Well, that is a move that ought to help entice folks back on to airplanes in a "we hope it's post-Covid" environment.
I have spent my career helping folks assess and control technological risks.
Inherent in my profession is the application of the concept of inherently safer design.
Greatest priority is placed on designing the hazards out of the system so that they are not there needing to be controlled. That didn't happen with the 737MAX. The aerodynamics of the design were inherently unstable.
Further down the list of options is the application of engineered controls (compensating systems) that are supposed to mitigate the hazards. These are less desirable, since they can fail when called upon. These added controls failed in the case of the two 737MAX crashes.
At the very bottom of the list of options is administrative controls (human intervention). This is at the bottom of the list since it is the most unreliable form of protection, no matter how much training and drilling is provided. Of course, with the issues surrounding the 737MAX, insufficient training was provided.
I have seen no indication that Boeing is going to remove the basic problem -- the inherent aerodynamic instability in the 737MAX design.
And, nothing has provided me the basis for confidence that Boeing and the FAA, collectively, can be trusted to be capable of layering on enough controls, of sufficient reliability, to adequately mitigate the risk associated with the basic design flaw inherent in the 737MAX.
I am not saying that the technology can't be developed. I am saying that I don't trust the responsible parties to deliver it. There are organization culture issues that, from my perspective, need to be addressed before trust can be regained.
If there are DL 737MAXs at some point in the future, I won't be flying them.