Newsstand - Buffalo plane crash captain 'failed flight tests'

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6263464.ece

The captain of the US commuter plane that crashed into a house in Buffalo, New York, in February, had failed flight tests and had never been properly taught how to respond to an emergency, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

How the heck does that happen on a licensed commercial airline?

How the heck does that happen on a licensed commercial airline?

Exactly!! Either he was competent to fly an aircraft or he was not.
Seems to me it's pretty much black or white.
I don't think that there is a "middle" ground about this

Exactly!! Either he was competent to fly an aircraft or he was not.


How the heck does that happen on a licensed commercial airline?

That's what is so alarming he failed flight tests.
I don't know the qualification rules for pilots but failing test seems to be a big deal. :confused:

If he failed once and then passed the next time is he qualified or not? Many people take certification exams of one sort or another and do not pass on the first try but do eventually and are licensed at that point.

The vast majority of plane crashes result in blame being placed on both the aircraft and on the pilot. The real question will be if this one rests squarely on the pilot or not.

The newspaper said that Captain Renslow, 47, who joined the plane’s operators Colgan Air in September 2005, had a history of failing periodic tests of competency. :(

The article says the PIC had only +/- 100 hours in the Q400 and had not undergone training to respond to the kind of emergency they were having. It also says he did the exact opposite thing from the the thing that would have saved the a/c from its stall. It also says the co-pilot had skiied all day in Washington state the say before, then flown a redeye to work at EWR... as the crash occurred in the late evening, this implies she was exhausted. It also says at least two Colgan safety officials resigned in recent weeks.

It all sounds like an accident waiting to happen, and overall very disturbing.

It's not like there is a shortage of good pilots. Why does something like this happen?

That's what is so alarming he failed flight tests. I don't know the qualification rules for pilots but failing test seems to be a big deal. :confused:

Check rides are very easy to fail. The checkride for the initial Flight Instructor rating often has a fail rate as high as 80%.

The article says the PIC had only +/- 100 hours in the Q400

Everybody starts with zero hours on a new airplane. You can't get experience flying an airplane without flying the airplane. There is a regulation which requires that at least one of the pilots have at least 75 hours in the type aircraft for a revenue flight. There are also time constraints within which a pilot must accumulate his first 120 hours on a new airplane to ensure that they get their initial experience quickly. If they don't meet those requirements then they have to go for additional training.

had not undergone training to respond to the kind of emergency they were having.

That would be a training program issue. If the training was required it should have been given. Training that is not required is not typically given.

Everybody starts with zero hours on a new airplane. You can't get experience flying an airplane without flying the airplane. There is a regulation which requires that at least one of the pilots have at least 75 hours in the type aircraft for a revenue flight. There are also time constraints within which a pilot must accumulate his first 120 hours on a new airplane to ensure that they get their initial experience quickly. If they don't meet those requirements then they have to go for additional training.


Why was he the PIC (Pilot-In-Command) of an airplane he doesn't have much experience with? If he didn't have the experience needed he shouldn't have been the Pilot-In-Command of the aircraft.

Why was he the PIC (Pilot-In-Command) of an airplane he doesn't have much experience with? If he didn't have the experience needed he shouldn't have been the Pilot-In-Command of the aircraft.

Agreed, the fact that Investigators believe the pilots didn't fully understand the operation of the ice-protection system leaves me puzzled. Maybe I'm nieve but I expect the pilot in charge to know the aircraft inside and out.
When the pilot is questionable of aspects of the aircraft he/she should never be in charge.

Agreed, the fact that Investigators believe the pilots didn't fully understand the operation of the ice-protection system leaves me puzzled. Maybe I'm nieve but I expect the pilot in charge to know the aircraft inside and out.
When the pilot is questionable of aspects of the aircraft he/she should never be in charge.While there are some questions about the pilot, the WSJ article (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html) that broke this story also suggests that the training was not as thorough as it could have been (my bolding):

The slowing speed set off an emergency system called a "stick-pusher," which pushes the control column down in order to send the aircraft into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall.

However, Capt. Renslow tried to force the plane to do the opposite. He yanked back on the controls while adding thrust. His effort was strong enough to manually override the stick-pusher. Within seconds, the plane lost lift, bucked violently and started to roll. It slammed into a house five miles from the runway.

Colgan's standard training program stops short of demonstrating the operation of the stick-pusher in flight simulators. Without such hands-on experience, safety investigators argue, pilots could be surprised and not react properly when the stick-pusher activates during an emergency. The FAA is required to sign off on all airline training manuals.

So good I had to share this from a commentor the Middle Seat Blog
It is time that we as pilots institute the professional pilots ticket fee. Call it the “Sully” Fee if you like. The passengers have not balked at all on the new round of bag fees of $15.00 per bag and shouldn’t balk at getting an experienced professional carrying them around in a pumped up aluminum mail tube 7 miles above the earth. For the most part every cockpit has years of flight experience. There are many copliots that were once Captains. It will take years before that experience is gone.

You can pay the fee or you can get the guy with the FAA minimum credentials. I am sure you have always asked for the government minimum standards for any thing you purchase, consume or utilize. I always ask for the doctor who just passed med school to work on my family.

Why was he the PIC (Pilot-In-Command) of an airplane he doesn't have much experience with?

Once again, that's the case for everyone when they transition to a new airplane. How can you start out on a new airplane without anything more than zero previous experience?

This Captain did have previous experience as a Captain on a Saab 340 as well as time as a First Officer and quite a bit of flight time before he was hired by Colgan.

When the pilot is questionable of aspects of the aircraft he/she should never be in charge.

He knew what he was required to know. From what I've seen, they're saying that there should be some additional training provided beyond what is currently required.

So good I had to share this from a commentor the Middle Seat Blog

Please ignore that blogger. It's not the first time that's been suggested by someone with a flawed understanding of economics.

Please ignore that blogger. It's not the first time that's been suggested by someone with a flawed understanding of economics.Sarcasm is lost on some. :rolleyes:

I think it is relevant to make it a matter of public record the fact that a person flying a plane has failed flight tests but in a way that doesn't sensationalize the 'facts'. I can't get over the fact that I remember hearing the co-pilots voice on tower communications, just minutes before the crash. Maybe this could have been avoided, if stricter rules were enforced regarding test failures, etc?

Again hindsight is a wonderful thing to have but doesn't help us here.

I would like to ask, what do you think about Pilots flying planes and failing the same types of test multiple times? Should they be able to fly commercial aircraft, how to you ensure the maximum safety of passengers, what is fair for everyone involved in the flight experience?

I think it is relevant to make it a matter of public record the fact that a person flying a plane has failed flight tests but in a way that doesn't sensationalize the 'facts'. I can't get over the fact that I remember hearing the co-pilots voice on tower communications, just minutes before the crash. Maybe this could have been avoided, if stricter rules were enforced regarding test failures, etc?

Again hindsight is a wonderful thing to have but doesn't help us here.

I would like to ask, what do you think about Pilots flying planes and failing the same types of test multiple times? Should they be able to fly commercial aircraft, how to you ensure the maximum safety of passengers, what is fair for everyone involved in the flight experience?

I think this incident spotlights the fact that there are some issues with pilot regulation. When we hear the captain did not know how to operate a piece of equipment on his aircraft we all wonder how that can be. Testing aside, how is he certified as the captain not knowing these things?
In addition, did he not realize he was deficient in these areas or was he the victim of poor training and a poor certification system?

Once again, that's the case for everyone when they transition to a new airplane. How can you start out on a new airplane without anything more than zero previous experience?

This Captain did have previous experience as a Captain on a Saab 340 as well as time as a First Officer and quite a bit of flight time before he was hired by Colgan.



That doesn't answer my question at all. He should not have been commanding in an aircraft he has little experience with. He should be (whatever you call the co-pilot) until he has sufficient experience with that type of aircraft. The fact that you say that this is normal bothers me. It appears to be a factor in this crash.

That doesn't answer my question at all. He should not have been commanding in an aircraft he has little experience with. He should be (whatever you call the co-pilot) until he has sufficient experience with that type of aircraft. The fact that you say that this is normal bothers me. It appears to be a factor in this crash.

Talk to your representatives. The change you suggest would have to come from legislation. The current rules require that one of the pilots have at least 75 hours in type and that a Captain with less than 100 hours in type has increased weather minimums for takeoff and landing.

How would you handle an airline that is introducing a new airplane type? What about brand new airplanes such as the upcoming B787 and the recently introduced A380? How does an airline crew a growing fleet if it takes a year, or more, to qualify each Captain?

Do you expect the upgrading Captains to take the ~50% pay cut to F/O pay for the time they spend building time in type before being allowed to upgrade? If so, nobody would upgrade. If not, how do you expect the airline to afford paying two Captains for a majority of their flights in a new or growing fleet?

It's not like there is a shortage of good pilots. Why does something like this happen?Perhaps a shortage of good pilots who are willing to be underpaid?

The pilot and FO were chatting about random things in the cockpit during what is supposed to be the "sterile" period.

That sterile period exists to ensure that the cockpit crew are paying attention to their flying, and NOTHING else.

http://www.buffalonews.com/home/story/667926.html

Some interesting excerpts:
The crew of Continental Connection Flight 3407 violated federal regulations banning extraneous conversation or activities on approach to landing
While pilots often fail those tests once or twice, "it is fairly uncommon to fail three," said a source with knowledge of the safety board investigation of the crash. "That's a little high. But then, why did they hire him?"

Colgan's spokesman told The Wall Street Journal, which first reported that Renslow failed those tests, that the company believes Renslow, a former small business owner who changed careers to become a pilot, did not disclose those failed tests when he applied for a job.

It's really a shame that it took so many deaths to ensure that Renslow couldn't pilot a commercial aircraft again.

In this case, the captain was experienced only on the Saab 340, which is subject to tailplane icing. The Dash-8 is not subject to this problem. It would seem an important bit of training on Pinnacle's part to emphasize the differences in response of the Saab and Bombardier turboprops. Much of what you'd learn from operating the Saab is transferable to the Bombardier, but the training should emphasize what is different. In this case, pulling back on the stick will overcome tailplane icing on the Saab but for the Dash-8 there is no instance where such a move is called for. Pulling back led to the crash and it is predictable that it would do so at low altitudes. Proper training by would have emphasized this. The manufacturer has no idea what the pilot's previous experience would be but the operating company certainly does. Predict: Pinnacle will come out of this looking negligent in their training,

This just has me irate! In addition, Colgan's training program does not include simulator training into how pilots should react when the stall warning system activates, sources said. WHAT? You have to be kidding me? Is that not a fairly basic and monumental activity? Should Colgan just remove the stall warning systems from all their aircraft since their pilots do not have the training and may not know how to use them?

Stall training is required for both initial and recurrent training.

If I heard correctly while listening to the hearing, stall training is required by the FAA, but classroom training is the regulation. Simulator training is not.

In this case, pulling back on the stick will overcome tailplane icing on the Saab but for the Dash-8 there is no instance where such a move is called for. Pulling back led to the crash and it is predictable that it would do so at low altitudes. Proper training... would have emphasized this. I would think basic airmanship emphasizes this. Perhaps this sounds naive, but if you're stalling, it means your airspeed is dropping, so the answer is to push forward, drop the nose and get some speed... not pull back, raise the nose and reduce speed further... right?

Anyway, just to make things worse, the NY Post says the crew were flirting and discussing "relationships" below 10k, just before the crisis started:

http://www.nypost.com/seven/05122009/news/regionalnews/crash_captain_was_coming_on_to_pretty_co_168824.ht m

This whole thing is negligence from start to finish. Incomplete training, PIC with barely enough hours and no regard for procedures or discipline, sick and exhausted copilot, male-female issues...

I guess for every Captain Sully & co., there's at least one example from the other extreme.

Talk to your representatives. The change you suggest would have to come from legislation. The current rules require that one of the pilots have at least 75 hours in type and that a Captain with less than 100 hours in type has increased weather minimums for takeoff and landing.


Does it really require legislation? I thought the FAA has authority to require whatever they deem necessary.



How would you handle an airline that is introducing a new airplane type? What about brand new airplanes such as the upcoming B787 and the recently introduced A380? How does an airline crew a growing fleet if it takes a year, or more, to qualify each Captain?


That's a good point. What we're hearing about this crash suggests that this Captain was not ready to be in command of this aircraft despite qualifying according to regulations. Perhaps the regulations need to be adjusted to ensure that this can't happen. Which airline is going to put the "keys" to their new 787 in the hands of a pilot that isn't ready to fly it?


Do you expect the upgrading Captains to take the ~50% pay cut to F/O pay for the time they spend building time in type before being allowed to upgrade? If so, nobody would upgrade. If not, how do you expect the airline to afford paying two Captains for a majority of their flights in a new or growing fleet?

Again, a good point. I suppose you may be right about this, but in this crash it is becoming clear that this Captain should not have been in command of this aircraft, because he was insufficiently trained. Somewhere, somehow, the process failed to ensure that a pilot qualified to fly this aircraft in icing conditions was on the flight deck.

This just has me irate! In addition, Colgan's training program does not include simulator training into how pilots should react when the stall warning system activates, sources said. WHAT? You have to be kidding me? Is that not a fairly basic and monumental activity? Should Colgan just remove the stall warning systems from all their aircraft since their pilots do not have the training and may not know how to use them?

I think pilots collectively bang their head against a wall every time they hear this.

Take a deep breath, realize that the media is on full sensationalize mode, and continue reading. :)

Regarding the captain's training issues...

According to the training records available on the NTSB website (http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA027/417478.pdf), two failures were at Colgan, which is not unprecedented (not having any failures would be a problem for a training program). One was during recurrent first officer training training in his previous aircraft, the Saab 340, and the second during upgrade. That leaves three to his previous life outside of Colgan, probably during his primary training.

No one is perfect and I have failed two checkrides since I started as a pilot, albeit one was during initial training and the second was my Certified Flight Instructor checkride which has an exceptionally high checkride failure rate.

Failures do not necessarily indicate that a person is a bad pilot, but a string of failures may. The problem is there is no good way to deal with this since checking can be very subjective, especially at the primary level. What may pass with one examiner may not with another examiner. This may lead some "bad" pilots to make it to an airline with a clean record, while a "good" pilot might have some dings due to an overly stringent examiner.

Regarding stall training...

There are two stall protection systems on most transport category aircraft. The first is the stick shaker, which alerts the crew of an impending stall. The second is the stick pusher, which pushes the nose down just before the wings actually stall.

The FAA approved Q400 training program focuses on recognizing and preventing a stall from occurring and recovering at the FIRST indication of a stall, which is the stick shaker. A full stall to the pusher or a recovery from that point is not typically demonstrated in the sim nor is it required. The point is to never allow the aircraft to reach that point because the results can be very ugly.

Futhermore, I haven't done a full stall since I was training persons for their private pilot license in a single engine aircraft. Higher licenses and training in heavier aircraft do not require full stalls due to the risky nature of practicing that maneuver. This practice was transferred into sim training. The question is, was that the right thing to do?

While it could be argued that a full stall should be at least demonstrated a few times in a sim, the focus should not change. Pilots should still be trained to AVOID stalls, with a few demonstrated full stalls thrown in for good measure.

It is interesting to note that a simulator can be damaged by putting it into a full stall, so this would be done with the motion turned off.

Checko

If I heard correctly while listening to the hearing, stall training is required by the FAA, but classroom training is the regulation. Simulator training is not.

There is no classroom training on stalls. Stall recovery must be demonstrated on all checkrides, initial and recurrent.

I would think basic airmanship emphasizes this. Perhaps this sounds naive, but if you're stalling, it means your airspeed is dropping, so the answer is to push forward, drop the nose and get some speed... not pull back, raise the nose and reduce speed further... right?

Unless it's a tailplane stall which is just the opposite--you pull hard. The problem occurred right after flaps were extended which is the typical trigger of a tailplane stall. The F/O retracted the flaps which indicates that she believed it to be a tailplane stall as that's part of the recovery. The hard pull up would be consistent with an attempted tailplane stall recovery. There is no requirement to ever practice the tailplane stall recovery in the simulator which is consistent with the improper application of full power which is the procedure for a conventional stall recovery, not a tailplane stall recovery.

After the accident we found out that the Q400 is not susceptible to tailplane stalls. Was that information given to the crews before the accident? If not, the crew had neither the information nor training that they needed. This issue will likely be addressed in the final report.

Anyway, just to make things worse, the NY Post says the crew were flirting and discussing "relationships" below 10k, just before the crisis started:

There was nothing like that in the transcript that I read. In that, they were discussing winter ops and their experience with them.

PIC with barely enough hours and no regard for procedures or discipline

The Captain had significantly more flight experience than is required to Captain an airliner under part 121. As far as sterile cockpit, what they were doing was not at all unusual. It's technically outside of sterile cockpit requirements but before they started the approach they were sterile. That's akin to driving 60 in a 55mph zone. Everyone has done it. It becomes dangerous when the non-essential conversation occurs when they should be accomplishing other tasks. That's akin to 90 in a 55 zone.

Does it really require legislation? I thought the FAA has authority to require whatever they deem necessary.

The FAA has the authority but the FAA understands that such a policy is neither needed nor practical. The only way to force the FAA to do something that it does not believe should be done is through legislation.

What we're hearing about this crash suggests that this Captain was not ready to be in command of this aircraft

That's not what I've been hearing. He had all of the necessary qualifications, experience and required training. You don't have to be unqualified to make mistakes.

Which airline is going to put the "keys" to their new 787 in the hands of a pilot that isn't ready to fly it?

By your definition, ANY pilot that they put in the 787 will be unqualified because they won't have any significant 787 time when they take their first revenue flight.

The information I've found on the accident crew's experience is:

The Captain had 3,379 hours, 261 of them on the Q400, 109 of those as a captain). He previously flew as Captain and F/O on the Saab 340 for Colgan. Prior to Colgan, he flew for Gulfstream International Airlines as a B-1900 Captain and F/O. The minimum time to be an airline Captain is 1500 hours. He had more than double that.

The First Officer had 2,200 hours, 772 of them on the Q400.

New York Times, May 13
"Captain Renslow had flown to Newark from his home in Florida the previous evening and had apparently slept in the crew lounge of Newark Liberty International Airport, a room not much different from a frequent-flier club lounge. Pilots are warned not to try to sleep there, under threat of dismissal."

The Captain had significantly more flight experience than is required to Captain an airliner under part 121.

If they had all of these hours and qualifications then why did they themselves state that they didn't know what to do in icing conditions? Do you not think it is possible to qualify according to regulations but still not know what one is doing?

I realize the media gets things wrong a lot, and that all I know is what is reported by them, so if I'm wrong then fine, but it just seems like these pilots were not "qualified" to be flying an aircraft that they didn't know how to handle in icing conditions.

I'm sorry, LarryJ, but this whole scenario is so patently culpable and indefensible, even Colgan has stopped trying. They had an exec on TV this morning conceding this is "very painful" for them. Like most airline mishaps this is a whole bunch of small mistakes and errors of judgment building into one big tragedy. This was eminently preventable. I feel for the families of the crew, who will go into the record books with harsh -- and proper -- judgments against them.

All this talk of bare minimum requirements has me wondering if Pinnacle, or the crew, had ever seen Office Space:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bXHPqj3NcI

If they had all of these hours and qualifications then why did they themselves state that they didn't know what to do in icing conditions?

How do you think that pilots get experience flying in icing conditions? The airplanes that they fly prior to being hired by an airline can't fly in icing so a pilot at his first airline job will typically have never flown through ice.

This Captain's first job was flying in Florida and the Caribbean so he didn't likely encounter any significant icing in the B-1900 but it was his fourth winter flying for Colgan in the Northeast which would have provided him with a significant amount of experience in icing conditions. The First Officer was hired in January 2008 so she likely missed most of the winter weather from that winter in training making this her first full winter season. Again I'd ask, where was she supposed to get winter flying experience if not from the flying that she was doing?

Do you not think it is possible to qualify according to regulations but still not know what one is doing?

Yes, but that would be a problem with the regulations. These pilots were well above the minimum requirements in age and flight experience. It is not at all unusual to have crews flying with similar, or lower, experience levels. These crews do so regularly and with a very high degree of safety.

The news media has latched on to this "experience" angle and have blown it well out of proportion because they don't understand the issues. This crew made mistakes but very experienced crews make mistakes as well. You can't say that this crew was unqualified just because they made mistakes. They were qualified well beyond the minimum requirements which have proven to be quite safe over the years.

If 3379 hours is not enough for an airline Captain then what is? If a crew with 1033 hours in the Q400 is not enough then what is? If a Captain who has Captained three types of turboprop airlines for two airlines is not enough then what is? If a Captain with 269 hours, and a First Officer with 772 hours, in type is not enough then what is? If four years of winter flying experience isn't enough then what is?

Experience isn't the issue here. The issue is why isn't simulator training in full stalls required? Why isn't simulator training in the tailplane stall recovery identification and recovery procedure required? Why wasn't the airline required to give ground instruction in the specific tailplane stall characteristics of the Q400? What good would have been thousands of hours of experience if the crew had never been trained that the Q400's tailplane stall characteristics are significantly different from most other turboprops?

snipThis is just pure speculation, but it's possible that the FAA sterile cockpit violations--clearly seen if you've read the CVR transcript--contributed to the improper reaction. In fact, the proper course of action for the stick pusher was covered in classrom training, just not in the simulator.

Let's back up for a second though, and look at what caused the stall in the first place. Was that a training issue, or simply pilot error?

I’m still baffled about neither pilot having experience with icing conditions understanding the co-pilot may not due to age, so let me ask this.
When it comes to experience, by the time a pilot has become captain has he not seen it all (or most conditions within reason) as a co-pilot working with an experienced senior captain over a period of years?
If Captain Renslow was truly qualified to be captain, then is it not the assumption that he has years of flight experience and is prepared for all sorts of inclement weather? How is he as captain truly qualified without this? An even bigger question is two pilots flying into Buffalo in February both knowing they have no experience with icing issues? :confused:

How do you think that pilots get experience flying in icing conditions? The airplanes that they fly prior to being hired by an airline can't fly in icing so a pilot at his first airline job will typically have never flown through ice.

This Captain's first job was flying in Florida and the Caribbean so he didn't likely encounter any significant icing in the B-1900 but it was his fourth winter flying for Colgan in the Northeast which would have provided him with a significant amount of experience in icing conditions. The First Officer was hired in January 2008 so she likely missed most of the winter weather from that winter in training making this her first full winter season. Again I'd ask, where was she supposed to get winter flying experience if not from the flying that she was doing?



Yes, but that would be a problem with the regulations. These pilots were well above the minimum requirements in age and flight experience. It is not at all unusual to have crews flying with similar, or lower, experience levels. These crews do so regularly and with a very high degree of safety.

The news media has latched on to this "experience" angle and have blown it well out of proportion because they don't understand the issues. This crew made mistakes but very experienced crews make mistakes as well. You can't say that this crew was unqualified just because they made mistakes. They were qualified well beyond the minimum requirements which have proven to be quite safe over the years.

If 3379 hours is not enough for an airline Captain then what is? If a crew with 1033 hours in the Q400 is not enough then what is? If a Captain who has Captained three types of turboprop airlines for two airlines is not enough then what is? If a Captain with 269 hours, and a First Officer with 772 hours, in type is not enough then what is? If four years of winter flying experience isn't enough then what is?

Experience isn't the issue here. The issue is why isn't simulator training in full stalls required? Why isn't simulator training in the tailplane stall recovery identification and recovery procedure required? Why wasn't the airline required to give ground instruction in the specific tailplane stall characteristics of the Q400? What good would have been thousands of hours of experience if the crew had never been trained that the Q400's tailplane stall characteristics are significantly different from most other turboprops?

The simulator is how you get experience, and these pilots didn't have it. I totally agree ith the last paragraph, which is kind of what I've been trying to say all along.

In today's NYT:

Low Pay and Long Commutes for Pilots Who Crashed

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/nyregion/14pilot.html?em

This is just pure speculation, but it's possible that the FAA sterile cockpit violations--clearly seen if you've read the CVR transcript--contributed to the improper reaction.

I don't think so. The conversation didn't interfere with their operation of the aircraft and it had stopped before the problems started.

Let's back up for a second though, and look at what caused the stall in the first place. Was that a training issue, or simply pilot error?

When the Captain called for the gear and flaps he was still at flight idle. As the drag increased, and props where increased for landing, the airplane began slowing very rapidly. They had a switch set which raised the point at which the stall warning sounds, among other things, due to icing conditions. This caused the stick shaker to activate at a higher airspeed than it would normally. I didn't get an exact time but from the point that the airspeed started dropping rapidly until the beginning of the upset was only a few seconds.

I’m still baffled about neither pilot having experience with icing conditions

Both pilots did have experience with icing conditions. The First Officer was commenting on her thoughts from when she was a new-hire over a year earlier. It was then that she said she didn't have any experience with icing conditions. Even if she missed all of the icing season in the late-winter/early-spring of 2008, due to being in training, she had been flying in icing conditions all of this winter.

This was the Captain's fourth winter flying for Colgan. He'd had quite a bit of experience flying in icing conditions.

When it comes to experience, by the time a pilot has become captain has he not seen it all (or most conditions within reason) as a co-pilot working with an experienced senior captain over a period of years?

That just depends on how quickly he upgraded. It sounds as though this Captain spent a good portion of his career as a Captain so he'd probably seen more as a Captain than he had as an F/O. The majority of this Captain's 3300+ hours were in airline operations on turboprop aircraft. He had relatively few hours in general aviation aircraft.

How is he as captain truly qualified without this? An even bigger question is two pilots flying into Buffalo in February both knowing they have no experience with icing issues? :confused:

The media reports have you confused. He had four winter's worth of experience. How much is enough?

LarryJ-
You seem to avoid putting any blame here on the flight crew themselves, and all of it on the FAA regs or the airline.

I can understand pilots circling the wagons a bit as the facts surrounding incidents like this come out, and calling one of your own out when they've made a mistake(s) just means you might be next--and I'm sure you'd like your brethren to avoid bashing you.

The minimum requirements to drive a vehicle are pretty low--some states have higher standards than others. But does that really mean that I'm not culpable if I am driving in conditions that are beyond my capabilities, or if the differences in the vehicle I happen to be driving are outside of my knowledgebase?

As for this comment:
I don't think so. The conversation didn't interfere with their operation of the aircraft and it had stopped before the problems started.The FAA regulations don't exist to simply discourage chatting as long as it doesn't interfere with the operation of the aircraft. The regulations exist to ensure the safety of every soul who paid that airline, and therefore the salary of the crew. They paid with the expectation that they would be in the hands of a crew that would follow the rules, regardless of which they didn't want to follow.

If the crew was willing to ignore that regulation, what others might they have chosen to assume were more or less guidelines than rules? Hell, maybe Renslow was a chatty Kathy during his training and missed enough to cause a triple failure. From what I understand, three is a bit of a red-flag.

When the Captain called for the gear and flaps he was still at flight idle. As the drag increased, and props where increased for landing, the airplane began slowing very rapidly. They had a switch set which raised the point at which the stall warning sounds, among other things, due to icing conditions. This caused the stick shaker to activate at a higher airspeed than it would normally. I didn't get an exact time but from the point that the airspeed started dropping rapidly until the beginning of the upset was only a few seconds.You make this scenario sound almost commonplace. Is it? Thousands of other aircraft brave similar conditions in similar aircraft every year, and don't nosedive to increase speed after stalling on approach.

So far, the icy conditions have not been noted as a potential factor in the incident. So, prior to the stick skaker/stick pusher, what did this crew do differently than other crews? Did they do something wrong?

You seem to avoid putting any blame here on the flight crew themselves, and all of it on the FAA regs or the airline.

I think I've been pretty clear that the accident was caused by mistakes made by the crew. That is not in dispute. If we stop at that, though, what have we accomplished? Nothing. Why did this properly qualified crew make mistakes which led to and accident? That's what we have to answer if we want to learn the lessons that this accident can teach.

If the crew was willing to ignore that regulation, what others might they have chosen to assume were more or less guidelines than rules?

I have never met an airline pilot who hasn't violated the sterile cockpit rule just as I've never met a driver who's never violated a speed limit. When a driver has an accident, however, we don't automatically say that since he was a couple mph over the limit his speeding was the cause of the accident. We look at the accident and determine in the speeding was a casual factor. As a pilot of 28 years, 19 of which as an airline pilot, I have read the entire 63-page CVR transcript and find no evidence that their violations of sterile cockpit played any role in the mistakes that they make which caused this accident.

You make this scenario sound almost commonplace. Is it?

Unexpectedly getting slower than you intended? Yeah, that's commonplace. In this case it was of a bigger magnitude than what you'd have on a typical flight. The airplane was slowing very quickly at that point.

So, prior to the stick skaker/stick pusher, what did this crew do differently than other crews? Did they do something wrong?

See my post in the Continental forum (http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/11748083-post126.html) for a discussion on that topic.

I think I've been pretty clear that the accident was caused by mistakes made by the crew. That is not in dispute. If we stop at that, though, what have we accomplished? Nothing. Why did this properly qualified crew make mistakes which led to and accident? That's what we have to answer if we want to learn the lessons that this accident can teach.True. Too easy to get caught up in the blame game, when it's the "why" and the lesson to be learned we need to focus on.
I have never met an airline pilot who hasn't violated the sterile cockpit rule just as I've never met a driver who's never violated a speed limit. When a driver has an accident, however, we don't automatically say that since he was a couple mph over the limit his speeding was the cause of the accident. We look at the accident and determine in the speeding was a casual factor. As a pilot of 28 years, 19 of which as an airline pilot, I have read the entire 63-page CVR transcript and find no evidence that their violations of sterile cockpit played any role in the mistakes that they make which caused this accident.

Unexpectedly getting slower than you intended? Yeah, that's commonplace. In this case it was of a bigger magnitude than what you'd have on a typical flight. The airplane was slowing very quickly at that point.

See my post in the Continental forum (http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/11748083-post126.html) for a discussion on that topic.Appreciate the post and the clarification. ^

All the experience in the world can't substitute for careful and quick thinking, analytical skill and good judgement. The Sullenberger story shows how these came together. Sullenberger had never ditched a plane but understood exactly, in his mind, the situation and its consequences. He paid careful attention to the problems and responded logically, not from any specific experience but from knowledge and mental rehearsals and used that with skill to overcome what seemed to be an impossible situation. In contrast, all the evidence shows that the Colgan pilots had no vision of their problem, let alone any thoughts on how to solve it. They depended on reflexive action. Had they escaped the crash, the experience would have been a great teacher. But that's no way to learn. The industry needs to find people who have the personal qualities, not just the numeric qualifications, to do this highly technical and complex job with the necessary competence. Recognizing this talent is not a matter of numbers but careful interviewing and proper testing. That is one of the things check pilots do. Mutiple failures in check rides are about as strong a warning as you can get that the person lacks the sensible judgement needed. The fact that these instances are so rare shows that the system is working but when they do occur they show the problems.

The entire accident, and the facts leading up to it, are just tragic. The passengers perished due to negligence. Period. It was not the snow, the plane, the route or air control. It was the negligence of the pilots and their employer, and Colgan seems to have admitted as much.

Let us hope that the FAA is forced to address the issues discussed in the posts above. The lives carried in regional carriers are no less valuable then those carried in first tier airlines. Unfortunately, so many passengers have few options and cannot vote with their pocketbooks.

Regulation is not always a bad thing . . .

The passengers perished due to negligence. Period. ... Let us hope that the FAA is forced to address the issues discussed in the posts above.

Since you've nailed this down so conclusively ("Period"), please tell us what you propose the FAA do? What should this new regulation require?

Since you've nailed this down so conclusively ("Period"), please tell us what you propose the FAA do? What should this new regulation require?


I am not knowledgeable enough to identify the specific steps the FAA should embark upon. Others are, see the post below from Joe Sharkey, as probably many on this board are also. Yet, I am knowledgeable enough, as will be a jury, if fault for this terrible event ever gets tried in a court, to know where blame should be placed. Negligence by the employer, the pilots and insufficient oversight by the FAA.

http://joesharkeyat.blogspot.com/


"The basic ugly truth -- long known by regional airline pilots and by those of us who follow these things -- is that many regional airline pilots work in a culture of chronic fatigue, in a sub-tier of the air-travel industry where captains might make $50,000 a year and first officers might make less than $20,000, and that the official FAA-sanctioned duty-time regulations that supposedly ensure that pilots have enough time to sleep (7 hours, which of course includes the time to get from airport to hotel and back) are a national scandal."

All the experience in the world can't substitute for careful and quick thinking, analytical skill and good judgement. The Sullenberger story shows how these came together. Sullenberger had never ditched a plane but understood exactly, in his mind, the situation and its consequences. He paid careful attention to the problems and responded logically, not from any specific experience but from knowledge and mental rehearsals and used that with skill to overcome what seemed to be an impossible situation. In contrast, all the evidence shows that the Colgan pilots had no vision of their problem, let alone any thoughts on how to solve it. They depended on reflexive action. Had they escaped the crash, the experience would have been a great teacher. But that's no way to learn. The industry needs to find people who have the personal qualities, not just the numeric qualifications, to do this highly technical and complex job with the necessary competence. Recognizing this talent is not a matter of numbers but careful interviewing and proper testing. That is one of the things check pilots do. Mutiple failures in check rides are about as strong a warning as you can get that the person lacks the sensible judgement needed. The fact that these instances are so rare shows that the system is working but when they do occur they show the problems.

your first sentence sums it up perfectly. sometimes people just "choke". it happens in every profession. sometimes the best doctor in the world makes a mistake. the best trained soldier, or policeman, or even athlete drop the ball when they have all the skills in the world to do the job correctly. there is always a human factor. you can beat this to death but the bottom line is it appears the guy pulled instead of pushed even though he knew better. im not bashing the guy and it is a terrible thing that people have died but the blame game gets pretty sickening after a while. if increased emergency training is a result of this then that is never a bad thing but im sure alot of you pilots probably agree, if not publicly, that the poor guy just fvcked up. sometimes the simplest answer is the correct one even if a finger pointing public does not agree...

"The basic ugly truth -- long known by regional airline pilots and by those of us who follow these things -- is that many regional airline pilots work in a culture of chronic fatigue, in a sub-tier of the air-travel industry where captains might make $50,000 a year and first officers might make less than $20,000, and that the official FAA-sanctioned duty-time regulations that supposedly ensure that pilots have enough time to sleep (7 hours, which of course includes the time to get from airport to hotel and back) are a national scandal."So there would be a good start - change the regs for regional carriers to require say, 9-10 hours for "sleep" (including travel time to/from airport/hotel).

The problem of course is that the FAA is a political outfit, not a safety outfit like the NTSB. The regional carriers will howl to the moon and pressure the FAA not to do this - and their reasoning will have everything to do with cost and nothing to do with safety.

The problem of course is that the FAA is a political outfit, not a safety outfit like the NTSB. The regional carriers will howl to the moon and pressure the FAA not to do this - and their reasoning will have everything to do with cost and nothing to do with safety.Yep. And why? Because "we" (the paying public) don't want to pay more. "We" want cheap and safe.

it appears the guy pulled instead of pushed even though he knew better.

Except that his training taught him to pull.

If you push during a stall recovery on a checkride you will fail. The FAA standards say that you must recover with "minimal loss of altitude" which, in transport category airplanes, means that you have to hold the nose up during the stall recovery. He did as he was trained, he just did it a bit too aggressively, and he is far from the first.

The training standard should be changed.

So there would be a good start - change the regs for regional carriers to require say, 9-10 hours for "sleep" (including travel time to/from airport/hotel).

A minimum ten hour rest requirement would be a very good step. We also need to cut off the maximum duty days at no more than 14 hours--it's currently 16.

In Spring on 1996 the NTSB and NASA released the results of a scientific study on fatigue and rest and duty time limits in commercial aviation. They collected data by wiring working airline crews with monitors which measured their brain activity while they flew actual revenue flights. From this data they were able to determine the effects of fatigue on pilot performance. They made quite a few recommendations including, IIRC, a 10 hour minimum rest period and a maximum 10 hour duty day. In the 13 years since that study has been released there have been exactly zero changes in the regulations regulation flight time, duty and rest.

I just want to point out the irony in this line. I actually laughed out loud.If you push during a stall recovery on a checkride you will fail.

I just want to point out the irony in this line. I actually laughed out loud.

Why? Was it funny?