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Old Mar 15, 2019, 8:55 am
  #484  
mduell
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Originally Posted by AirbusFan2B
Are such extensive workaround procedures considered best in class for modern aircraft, eg A320 fraught with this kind of stuff too?
I can't think of a single airliner that doesn't have a runaway trim procedure. I also can't think of a single jetliner without multiple systems for activating the trim.

Originally Posted by surram
Thank you for the detailed explanation. But this still begs the following simple questions:
1) Why does an MCAS depend on only a single AoA sensor? Isn't this completely contrary to all the design principles of avoiding a "single point of failure"?

2) If MCAS was supposed to make flying more safer, and idiot proof (from getting into a stall situation), isn't it logical for it to shut itself off automatically, when it diagnoses a runaway situation? Why does this MCAS necessitate or relies solely on a pilot to diagnose a critical situation and cutoff the automation - which flies in the face of basic design principles. Does it not?

4) Does it not feel like the MCAS is band-aid to fix a engine positioning design flaw (yes, flaw)? Or to keep the same 737 certification and avoid a costly re-certification process with the FAA. Rather than fix the core issue, they designed a work-around and expecting a human to figure out and kill the "work-around" in a very dangerous situation with alarms blazing and a few seconds to react.

5) So, let's say in the event of manually cutting off the MCAS by pilots, (MCAS allegedly was designed to prevent a stall) would not not risk a stall situation? Because I read the MCAS becomes active ONLY in manual fly mode as opposed to the Autopilot. This last question is truly terrifying. If you design a product designed to work with a workaround that would prevent a fatal stall, if you kill the workaround, wouldn't you add more risk?

6) Boeing can blame the pilot and maintenance - why does a 6 month old aircraft need so much maintenance anyway?

If a manufacturer does not operate with transparency when faced (esp. when faced with design issues), aren't the flying public or even airlines (Ethiopian does not want the US to handle the blackboxes) going to lose faith and confidence in the product, transparency and leadership? Also the FAA it looks like it is hand in gloves with Boeing, because I read that FAA certifies planes based on self-certification. FAA only inspect the procedures and processes and does not really verify the end result (meaning doing a code review - I used to write software that I cannot release to my customer unless it goes through a buddy full code review). Who is watching Boeing? Truly concerning!

I would appreciate clarifications, please.
The content of these questions betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of aircraft design, certification, and human factors. Given the tone and loaded language presented here, I don't get the impression that even detailed answers will provide any clarity.

Originally Posted by bocastephen
Yes, and that's the key issue - when there is a malfunction, whose fault is it? Hardware or software? When it's faulty hardware a good pilot in the right conditions can use their knowledge to figure out which instrument is right and which is wrong and make adjustments. When the hardware is talking to a computer and the computer is talking to the pilot, the pilot is often left out of important details that might help them decide who is right or wrong.
I have very little faith in the ability of pilots to interpret voltages from the hardware. Computers running software are providing large amounts of useful augmentation to help the pilots do their job.

Originally Posted by bocastephen
The bottom line is a computer should never be allowed to override a conscious pilot without offering the pilot some form of kill switch to disable the computer's overriding control inputs.
1970s called, they want their human factors mentality back. Sometimes we're going to let the computer override, sometimes we're going to let the pilot override. In this case, runaway stab, there's a well designed/trained/practiced procedure for pilot override; in the worst case, you can grab the control wheel.

Originally Posted by bocastephen
In a rather stinging rebuke of Boeing and the USA, the black box from Ethiopia was sent to France for impartial third party analysis - this reflects very badly on Boeing and on the impartiality of the US to investigate one of its own key defense contractors.
Originally Posted by kilo
I have no reason to doubt the integrity of the technicians that will extract the data whichever country oversees this.

However because of the narrative following this case I think it potentially helps Boeing and possibly the FAA (from a perception point of view) if this is done outside the USA. And as mentioned it’s very likely there will be Boeing representatives present.
Naked political grandstanding; NTSB has far more experience with 737 FDR data analysis than BEA. And there's already reports of Annex 13 issues.
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