not forget the FAA who approved all of it. They are also responsible and now, airlines around the world are wondering if they should have let the Brazilian regulators test, analyze and decide...and not the FAA.
Mar 17, 2019, 2:55 pm
#2136
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Even subtle things, like linking engineering pay to overall company performance through incentive plans, or the institution of rigid salary bands that preclude the company from recruiting top talent, can fundamentally shift a culture away from safety. These are the types of decisions that end up being made by MBA types, that can lead to outcomes such as what we see today.
Mar 17, 2019, 3:23 pm
#2137
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
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Read John Ostrower's report. Excellent insight on how we got here.
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...n-the-737-max/
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...n-the-737-max/
Mar 17, 2019, 3:41 pm
#2138
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Mississauga Ontario
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And so it begins:
““After reviewing the latest development, especially the increasing customer concerns towards the MAX 8, we have lost the confidence in the product,” – President Commissioner of Garuda Indonesia
"Garuda is looking to dump its 737 Max deal with just one delivery thus far..... "
““After reviewing the latest development, especially the increasing customer concerns towards the MAX 8, we have lost the confidence in the product,” – President Commissioner of Garuda Indonesia
"Garuda is looking to dump its 737 Max deal with just one delivery thus far..... "
Mar 17, 2019, 3:52 pm
#2139
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A new damning report from Seattle Times
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Pulled some quotes directly from the article that was shocking to me. (Beyond 24Left's summary)
Did Boeing and FAA play with people's lives by rushing through the cert process, as well as not informing FAA of a update to their MCAS that has a limit more than 4X of what the FAA was told?
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Pulled some quotes directly from the article that was shocking to me. (Beyond 24Left's summary)
The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes.
“There was constant pressure to re-evaluate our initial decisions,” the former engineer said. “And even after we had reassessed it … there was continued discussion by management about delegating even more items down to the Boeing Company.”
“There was constant pressure to re-evaluate our initial decisions,” the former engineer said. “And even after we had reassessed it … there was continued discussion by management about delegating even more items down to the Boeing Company.”
But several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process. Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing
After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.
That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.
“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.
“The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
At a limit of 2.5 degrees, two cycles of MCAS without correction would have been enough to reach the maximum nose-down effect.
In the final seconds, the black box data shows the captain resumed control and pulled back up with high force. But it was too late. The plane dived into the sea at more than 500 miles per hour.
In the final seconds, the black box data shows the captain resumed control and pulled back up with high force. But it was too late. The plane dived into the sea at more than 500 miles per hour.
Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association at American Airlines, said his training on moving from the old 737 NG model cockpit to the new 737 MAX consisted of little more than a one-hour session on an iPad, with no simulator training.
Like all 737s, the MAX actually has two of the sensors, one on each side of the fuselage near the cockpit. But the MCAS was designed to take a reading from only one of them.
Lemme said Boeing could have designed the system to compare the readings from the two vanes, which would have indicated if one of them was way off.
Alternatively, the system could have been designed to check that the angle-of-attack reading was accurate while the plane was taxiing on the ground before takeoff, when the angle of attack should read zero.
Lemme said Boeing could have designed the system to compare the readings from the two vanes, which would have indicated if one of them was way off.
Alternatively, the system could have been designed to check that the angle-of-attack reading was accurate while the plane was taxiing on the ground before takeoff, when the angle of attack should read zero.
Last edited by Jumper Jack; Mar 17, 2019 at 4:06 pm
Mar 17, 2019, 3:53 pm
#2140
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It certainly wouldn't have been a binary "we're gonna save a bunch of money *or* we'll engineer the MCAS system to be safe". It was most likely a long series of events, which began with decisions made with respect to long-term workforce management, the use of contractors and outsourcing, the fact of wanting to re-use the 737 type certificate, and so on and so forth. The engineering interviewing process has morphed in most cases from being one of assessing technical competence, led by engineers themselves, to being one that is dominated by HR types who basically are screening for "yes-men" and overly concentrate on factors such as their perception of how well a person will get along with a team, effectively placing psychological factors ahead of technical competence.
Even subtle things, like linking engineering pay to overall company performance through incentive plans, or the institution of rigid salary bands that preclude the company from recruiting top talent, can fundamentally shift a culture away from safety. These are the types of decisions that end up being made by MBA types, that can lead to outcomes such as what we see today.
Even subtle things, like linking engineering pay to overall company performance through incentive plans, or the institution of rigid salary bands that preclude the company from recruiting top talent, can fundamentally shift a culture away from safety. These are the types of decisions that end up being made by MBA types, that can lead to outcomes such as what we see today.
Mar 17, 2019, 4:09 pm
#2141
Join Date: Mar 2019
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I feel like getting a software fix out so quickly is actually the wrong move from a public perception standpoint. While nobody wants to see this drag on and they’ve been working on this since Lion Air, it does come across as a knee-jerk reaction to the grounding
Mar 17, 2019, 4:47 pm
#2143
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Lemme said Boeing could have designed the system to compare the readings from the two vanes, which would have indicated if one of them was way off.
Regardless of shortcomings with pilot training and aircraft maintenance, it seems odd that such a simple 'trouble light' would only be surfaced as part of an optional extra though. One more piece of valuable information the pilots could have either acted upon or ignored.
Mar 17, 2019, 6:27 pm
#2144
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Turf issues is part of the context. There are universities with a program in "software engineering," possibly run jointly between computer science and electrical/computer engineering. This said, I am personally skeptical that licencing does any good. If you compare between countries that have licencing and those which don't, I don't think one can make a case that licensing does anything for you. Compare, say, the UK and Germany. The licencing thing really is an offshoot of the original UK tradition whereby engineers did not really come out of universities but from the trades, plus licensing. At the end of the day it's mainly paperwork and bureaucracy.
Mar 17, 2019, 6:31 pm
#2145
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Other sources have indicated that Boeing does indeed perform this check but only indicates an issue to the pilots as part of some form of add-on package that Lion Air did not purchase.
Regardless of shortcomings with pilot training and aircraft maintenance, it seems odd that such a simple 'trouble light' would only be surfaced as part of an optional extra though. One more piece of valuable information the pilots could have either acted upon or ignored.
Regardless of shortcomings with pilot training and aircraft maintenance, it seems odd that such a simple 'trouble light' would only be surfaced as part of an optional extra though. One more piece of valuable information the pilots could have either acted upon or ignored.
Does feel that all of this should be standard on every 737 MAX though, I agree.