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What kind of High Altitude Upset Training are HA pilots required to do?

What kind of High Altitude Upset Training are HA pilots required to do?

Old Jan 14, 2015, 11:56 am
  #1  
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What kind of High Altitude Upset Training are HA pilots required to do?

According to the FAA (http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/...m?newsId=16774), loss of control in flight -- often at higher altitudes and confronting more- complex automation problems -- is now the number one cause of civil aviation accidents, mostly because other factors have been greatly reduced by technology.

What kind of high altitude upset recovery training, and (near-) stall recovery training, are Hawaiian Air pilots offered today, if any? If such loss of control training is offered, how frequently do pilots go through it?

Thanks!

Last edited by Alex909; Apr 23, 2015 at 6:45 pm Reason: Added Source "2013 FAA report source"
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Old Jan 21, 2015, 2:29 pm
  #2  
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Automation

I am a very frequent HAL passenger with the need to go between Hawaii or US Mainland and China/Japan monthly. I posted here because I need to decide on my flights and carrier for this year but I hesitate to do so because I am genuinely becoming concerned about automation and training (I am also a software engineer with automation experience, so that does not help.)

It is becoming more and more clear that what pilots seem to be experiencing with complex aircraft such as A330 or B777/787 is a new situation where, due to the complex design nature of their aircraft, they instantly don't know what the aircraft itself is doing. So in an abnormal situation, as in the one which lead to several recent crashes (AF447, Asiana214 at SFO) and many more near incidents (resulting in Airbus issuing new directives recently), we have the situation where several qualified pilots were baffled with what was happening to the aircraft. It seems you have only minutes to work out what's going on, and then to deal with it, or else.

I am starting to become genuinely concerned since HAL has an aggressive strategy to switch the fleet away from 767 to more highly automated planes. It would be helpful to know that a training strategy is being put in place to deal with possible sensor and automation failures.
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Old Jan 21, 2015, 3:18 pm
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Originally Posted by Alex909
I am a very frequent HAL passenger with the need to go between Hawaii or US Mainland and China/Japan monthly. I posted here because I need to decide on my flights and carrier for this year but I hesitate to do so because I am genuinely becoming concerned about automation and training (I am also a software engineer with automation experience, so that does not help.)

It is becoming more and more clear that what pilots seem to be experiencing with complex aircraft such as A330 or B777/787 is a new situation where, due to the complex design nature of their aircraft, they instantly don't know what the aircraft itself is doing. So in an abnormal situation, as in the one which lead to several recent crashes (AF447, Asiana214 at SFO) and many more near incidents (resulting in Airbus issuing new directives recently), we have the situation where several qualified pilots were baffled with what was happening to the aircraft. It seems you have only minutes to work out what's going on, and then to deal with it, or else.

I am starting to become genuinely concerned since HAL has an aggressive strategy to switch the fleet away from 767 to more highly automated planes. It would be helpful to know that a training strategy is being put in place to deal with possible sensor and automation failures.
Many of the crashes blamed on pilot error end up being caused by poor communication protocols between pilots. HA is known to be very focused on this issue.
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Old Jan 21, 2015, 7:55 pm
  #4  
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Originally Posted by Alex909
I am a very frequent HAL passenger with the need to go between Hawaii or US Mainland and China/Japan monthly. I posted here because I need to decide on my flights and carrier for this year but I hesitate to do so because I am genuinely becoming concerned about automation and training (I am also a software engineer with automation experience, so that does not help.)

It is becoming more and more clear that what pilots seem to be experiencing with complex aircraft such as A330 or B777/787 is a new situation where, due to the complex design nature of their aircraft, they instantly don't know what the aircraft itself is doing. So in an abnormal situation, as in the one which lead to several recent crashes (AF447, Asiana214 at SFO) and many more near incidents (resulting in Airbus issuing new directives recently), we have the situation where several qualified pilots were baffled with what was happening to the aircraft. It seems you have only minutes to work out what's going on, and then to deal with it, or else.

I am starting to become genuinely concerned since HAL has an aggressive strategy to switch the fleet away from 767 to more highly automated planes. It would be helpful to know that a training strategy is being put in place to deal with possible sensor and automation failures.
I can assure you that HAL pilots are trained on every level of automation that the 330 has, as well as many emergency scenarios. This includes everything from dual engine failures to engine fires, cabin depressurization, loss of "protections," loss of braking and the list goes on. One cannot be trained on every possible scenario, but basic principles are addressed throughout training and come instilled in all pilots at the level found at an airline like HAL. Automation, it's advancements and the new realities this brings are very much a topic of discussion at HAL and I would imagine every US carrier. I certainly wouldn't book away from HAL, just because the airline operates Airbus product.
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Old Jan 22, 2015, 7:33 pm
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Originally Posted by azj
I can assure you that HAL pilots are trained on every level of automation that the 330 has, as well as many emergency scenarios. This includes everything from dual engine failures to engine fires, cabin depressurization, loss of "protections," loss of braking and the list goes on. One cannot be trained on every possible scenario, but basic principles are addressed throughout training and come instilled in all pilots at the level found at an airline like HAL. Automation, it's advancements and the new realities this brings are very much a topic of discussion at HAL and I would imagine every US carrier. I certainly wouldn't book away from HAL, just because the airline operates Airbus product.
Thanks, Azj, really appreciate the response. I am not particularly biased against Airbus. The newer Boeing products also have issues with fly-by-wire automation, even though their FBW design seems more conservative than Airbus. For example, the B777 "FLCH mode" trap encountered by the Asiana Pilot when approaching SFO - he clearly did not understand what the automation in his plane was doing until it was too late.

How much hand flying the typical HAL pilot gets in their A330? Does HAL explicitly encourage pilots to hand fly when appropriate?

I am asking this, because the automation provided by fly-by-wire systems comes at the cost of requiring the pilot to know how to fly the aircraft when the FBW reconfigures/drops away in case of sensor failures, software problems etc.

Last edited by Alex909; Jan 22, 2015 at 7:54 pm
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Old Jan 22, 2015, 8:13 pm
  #6  
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Originally Posted by Alex909
Thanks, Azj, really appreciate the response. I am not particularly biased against Airbus. The newer Boeing products also have issues with fly-by-wire automation, even though their FBW design seems more conservative than Airbus. For example, the B777 "FLCH mode" trap encountered by the Asiana Pilot when approaching SFO - he clearly did not understand what the automation in his plane was doing until it was too late.

How much hand flying the typical HAL pilot gets in their A330? Does HAL explicitly encourage pilots to hand fly when appropriate?

I am asking this, because the automation provided by fly-by-wire systems comes at the cost of requiring the pilot to know how to fly the aircraft when the FBW reconfigures/drops away in case of sensor failures, software problems etc.
I would say the average 330 pilot hand flies LESS than their 767 and 717 counterparts. HAL does indeed encourage hand flying when appropriate and I would imagine most pilots take advantage of this opportunity. After all, they are pilots.

I think those who have flown the 330 longer and therefore are more comfortable are more willing to hand fly. All takeoffs and nearly every landing are hand flown. That's true for all types of planes, however. The more you get comfortable, the more you are willing to hand fly the plane. Again, 330 pilots get trained on how to handle the plane in its "reconfigured" situations. In essence, the plane becomes like a non fly by wire plane, when degraded.
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Old Feb 16, 2015, 9:51 pm
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Alex909, have you met alex999?

More on-topic, most simulator training is for very abnormal and rare situations, so I suspect HA pilots are just fine with the unusual (as are pilots of all other U.S. airlines).
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Old Feb 17, 2015, 4:33 pm
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I think another common theme in recent accidents is the fact that Airbus aircraft use a "sidestick" as opposed to a more traditional "yoke" that are found on Boeing aircraft.

The significance lies in the fact that Airbus pilots cannot see (easily) what actions the co-pilot is taking, and vice versa. On the other hand, each yoke on the boeing moves in sync when either of the pilots takes action.

This was evident in the Air France 447 (also an Airbus A330) disaster, where the co-pilot was pulling back on the stick to try and gain altitude, but instead was causing a stall (whereby the corrective action would have been to simply level out, or move it forward). Only seconds before the crash did the captain become aware of the co-pilots actions (and that was via the co-pilot telling him he had been pulling back on the stick for roughly two minutes), but sadly, it was too late. Read the transcript, its scary.

I'm no expert, but in these recent events, a common theme is pilots incorrectly pulling back (on side stick or yoke), when the correct action is to level out or push forward to gain airspeed and avoid/correct a stall. Again, the big difference is that on the airbus, pilots don't have a "steering wheel" in front of them that moves while the other pilot is taking action. They have to be able to see around the other pilot, and obviously, be thinking about the need to look in the first place.

I'm sure a pilot or aviation expert can speak more clearly and/or correct me, but I think the issue of too much automation is a real concern; and more specifically, the Airbus "sidestick" not moving in tandem between pilots is of significance (at least in recent accidents).

All of that said, I still feel safe flying on HA.
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Old Feb 17, 2015, 5:19 pm
  #9  
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Originally Posted by laxsnaogg
I think another common theme in recent accidents is the fact that Airbus aircraft use a "sidestick" as opposed to a more traditional "yoke" that are found on Boeing aircraft.

The significance lies in the fact that Airbus pilots cannot see (easily) what actions the co-pilot is taking, and vice versa. On the other hand, each yoke on the boeing moves in sync when either of the pilots takes action.

This was evident in the Air France 447 (also an Airbus A330) disaster, where the co-pilot was pulling back on the stick to try and gain altitude, but instead was causing a stall (whereby the corrective action would have been to simply level out, or move it forward). Only seconds before the crash did the captain become aware of the co-pilots actions (and that was via the co-pilot telling him he had been pulling back on the stick for roughly two minutes), but sadly, it was too late. Read the transcript, its scary.

I'm no expert, but in these recent events, a common theme is pilots incorrectly pulling back (on side stick or yoke), when the correct action is to level out or push forward to gain airspeed and avoid/correct a stall. Again, the big difference is that on the airbus, pilots don't have a "steering wheel" in front of them that moves while the other pilot is taking action. They have to be able to see around the other pilot, and obviously, be thinking about the need to look in the first place.

I'm sure a pilot or aviation expert can speak more clearly and/or correct me, but I think the issue of too much automation is a real concern; and more specifically, the Airbus "sidestick" not moving in tandem between pilots is of significance (at least in recent accidents).

All of that said, I still feel safe flying on HA.
The issue is not a side-stick vs. yoke issue. It's a situational awareness issue and knowing how to react in said situations. The Airbus side-stick has an overriding capability for the other pilot to take control from the other one. If both pilots were making side-stick inputs, like in the case of AF447, the airplane actually yells at you "dual input!" "dual input!" That's usually the first clue that you know the other pilot is also making side-stick inputs. I suspect that due to the gravity of the situation, the AF447 pilots did not hear the "dual input!" commands. One only has to look at the accident of the Asiana 777 in SFO, which was another case of lack of situational awareness. Some of the key tenants of flying these days is knowing what the automation is doing and knowing when to take control when you don't like what the automation is doing. A yoke or side-stick isn't going to fix those issues.
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Old Feb 18, 2015, 8:11 pm
  #10  
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Thank you, relangford and laxsnaogg, for restarting the discussion. Frankly, I was wondering if anybody else cared about the loss of control issue and so i was not sure if flyer talk was even the right forum to discuss. Great!

Trained as both a software- and a mechanical engineer, I've had an early interest in aviation and human machine interfaces since growing up in Germany where my first boss was involved in the development of the A300. Interestingly, there was already controversy around cockpit design and automation back then as we had two related accidents in Europe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_296, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Inter_Flight_148) and in both these cases it looked like various aspects of automation and human/machine interface was to blame. At the Berlin air show in 1994 I met the president of the German "Cockpit" air pilot association, who mentioned that many of her colleagues had concerns about the man machine interface Airbus was developing. She mentioned issues like thrust lever positions not being intuitive (they don't move with the auto throttle control), side sticks (in older planes the control column responds to what the autopilot does, where as the airbus joy stick stays motionless), and she felt that important flight parameters were displayed by airbus as small numbers that would be hard to read in high-stress situations. The cockpit design was not giving her as much 'feel' as as it could as to how the plane is acting and responding and, in a upset situation where you have high stress and little time, she felt this could be a problem. Many years later, the Air France 447 accident brought back memories from the conversation with her when the A332 autopilot disconnected suddenly in a storm at night leaving the pilots utterly baffled how to respond and unable to fly manually. See, http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-ne...pitch-commands.

Some think that only radical training improvements might be able to improve the situation.

Originally Posted by azj
The issue is not a side-stick vs. yoke issue. It's a situational awareness issue and knowing how to react in said situations. The Airbus side-stick has an overriding capability for the other pilot to take control from the other one. If both pilots were making side-stick inputs, like in the case of AF447, the airplane actually yells at you "dual input!" "dual input!" That's usually the first clue that you know the other pilot is also making side-stick inputs. I suspect that due to the gravity of the situation, the AF447 pilots did not hear the "dual input!" commands. One only has to look at the accident of the Asiana 777 in SFO, which was another case of lack of situational awareness. Some of the key tenants of flying these days is knowing what the automation is doing and knowing when to take control when you don't like what the automation is doing. A yoke or side-stick isn't going to fix those issues.
Totally agree that situational awareness is part of the issue. But what the other pilot is doing in response to a developing situation is an important part of situational awareness. Some argue very persuasively that the side-stick design makes this very difficult. In this short video, Sully Sullenberger demonstrates the issue (see here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kERSSRJant0.) The other two pilots "not flying" in the AF447 accident did not realize that Bonin, the "pilot flying" had the stick back and was pointing the nose upwards for extended periods when flying at a high cruise altitude where this was very dangerous. They could not see Bonin's stick and "dual input" alarm did not help the others, because they did not understand the situation and so they did not try to intervene until much later into the situation.

Last edited by Alex909; Apr 21, 2015 at 11:00 am Reason: merge
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Old Apr 14, 2015, 6:47 pm
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Airbus Official Speaks Out on Pilot Training Issues

http://www.wsj.com/article_email/air...NjE4MjAxMjIzWj

In this speech, the airbus representative makes several radical claims relevant to the discussion here:

1. The exclusive use of automation has led to the degradation of pilot skills where modern pilots increasingly lack the skill to hand fly their aircraft without the "goodies". (= in the context of failure of automation and in the presence of misguided information.) They lack the ability to establish a safe flight path given only very basic information such as pitch, power, and altitude. They tend to cling to (computer generated) flight director bars, even when "hand flying" the air craft

2. While systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated, there is very little training involved in current airline "training". It is most entirely composed of "testing", and there is no upside for the trainee.

3. Some airlines live in fear of their pilots actually touching the controls with real hands, but can't find a solution to re-establish those skills

This is now the second time someone official from Airbus speaks out about the issue (Airbus training captain Jaques Drapier was the first to raise the issue of manual flying skills, at the World Aviation Training Conference in 2012). The comments by professional readers at the end of the article support these points.

It has been reported that HA installed their own local A330 simulator in 2013. (http://skift.com/2014/04/23/what-its...-into-beijing/). The gist of the press coverage at the time was cost saving and unfortunately little of substance was revealed about the actual training regime A330 pilots go through at HA, how it is different from the state of the industry as it is emerging above. I am hoping someone can comment more here. Hawaiian should have an advantage over other airlines given that many pilots will be older pilots transferring over from B767 with residual manual handling skills from earlier days, but given that the company is growing and competing with LCCs, it is surely being pulled into the same direction as the rest of the industry.

Last edited by Alex909; Apr 23, 2015 at 6:36 pm
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Old Dec 1, 2015, 12:03 pm
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another data point that high altitude stalls and computer failures are still with us

The Air Asia 8501 crash investigation report (flight QZ8501 from Surabaya to Singapore) was finally released today. (The local NTSB took one year to investigate.) The report is still being discussed, but it looks like Air Asia is in many aspects a direct replay of the Air France 447 loss a few years earlier. It started with a computer malfunction at high altitude (solder joint crack on circuit board), after which both pilots were overwhelmed with a cycle of error messages. The autopilot disconnected and pilots were unable to control the plane after unsuccessfully trying to reset computers. The report says both pilots were wrestling with the stick to fly the plane in its degraded, non-computer aided "alternate" mode. (Interestingly, "the right side stick input was mostly at maximum pitch up until the end of recording".)

The report is here: http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

Last edited by Alex909; Dec 1, 2015 at 3:20 pm Reason: Include link to report
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Old Dec 1, 2015, 8:32 pm
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From what I understand, the Pilots were the ones who induced the Alternate law and likely the out of control situation by STUPIDLY performing undocumented reset procedures while in the air. Had they not done that, they wouldn't have found themselves in that situation. Airbus a/c are flyable at the most degraded law, which is direct law. It won't be pretty, or easy, but it's very doable with a little bit of aviating. They didn't even get to that point. Without getting too technical, Alternate law is a simple degradation of some of the protections unique to Airbus. Without those, it's like flying any other FBW aircraft. Any sane pilot would NEVER EVER perform a computer reset procedure that isn't sanctioned for airborne operations. The fact that the Captain saw a mechanic perform a reset procedure on the ground, did not give HIM license to perform the same, while in the air.

All airplanes have problems. Please don't try to create unnecessary fear of Airbus products. AirAsia, like Air France were unnecessary accidents caused much in part by pilot error.
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Old Dec 1, 2015, 10:37 pm
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Originally Posted by azj
From what I understand, the Pilots were the ones who induced the Alternate law and likely the out of control situation by STUPIDLY performing undocumented reset procedures while in the air. Had they not done that, they wouldn't have found themselves in that situation. Airbus a/c are flyable at the most degraded law, which is direct law. It won't be pretty, or easy, but it's very doable with a little bit of aviating. They didn't even get to that point. Without getting too technical, Alternate law is a simple degradation of some of the protections unique to Airbus. Without those, it's like flying any other FBW aircraft. Any sane pilot would NEVER EVER perform a computer reset procedure that isn't sanctioned for airborne operations. The fact that the Captain saw a mechanic perform a reset procedure on the ground, did not give HIM license to perform the same, while in the air.

All airplanes have problems. Please don't try to create unnecessary fear of Airbus products.
I haven't read the report yet but having a LONG flight coming up on HA, I'll have to grab the PDF to read.
Personally-as a huge Airbus fan-I cannot STAND the Airbus fear/bashing that happens sometimes. As azj said-all airplanes have problems.

The single greatest thing I ever heard my beloved Fifi called was "A THINKING man's airplane" and oh how true that statement is. I've spent the better part of 7 years studying Airbus philosophy/laws/logic etc. Basically soaking up everything I can get my hands on to read/watch/learn about Airbus and I will always defend/debate for Fifi!

First off-It seems these guys forgot the old adage AVIATE NAVIGATE COMMUNICATE!

The pressure apparently got so great that the THINKING went out the window along with the CRM, the aviating and the common sense. May I point you all to the QF32 incident as a great example of working the issue AND handling the Airbus systems and philosophy the PROPER way-all the while AVIATING FIRST-Now granted there were 4-5 pilots working the problems on QF32 vs the 2 on air Asia and the 3 on AF.

On a technical note-I wonder If either ever got kicked into Mechanical Backup. IIRC to get from mechanical backup back into direct law-I believe (and anyone who knows can correct me here) you need only to get two of the computers back on line to get Direct Law back? My point is these guys were in "oh [shooot] mode" yanking breakers they shouldn't have been yanking because they were desperate to get back to their version of "normal law" so to speak.

Last edited by FlyinHawaiian; Dec 2, 2015 at 5:06 am Reason: masked profanity removed, per FT rules
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Old Dec 1, 2015, 11:55 pm
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Originally Posted by azj
From what I understand, the Pilots were the ones who induced the Alternate law and likely the out of control situation by STUPIDLY performing undocumented reset procedures while in the air. Had they not done that, they wouldn't have found themselves in that situation.
The report does not conclusively say whether undocumented procedures ("pull circuit breakers on both FACs") were performed. Some in the investigation team are denying that they did, see here for details:

http://www.gerryairways.com/index.ph...to-avalanches/

In any case, shouldn't the airplane remain flyable even after power to both computers had been cycled?

Airbus a/c are flyable at the most degraded law, which is direct law. It won't be pretty, or easy, but it's very doable with a little bit of aviating. They didn't even get to that point. Without getting too technical, Alternate law is a simple degradation of some of the protections unique to Airbus. Without those, it's like flying any other FBW aircraft. Any sane pilot would NEVER EVER perform a computer reset procedure that isn't sanctioned for airborne operations. The fact that the Captain saw a mechanic perform a reset procedure on the ground, did not give HIM license to perform the same, while in the air.

All airplanes have problems. Please don't try to create unnecessary fear of Airbus products. AirAsia, like Air France were unnecessary accidents caused much in part by pilot error.
You are misreading me. Airbus is not the target of this thread, training is. I am concerned about the rapid change of technology and how pilot training responds to it. As an engineer I am concerned about what looks like glaring weaknesses in the way modern Fly-by-Wire automation interacts with pilots, both Boeing and Airbus. (See Asiana 214 "FLCH trap" for a Boeing automation situation.) As a passenger I am concerned about hours and hours of over water in turbulent winter weather and how the man/machine system is trained to react to aprupt failures, often occuring at night and near max cruise alt. As an investor in HA stock I want to be assured that every precaution is being taken such that HA crew are specifically trained for high altitude upsets with associated startle factor, unusual G factors, and loss of situational awareness. Ideally, I want my pilots to be able to troubleshoot computer problems without causing hull loss. (And associated impact to the HA stock and my retirement portfolio.) The pilots here were bombarded with the same error message that came at them with rapidly increasing frequency... it would take a lot of system knowledge on their part to conclusively decide "these ECAM messages can safely be ignored", but "this message" requires urgent action of some kind, no?

Last edited by Alex909; Dec 2, 2015 at 12:24 am
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