chinatraderjmr

Perhaps he saw a giant bird on the field . No more to this story then what the pilot said. Everything is not a conspiracy

JFKSFOLAX_friend

Unless you have access to United's systems, you don't know definitively just like the other side doesn't know.

Both groups of people that are saying "definitely" something is going on/ "definitely" nothing is going on have, in actuality, no idea unless they have access to United's systems.

aluminumdriver

OK here's probably the answer.

We get final weights from our load planning after all passengers are boarded and bags, usually as we taxi out. We make sure we're legal and safe for takeoff.

In the past, this worked like clockwork. However, in the past couple months after an IT changeover (sound familiar?), there have been instances of crews getting new final weights after they take off that are incorrect. So with this in mind, pilots are much more careful and wary of their final weight products. On takeoff roll, they probably saw an ACARS message pop up, something that in the past we'd just ignore till airborne. But right now, thinking it might be another new final weights coming through and they were probably close to their maximum allowable takeoff weight, they elected to abort to make sure. It may feel like they slammed on the brakes but they were below 80 knots so it may feel violent, but in reality not that big a deal up front.

Just another example of your United pilots taking the safe decision in a very difficult operating environment we're in right now.

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Moderator2

True statement, but the OP's flight was from SFO.

FlyWorld

This is consistent with a lot of other posts.

Why are weights and measures now less reliable than they were before $mi$ek threw away the UA systems that worked like clockwork? Is it actual bugs in the software? Do certain pieces of cargo fail to get counted in a random fashion, the same way that certain passengers fail to get upgraded in a random fashion? Are the systems that determine the safety of our flights subject to the same incomprehensible unreliability as those that we see on the PAX side?

aluminumdriver

I don't know the reason why the system is having problems. All I can do is just roll my eyes again, and know that I have to check weights two, three times a flight. And as this crew did, if on takeoff roll in the low speed regime and get an ACARs message and close to takeoff weights, abort and take a look at the message. It seems to be getting better based on my recent flights, so hopefully the problem is being rectified.

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Thunderroad

Whoa....I have absolute confidence in UA pilots, ad, but the part I've bolded gives me pause about the safety of UA's systems. I can't pretend to understand everything that's going on, even including your relatively clear explanation here. But I really am not comfortable with the notion of crews getting incorrect information while in the air, especially when it includes things like weight and balance of the aircraft.

I know that your post was meant to be anything but alarming, and I suspect that the incorrect information per se is not necessarily dangerous. But accidents often happen when a few things go wrong at once. This shortcoming sounds like a potentially significant part of an accident waiting to happen.

In other words, if UA's IT systems are relaying incorrect information to pilots, shouldn't the FAA, NTSA or whatever federal agency be all over UA to correct this immediately?

And not to say that it's the pilots union's responsibility to police UA, but if this problem is in fact significant is the union taking it up with the appropriate federal authorities?

FlyWorld

Honestly, that isn't good enough.

If this regime cared about our safety, then you, as a pilot, should have received a clear piece of communication that explains the cause of the problem, describes the plan to fix it, and provides a date for fixing it.

The fact that you have to rely on nothing more than "hope", five full months after Jeff threw UA into the garbage to replace it with a crappy cheapo version of CO, for something that has important safety implications tells me that it's not a priority for them. And, if pilots are being forced to manually do tasks that used to be done automatically, this indicates the removal of an automated safety control, and therefore, the introduction of a new safety risk. All we need is for one distracted pilot to forget, to perform that calculation incorrectly, or to fail to detect that condition before the critical moment, on a day when the plane is overweighted or not properly balanced and it encounters a critical situation - then what happens to that flight?

All of us have been holding our breaths and "hoping" things will get better for 5 months. In that time, we've had little evidence to support that hope.

aluminumdriver

It may not be good enough, but it's really all I can say on a public forum. The FAA, company and pilots are aware of the issue. Most of the mistakes have not been a safety issue, but more a legal dispatch issue from what I see. Example would be we have to get a new flight plan if our weight goes up by 2000lbs. We're taking off at 130,000 and good up to 145,000 lbs at that flap setting and power. We get a message after takeoff that our weight went up 2000 lbs. Well, we're well clear of our allowable takeoff weight, but I'm illegal for not getting a new flight plan prior to takeoff. So not really a safety issue but a dispatch problem. However, until we read the message, we don't really know. Many pilots have just gone to planning for max takeoff power or bumping up their speeds just in case there are errors, so we're well above the safety margin. The problem hasn't been with CG or balance issues at all.

Not only that, but our takeoff numbers don't even become relevant unless we lose an engine on takeoff and continue, otherwise with all engines we're well above our takeoff performance numbers. Everything is based on worst case scenario of losing an engine at V1 and continuing.

You won't find me defending this management group for anything they've done with this merger, but I will say that we're not flying an unsafe airline, the pilots make sure of that.

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DeaconFlyer

Where did he say anything about the pilots having to do things manually?

hoopics

Couldn't it be as simple as not hitting V1 by the expected point on the runway due to weight, and aborting before running out of runway?

Or are the mainline planes (A3xx / 737 / 757) all so much less weight sensitive that you'd never have that problem assuming two healthy engines?

CALMSP

flight systems are not integrated, so blaming Jeff and the company is not valid on this one.

aluminumdriver

That is exactly right. All our data is based on losing an engine and having to continue. So with two engines you're well above any performance issues on a normal takeoff. Now, how many FTer's here have been on a United plane that lost an engine on takeoff and continued?

We use a balanced field approach for V1, so we don't have a spot down the runway where we can see if we're hitting V1 at the right spot. United also doesn't abort above 80 knots and below V1 unless it's a safety of flight issue like loss of an engine. So any abort for an ACARS message is a low speed abort.

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Actually they are with regards to dispatch, flight plans, load planning, flight procedures, etc...

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CALMSP

Load Planning is not. You have two different systems, work groups and procedures that are being done.

mh3265a

Now that makes sense to me. Thanks for sharing!