Last edit by: 24left
Jan 18 2021 TC issues Airworthiness Directive for the 737 MAX
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Link to post https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/32976892-post4096.html
Cabin photos
Post 976 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29534462-post976.html
Post 1300 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/29780203-post1300.html
Cabin Layout
Interior Specs can be found here https://www.aircanada.com/ca/en/aco/home/fly/onboard/fleet.html
- Window seats may feel narrower to come as the armrests are placed "into" the "curvature" of the cabin.
- Seats with no windows feel even more narrower as there is no space created by the curvature of window.
- All bulkhead seats have very limited legroom.
- Seats 15A, 16A, 16F, 17A and 17F have limited windows.
- Exit rows 19 and 20 have more legroom than regular preferred seats.
Routes
The 737 MAX is designated to replace the A320-series. Based on announcements and schedule updates, the following specific routes will be operated by the 737 MAX in future:
YYZ-LAX (periodic flights)
YYZ-SNN (new route)
YUL-DUB (new route)
YYZ/YUL-KEF (replacing Rouge A319)
YYT-LHR (replacing Mainline A319)
YHZ-LHR (replacing Mainline B767)
Hawaii Routes YVR/YYC (replacing Rouge B767)
Many domestic trunk routes (YYZ, YVR, YUL, YYC) now operated by 7M8, replacing A320 family
Air Canada Selects Boeing 737 MAX to Renew Mainline Narrowbody Fleet
#2656
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
No kidding.
I am also having problem understanding how software could fix this.
So the software post fix turns off MCAS more easily? So it isn't really needed in the first place? The obvious inference is that it will be turned off by the software when it is actually needed. In which case the pilot training should not only be for how to shut it off when it activates incorrectly, but how to fly the plane when it didn't activate but should have? Is that type of training being done by AC? Mandated by CTA? FAA? And if the latter is the case, how on earth does this pass the sniff test in terms of being the same plane as the 737 was previously in terms of training and certification?
It seems pretty clear that *IF* MCAS solves a real issue, then it is needed. And if it is needed, the current sensor model (2 sensors only, if they disagree MCAS is turned off--I believe that is what is described as the "fix" in what is know publicly) is insufficient. Therefore software fix alone is not sufficient. Not really sure that Boeing is really trying to do anything other than get their planes back in the air as fast as possible.
Of course, with no complete public disclosure of what the fix is, this post is speculative.
I am also having problem understanding how software could fix this.
So the software post fix turns off MCAS more easily? So it isn't really needed in the first place? The obvious inference is that it will be turned off by the software when it is actually needed. In which case the pilot training should not only be for how to shut it off when it activates incorrectly, but how to fly the plane when it didn't activate but should have? Is that type of training being done by AC? Mandated by CTA? FAA? And if the latter is the case, how on earth does this pass the sniff test in terms of being the same plane as the 737 was previously in terms of training and certification?
It seems pretty clear that *IF* MCAS solves a real issue, then it is needed. And if it is needed, the current sensor model (2 sensors only, if they disagree MCAS is turned off--I believe that is what is described as the "fix" in what is know publicly) is insufficient. Therefore software fix alone is not sufficient. Not really sure that Boeing is really trying to do anything other than get their planes back in the air as fast as possible.
Of course, with no complete public disclosure of what the fix is, this post is speculative.
#2657
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: YVR
Programs: AC E50K, NEXUS
Posts: 645
I am with you all the way CC. Which is why I asked " In which case the pilot training should not only be for how to shut it off when it activates incorrectly, but how to fly the plane when it didn't activate but should have?"
I get that it isn't a binary condition. The plane can be flown without it. However, my point (perhaps poorly phrased) was that it is off and needed, and if it is more likely to be off and needed than prior to the fix, then shouldn't training also be covering the off and needed scenario. In addition to the on and trying to force the plane to crash scenario.
If we really wanted to be precise, it would be interesting to know what percentage of problem scenarios are addressed by the "off and needed"? Because if it is only 1%, and the other 99% are "activated and not needed (and trying to cause a crash)" then I would ask: is it worth the risk? What is the likelihood that even with good training it will still result in a problem? OTOH, if "off and needed" is 95% of the scenarios, doesn't it seem like a good hardware fix is a better idea than just a software fix? (And yes I know that strays in the Boeing vs. Airbus control philosophy...)
I get that it isn't a binary condition. The plane can be flown without it. However, my point (perhaps poorly phrased) was that it is off and needed, and if it is more likely to be off and needed than prior to the fix, then shouldn't training also be covering the off and needed scenario. In addition to the on and trying to force the plane to crash scenario.
If we really wanted to be precise, it would be interesting to know what percentage of problem scenarios are addressed by the "off and needed"? Because if it is only 1%, and the other 99% are "activated and not needed (and trying to cause a crash)" then I would ask: is it worth the risk? What is the likelihood that even with good training it will still result in a problem? OTOH, if "off and needed" is 95% of the scenarios, doesn't it seem like a good hardware fix is a better idea than just a software fix? (And yes I know that strays in the Boeing vs. Airbus control philosophy...)
#2658
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YYC
Programs: AC SE 1MM, Marriott Ambassador
Posts: 3,392
However, it strikes me that adding at least one more AoA indicator (for 3) or even better two more (for 4) and requiring a quorum (similar to the fix Airbus had that was mentioned way upthread) would be a darn good start.
#2659
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YYC
Programs: AC SE 1MM, Marriott Ambassador
Posts: 3,392
The purpose of MCAS is to make the MAX fly like non-MAX in a very small area of the flight envelope, light load and max aft CoG. The difference between the two is that the MAX requires less back pressure on the yoke. According to Juan Brown (a 737 NG pilot, currently flying 777) in one of the videos I posted earlier, pilots he knows who have flown the MAX say they can barely tell the difference between the MAX and non-MAX with MCAS turned off.
Seriously. Not trying to be snarky at all. If that one area of the flight envelope is the only reason for it, then why have it? Either Boeing's opinion of the size of that envelope, or the likelihood of a stall in that envelope's is very different than the pilot you cited, or...? I can't think of another reason, doesn't mean one doesn't exist.
So, back to the line of reasoning: if it is required, then it should be fixed (including hardware). If the hardware isn't fixed, then the software will make it more likely to turn off. If it is more likely to turn off, then it is less likely to be engaged when it is actually needed. In which case I am just asking if this training that is being recommended or required (depending on your jurisdiction) includes training for flying the plane when MCAS is required but not engaged. Because if the training only includes how to quickly disengage MCAS, then nothing has been accomplished but trading one problem for another.
#2660
Join Date: Dec 2011
Location: YYZ
Programs: AC SEMM / HH Diamond
Posts: 3,140
The purpose of the MCAS is to make the MAX compliant with the federal regulations - specifically FAR 25.173 "Static longitudinalstability". The non--MAX planes do comply with this regulation, so a side effect does result in consistency with the MAX ... but type consistency is just a side effect, not the motivation.
MCAS was Introduced to counteract the non-linear lift of theLEAP-1B engine nacelles and give a steady increase in stick force as AoA increases. The new location and size of the engine nacelle causes the vortex flow off the nacelle body to producelift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG this lift causes a slight pitch-up effect (ie a reducing stick force) which could lead the pilot to further increase theback pressure on the yoke and send the aircraft closer towards the stall. This non-linear/reducing stick force is not allowable under FAR 25.173 "Static longitudinalstability".
MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during steep turns with elevated load factors (high AoA) and during flaps upflight at airspeeds approaching stall.
MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during steep turns with elevated load factors (high AoA) and during flaps upflight at airspeeds approaching stall.
@canadiancow brings up a fair observation that pilots are trained how to deal with planes in non compliant and non normal states (engine out being a great example) ... but that leads to two questions: (1) will the MAX pilots be explicitly trained with how to deal with an MCAS out situation - and (2) will pilots even be notified when they are in that situation?
We know that an AOA disagree indicator will now be standard on the MAX, but that's not the same as a MCAS out indication.
We're getting into speculation here, but I've read that MCAS may disable itself if it detects that too many cycles have triggered during a single flight. Suppose that happens - will the pilots be warned? Will they treat that situation with the same level of urgency that they treat an engine out scenario (or perhaps more realistically, an AOA disagree indication)?
#2661
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: YYC
Programs: AC SE 1MM, Marriott Ambassador
Posts: 3,392
@bimmerdriver, i don't believe it's fully accurate to say that the purpose of the MCAS is to make the MAX fly like the non-MAX.
The purpose of the MCAS is to make the MAX compliant with the federal regulations - specifically FAR 25.173 "Static longitudinalstability". The non--MAX planes do comply with this regulation, so a side effect does result in consistency with the MAX ... but type consistency is just a side effect, not the motivation.
So back to the comment from @ridefar - if the new software fix turns off the MCAS system, pilots will be left with a plane that is not compliant with FAR 25.173.
@canadiancow brings up a fair observation that pilots are trained how to deal with planes in non compliant and non normal states (engine out being a great example) ... but that leads to two questions: (1) will the MAX pilots be explicitly trained with how to deal with an MCAS out situation - and (2) will pilots even be notified when they are in that situation?
We know that an AOA disagree indicator will now be standard on the MAX, but that's not the same as a MCAS out indication.
We're getting into speculation here, but I've read that MCAS may disable itself if it detects that too many cycles have triggered during a single flight. Suppose that happens - will the pilots be warned? Will they treat that situation with the same level of urgency that they treat an engine out scenario (or perhaps more realistically, an AOA disagree indication)?
The purpose of the MCAS is to make the MAX compliant with the federal regulations - specifically FAR 25.173 "Static longitudinalstability". The non--MAX planes do comply with this regulation, so a side effect does result in consistency with the MAX ... but type consistency is just a side effect, not the motivation.
So back to the comment from @ridefar - if the new software fix turns off the MCAS system, pilots will be left with a plane that is not compliant with FAR 25.173.
@canadiancow brings up a fair observation that pilots are trained how to deal with planes in non compliant and non normal states (engine out being a great example) ... but that leads to two questions: (1) will the MAX pilots be explicitly trained with how to deal with an MCAS out situation - and (2) will pilots even be notified when they are in that situation?
We know that an AOA disagree indicator will now be standard on the MAX, but that's not the same as a MCAS out indication.
We're getting into speculation here, but I've read that MCAS may disable itself if it detects that too many cycles have triggered during a single flight. Suppose that happens - will the pilots be warned? Will they treat that situation with the same level of urgency that they treat an engine out scenario (or perhaps more realistically, an AOA disagree indication)?
#2663
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,742
#2664
Join Date: Jan 2017
Location: Halifax
Programs: AC SE100K, Marriott Lifetime Platinum Elite. NEXUS
Posts: 4,527
#2665
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
One can't simply redesign an engine cowling without understanding that the underlying engine itself, its size, shape, external piping and certification will all need review. That is most certainly not a "relatively easy retrofit", nor would it be accomplished within a year.
#2666
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,742
Much like an innocent kitchen renovation, one starts with the simple task of replacing or redesigning one component, but soon realizes that it leads to the discovery that additional and progressively more complex features require overhaul as well.
One can't simply redesign an engine cowling without understanding that the underlying engine itself, its size, shape, external piping and certification will all need review. That is most certainly not a "relatively easy retrofit", nor would it be accomplished within a year.
One can't simply redesign an engine cowling without understanding that the underlying engine itself, its size, shape, external piping and certification will all need review. That is most certainly not a "relatively easy retrofit", nor would it be accomplished within a year.
Probably not that bad. But definitely easier than redesigning the horizontal stabilizer. Maybe about a year. But eh, that's what they should have done in the first place. Plus, a redesigned MCAS might be OK as a temporary fix, until a permanent one is put in place. Anyway, key issue is, the Boeing bottom line should not be the overriding concern.
#2667
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,742
#2668
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: YVR
Programs: Bottom feeder Star Gold
Posts: 2,652
We're wearing the clear goggles of hindsight, but can't be too surprised with the unfortunate results of deriving a new airplane from a 20-year old derivative of a 50-year old classic, itself partially derived from a 60-year old airplane.
#2670
FlyerTalk Evangelist
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: YYC
Posts: 23,742
@Stranger
while I agree in principle, and to stick to Thread topic, the reality is Boeing built & sold an aircraft that AC shareholders were willing to buy, presumably after AC mgmt due diligence. And we may never know how AC & Boeing settle the fall-out between them, save any E&O insurance / warranty proceeds that may cover latent defects that become evident after contract signed.
About due diligence, it is hard to see how far airlines can go beyond effectively trusting Boeing or Airbus. I don't believe AC has/had the technical capability of assessing in detail the design of these airplanes. It's like the old say, no one was ever fired for buying IBM.
Instead, what we do know, for sure, only three parties exist that will pay the freight?
1. Boeing Shareholders
2. AC Shareholders
3. AC Customers
And given Canada duopoly with WJ in exact same boat, adjusted for any contract variances, which of these three parties will end up paying here?
A lot of high paid executives, solicitors, & political advocates working overdrive to keep 1. & 2. whole.
So who is looking out for travelers interests and pocketbook?
1. Boeing Shareholders
2. AC Shareholders
3. AC Customers
And given Canada duopoly with WJ in exact same boat, adjusted for any contract variances, which of these three parties will end up paying here?
A lot of high paid executives, solicitors, & political advocates working overdrive to keep 1. & 2. whole.
So who is looking out for travelers interests and pocketbook?
To some extent the travelling public is already paying. This said, when an airline buys a plane there surely is an expectation that the product is fit for the purpose. I would think even with "high paid executives," good lawyers etc., Boeing will end up the main victim of their corner cutting. This said, it would only be fair for AC shareholders to suffer also to some extent and yes, they likely will. As to the flying public, I can only speak for myself. Yes, I am willing to suffer somewhat higher fares for the sake of ending up on a safer plane. This said, I am sure most people will want to have it both ways. As usual. And I won't cry for these.